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As delegates gathered in Philadelphia in May 1775 for the start of the Second Continental 
Congress, many of the men present understood that independence was one possible solution to 
the growing problems with Parliament and King George III.  Congressmen in the summer of 
1775 created new revolutionary institutions to address the political crisis, and during those 
turbulent times they turned to the eighteenth-century culture of honor to provide guidelines for 
their conduct and decision-making.  The legislative structure of the Continental Congress and the 
hierarchy of the Continental Army were shaped by the honor code.  The eighteenth-century 
culture of honor constituted a system of defining cultural assumptions and behavior that helped 
to create social identity, structure social interactions, and govern behavior in the political and 
military spheres.  Although in the 1770s there was no consensus on the exact definition of honor 
and its role in American society, the idea of honor did provide the “social glue” that held the 
colonists together as they contemplated and fought for independence.  I argue that personal 
constructions of honorable behavior caused many of the problems between Congress and the 
army because gentlemen in those two institutions operated under different interpretations of the 
honor code. 
 When difficulties arose between Congress and the army over promotions, pensions, or 
congressional privilege, revolutionaries in both institutions turned to the guidelines of the honor 
code to resolve the disputes.  The honor culture provided three options to address the tensions 
between the Continental Congress and the Continental army: meditation, resignation, or affairs 
of honor.  Mediation was the most commonly used option and reveals the large friendship 
networks that developed between Congress and the army.  A concern for honor helps to explain 
why disputes involving people’s intentions and reputations occupy a significant proportion of the 
 viii 
official records of the Continental Congress.  Moreover, honor and its application by soldiers and 





“I don’t see how any Man of Feeling or Sentiment can continue in a public Department where 
every measure is looked upon with a jaundiced Eye and of course all Mistakes are magnified into 





 Standing on the muddy streets of York, Pennsylvania, in April 1778, Colonel Daniel 
Morgan accused Richard Peters, secretary of the congressional Board of War, of plotting against 
George Washington, the Continental Army’s commander-in-chief.  Gossip exchanged in 
personal letters between civilian and military officials during the winter months of 1777/78 
speculated about the existence of a possible cabal to replace Washington.
2
  Knowing that 
Washington would never challenge a public official over words circulated in private letters, 
Morgan confronted Peters, hoping to force him to confess to his participation in the cabal and 
acknowledge his dishonorable behavior.  Peters’s apology for duplicitous behavior would 
preserve Washington’s and the Continental Army’s honor.  Peters’s and Morgan’s altercation 
exemplifies the problems and heated disagreements that developed among revolutionaries during 
the war for American independence.
3
  This thesis analyzes the means by which revolutionaries 
dealt with the tensions that plagued the Continental Congress and the Continental Army.  
Although Americans felt the pressure of trying to defeat the British army to ensure a successful 
                                                 
1
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American Independence, 216-222.    
3
 I use the term “revolutionaries” to indicate gentlemen who served in either the Continental Army or the 
Continental Congress.  
 2 
rebellion, there was an underlying cause of the explosive problems between the two 
revolutionary institutions.  That deeper cause was the eighteenth-century culture of honor, a 
system that dictated gentlemanly behavior and the options available to resolve disputes.  The 
culture of honor shaped the decisions made by eighteenth-century gentlemen, creating many of 
the conflicts and compromises of the American Revolution. 
If participation in politics at the most basic level required a good character and 
reputation, then the culture of honor provided a set of rules to govern how a reputation was 
maintained.  Since gentility was a prerequisite for political status in the colonies, personal honor 
served as a carefully guarded component of character.  Because of honor’s critical importance, 
politicians and military officers guarded against any possible stain on their characters.  In the 
eighteenth century, revolutionaries believed “honor was an all-or-nothing proposition.”
4
 
A leader, therefore, could not hope to lose his honor and maintain his public reputation.  
That was why Colonel Morgan confronted Richard Peters in the muddy streets.  In this face-to-
face encounter Morgan let Peters know that men were prepared to defend Washington’s honor 
with their lives.  Morgan also hoped to prove his loyalty to Washington.  Any hint of a campaign 
to replace the commander-in-chief challenged Washington’s honor and, consequently, the 
integrity of the officers who pledged their loyalty to their commanding officer.   
 Historians who discuss the conflicts between civil and military authorities during the war 
use three different analytical frameworks to explain how and why tensions developed and 
eventually dissipated: (1) ideological differences; (2) civilian meddling; and (3) an egotistical 
officer corps.  In asserting the centrality of the culture of honor, this thesis proposes a new 
analytical framework to supplement the existing Revolutionary War historiography.  Reference 
                                                 
4
 Andrew S. Trees, The Founding Fathers & The Politics of Character (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 52.   
 3 
to the eighteenth-century culture of honor helps to explain some aspects of the continual conflicts 
that developed between the Continental Congress and the Continental Army.  By focusing on 
analyzing and explaining the revolutionaries’ cultural worldview, I can explore how ideology 
shaped their behavior and why politics were so personal during the war years.  An emphasis on 
the honor culture provides a more complete explanation of the problems that plagued the 
revolutionary war effort. 
H. James Henderson, in Party Politics in the Continental Congress, and Jonathan G. 
Rossie, in The Politics of Command in the American Revolution, argue that ideological 
differences in both Congress and the army caused friction throughout the war.
5
  Their analysis 
examines the contentious debate over establishing a standing army or using state militias to fight 
the British.  This debate continued beyond 1775, as some delegates persisted in voting down any 
act that would serve to strengthen the Continental Army.  Army officers are depicted in these 
texts as angry hotheads, resentful of congressional caution.  Delegates also worried about the 
balance between state power and national power in deciding how to prosecute and pay for the 
war.
6
  Historians portray the confrontations between officers and congressional delegates as the 
result of a struggle between ideological groups for control over the future direction of the 
American Revolution.   
Though ideological differences were important reasons for tensions among 
revolutionaries, an analysis that relies mainly on such differences fails to explain how social 
connections shaped the delegates’ reactions to the ideological conflicts.
7
  The eighteenth-century 
                                                 
5
 Hebert James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1974) and Jonathan Gregory Rossie, The Politics of Command in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1975). 
6
 Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress, 218-245. 
7
 This critique is shaped by Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen 
 4 
culture of honor provided specific guidelines for political conflict and this aspect of analysis is 
missing from Henderson’s and Rossie’s accounts.  Ideology and behavior were both shaped by 
the culture of the time.   
 The second analytical framework that most military historians prefer proposes that the 
Continental Congress almost crippled the Continental Army’s ability to defeat the British 
because of the ineptness of congressional representatives.  The case for civilian meddling is 
argued most persuasively in Richard H. Kohn’s essay, “American Generals of the Revolution: 
Subordination and Restraint” and A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 
1763-1789 by James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender.
8
  Some military historians 
celebrate the steadfast group of army veterans who valiantly ignored congressional interference 
and fought the British to the bargaining table.  They present a heroic story of officers 
overcoming congressional stumbling blocks to win the war and save the revolution.  Most 
historians who subscribe to this view describe the Revolution in terms of the development of a 
nationalist movement in both Congress and the army, one that urged the creation of a strong 
national government.  They give little attention to delegates who wished to check the power of 
Congress.  This argument loses sight of the pressures facing the Continental Congress during the 
war and fails to explain why Washington was willing to subordinate himself and his army to 
congressional authority.  Moreover, while the army’s resentment of Congress is readily apparent 
                                                                                                                                                             
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2010) and Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of 
Reason (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987).   
8
 Richard H. Kohn, “American Generals of the Revolution: Subordination and Restraint,” in Reconsiderations on the 
Revolutionary War: Selected Essays, ed. Don Higginbotham (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978) and James Kirby 
Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789 (Arlington 
Heights, Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1982). Martin and Lender conclude A Respectable Army with this summation of the 
behavior of the Continental army: “paradoxically this same hardcore group of regulars [the Continental Army], so 
damned by so many patriots (and feared by ideologues as the antithesis of the republican ideal of the militia) set the 
highest example of selfless behavior in Revolutionary America.”  A Respectable Army, 194. 
 5 
in the officers’ personal letters, the relationship between the civil and military authorities was 
more complicated than that.   
Research in political history also contradicts the military historians’ indictment of 
congressional ineptitude and deliberate neglect of the army.  Jack N. Rakove and Calvin C. 
Jillson and Rick K. Wilson rehabilitate the reputation of Congress, describing it as an extralegal 
assembly that managed to win a war and keep the children of the revolution from devouring one 
another.
9
  While Congress and the army were not perfect institutions, the disputes that developed 
between them were a consequence of more than the delegates’ ineptitude or their internecine 
ideological battles. 
 The third analytical framework presents the officer corps as an egotistical group, focused 
more on its personal grievances rather than on the larger issue of winning independence.  
Although this argument does not dominate the literature, it runs as a subtext through many 
discussions of the officer corps’ behavior.  Some historians portray the officers’ behavior as 
petty and irrational, without examining how their worldview and social rank shaped their 
actions.
10
  Though the litany of officers’ complaints and resentments can be overwhelming to 
even the most tolerant researcher, they reveal the mentality of eighteenth-century American 
revolutionaries.   
                                                 
9
 Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretative History of the Continental Congress (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979) and Calvin C. Jillson and Rick K.  Wilson, Congressional Dynamics: Coordination, 
Structure & Choice in the First American Congress, 1774-1789 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
10
 Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army & American Character, 1775-1783 
(Chapel Hill: Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture at University of North Carolina, 1979) 
and John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) See especially Royster’s chapter “Valley Forge” and pp. 200-213 where he discusses the 
officers’ pretensions to gentility and how their growing professionalization worried ideologues in Congress.   
 6 
 Colonial Americans’ actions are more easily analyzed when viewed through the 
framework of the eighteenth-century culture of honor.
11
  The culture of honor constituted a 
system of defining assumptions that helped to create social identity, structure social interactions, 
and govern behavior in eighteenth-century institutions.
12
  Although there was no consensus in 
the 1770s on the exact definition of honor and its role in American society, the idea of honor did 
provide the “social glue” that held the colonists together as they contemplated independence.
13
  
Honor was significant for many societies because, in a world with no police force and limited 
access to law courts, “the willingness on the part of individuals to internalize standards of honor, 
and on the part of the communities to enforce them, was often the best guarantee of keeping the 
peace.”
14
  I argue here that personal constructions of honorable behavior caused many of the 
problems between Congress and the army because gentlemen in those two institutions operated 
under different interpretations of the honor code.  A concern for honor helps to explain why 
disputes involving people’s intentions and reputations occupy a significant proportion of the 
congressional record.   
 Several recent trends in historical analysis have shaped my use of the culture of honor 
framework to analyze historical actors’ behavior during the American Revolution.  The field of 
emotional history offers constructive and critical ways to think about honor and resentment, 
terms used frequently and forcefully in Americans’ letters during the late colonial period and 
Revolution.  Historians Peter Stearns and Jan Lewis have suggested that “emotional standards 
(sometimes called emotional culture) play a distinct role in any society or group.”  Emotional 
                                                 
11
 See Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, Freedman, Affairs of Honor, Trees, The Politics of 
Character, or Michal J. Rozbicki, The Complete Colonial Gentleman: Cultural Legitimacy in Plantation America 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998).   
12
 Brendan Kane, The Politics and Culture of Honour in Britain and Ireland, 1541-1641 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 8.  
13
 Ibid., 10. 
14
 Ibid., 10.  
 7 
standards influence a society’s public representations “including law as well as literature…and 
they also affect personal judgments.”
15
  In the eighteenth century, anger and resentment were 
proper emotions for a gentleman to display publicly when he felt insulted by a social equal.  
Colonial society encouraged gentlemen to react with heightened sensitivity to any insult.  In 
responding gentlemen had three socially acceptable methods of resolving the dispute: mediation, 




Without the context of the eighteenth-century honor culture, gentlemen’s reactions can 
appear to be petty and irrational.  The study of emotional history has demonstrated that people 
were influenced by the social and emotional options available to them to express their feelings.
17
  
These options also limited a person’s reactions to certain situations.  Culture, to an extent, shapes 
the behavior of those who are part of it.  This thesis analyzes the new elite American political 
and military culture developing during the Revolution.
18
  Emotional history provides a useful 
analytical vocabulary to examine the language and behavior of contentious politicians and 
military officers.  
 The body of research on the political culture of the tumultuous 1790s is the most 
influential area of current historiography that support my thesis.  Several recent books, including 
                                                 
15
 Peter N. Stearns and Jan Lewis, “Introduction,” in An Emotional History of the United States, Eds. Peter N. 
Stearns and Jan Lewis (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 5.   
16
 John Ferling, The Ascent of George Washington: The Hidden Political Genius of an American Icon (New York: 
Bloomsbury Press, 2009).  Ferling discusses how Washington copied maxims from etiquette books as a young man.  
A good essay on the importance of etiquette books to colonial Americans is: C. Dallett Hemphill “Class, Gender, 
and the Regulation of Emotional Expression in Revolutionary-Era Conduct Literature,” in An Emotional History of 
the United States, 33-51.   
17
 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (NewYork: Oxford University 
Press, 1982).  
18
 See Nicole Eustace, Passion is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution (Chapel 
Hill: Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture at University of North Carolina, 2008).  Eustace 
offers an insightful look into American emotional culture and how colonists acted out certain emotions.  While I 
disagree with some of the arguments made by Eustace on how emotions played into the push for independence, her 
chapter on resentment was helpful in understanding the culture of honor in colonial Pennsylvania. 
 8 
Joanne B. Freeman’s Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic, James Roger 
Sharp’s American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis, and Andrew S. 
Trees’s The Founding Fathers & The Politics of Character, discuss why politics were so 
personal and fractious in the decade following ratification of the Constitution.  These studies of 
political culture use elements of emotional history and a focus on the development of political 
ideology to analyze the fierce political combat of the 1790s.  The company that politicians kept 
influenced both their political ideology and national reputation.  Analysis of the language and 
behavior of historical actors in the late eighteenth century reveals how deeply intertwined 
personal relationships and politics were on the national stage.  A political disagreement could 
very quickly turn into a character assassination because a gentleman’s political ideology was 
linked to his personal identity.  Political culture studies have uncovered the code of manners that 
governed historical actors’ behavior in the 1790s, and this method of analysis may be applied to 




 For the eighteenth-century culture of honor to have existed, a particular social group, the 
colonial elite, had to acknowledge and accept a standard set of norms that governed their 
behavior.
20
  In the thirteen colonies, socially prominent gentlemen were expected to participate 
actively in the political sphere.  As Richard R. Beeman stated in The Varieties of Political 
                                                 
19
 Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor, Andrew S. Trees The Founding Fathers & The Politics of Character, James 
Roger Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1993)  
20
 Appiah, The Honor Code, 20.  Appiah describes the social group as an “honor world,” where people acknowledge 
a set of behaviors that apply specifically to their social group.  Not all historians accept the existence of an elite 
economic and social group in colonial America, especially in comparison with British society; some historians used 
the term “self-proclaimed elite.”  I believe that American colonists lived in a hierarchical world defined by 
deferential and elitist social practices.  Nicole Eustace used “self-proclaimed” in Passion is the Gale.  For excellent 
overviews of colonial society, see: Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: 
Knopf, 1992); Robert Olwell and Alan Tully, Eds., Cultures and Identities in Colonial British America (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2006); and Michal J. Rozbicki, The Complete Colonial Gentleman. 
 9 
Experience in Eighteenth-Century America, colonists possessed an “instinctive assumption that 
there was an integral relationship between social authority and political power.”
21
  The members 
of the colonial elite who possessed political power came from the ranks of “gentlemen 
freeholders, aspiring lawyers, and leisured merchants” and differed from their British 
counterparts only because they did not belong to an established hereditary aristocracy.
22
  
Otherwise, the colonial elite mimicked the British gentry in various ways, usually by reading the 
same literature, studying law at the British courts, or adhering to the standards of the honor code 
prized by the British ruling elite.  Colonial elites patterned themselves after the British elites to 
create an orderly and well-governed society “whose leaders possessed the appropriate traits of 
wealth, education, gentility and liberality.”
23
  The creation of a deferential political system 
allowed the gentry to preserve their political power.  Elite leaders believed that their superior 
education allowed them to legislate for the general good of society.   
 During the 1700s, all thirteen colonial legislatures practiced a form of deferential politics, 
and recognition of hierarchy and deference shaped the worldview of all participants in the 
American Revolution.  Moreover, a political culture based on deference required knowledge of a 
person’s character and friendships.  “Character,” in the eighteenth-century world, referred to the 
mix of traits, vices, and virtues that, together, determined a person’s social worth.  Character was 
perceived as an almost “tangible possession, something one fashioned, held and protected, so 
that one could speak of acquiring character.”
24
  A colonial gentleman believed that his peers’ 
recognition of his good character determined his personal self-worth and social rank.  Colonial 
                                                 
21
 Richard R. Beeman, The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 16. 
22
 Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics, 19.   
23
 Beeman, The Varieties of Political Experience, 16. 
24
 Freeman, Affairs of Honor, xx.  Freedman’s argument in Affairs of Honor influenced my analysis of the culture of 
honor.  Her preface was helpful in initiating me into the vocabulary and meaning of eighteenth-century political 
disputes.  The quote is from Trees, The Founding Fathers & The Politics of Character, 2. 
 10 
society also held that education and moderation in behavior and speech were among the most 
important qualities that a leader needed to warrant the loyalty and respect of followers. 
 When a gentleman pursued political office or a commission in the local militia, he knew 
that his peers evaluated his character and reputation.  Even a person’s political beliefs were 
linked to his character.  In his personal diary, John Adams described the typical colonial 
legislature, in which everyone knew “a Man’s Pedigree and Biography, his Education, 
Profession and Connections, as well as his fortune.”
25
  This knowledge allowed legislators “to 
see what it is that governs a Man and determines him to his Party in Preference to that, to this 
System of Politicks rather than another.”
26
  A person’s ideological principles determined his 
political identity and group of friends.  Politicians at the First Continental Congress in September 
1774 suddenly had to “enquire and learn the Characters and Connections, the Interests and 
Views of a Multitude of Strangers.”
27
  The Continental Congress stretched the boundaries of the 
old deferential political system, causing character and honor to take on a more significant 
meaning in the expanded political sphere. 
Deferential politics has dominated these pages because a professional military class did 
not exist in the colonies until the establishment of the Continental Army in June 1775.  Although 
many colonial gentlemen had served in gratis positions in their local militias, there was no corps 
of retired professional soldiers.  Some, such as George Washington, had gained military 
experience during the French and Indian War, fighting alongside the British Regulars, but British 
officials had always refused to allow colonial gentlemen to join the King’s officer ranks.
28
  
                                                 
25
 Freeman, Affairs of Honor, 20. 
26
 Ibid., 20. 
27
 Ibid., 20. 
28
 The British officers’ refusal to acknowledge colonial elites’ attempts to establish social equality can be found in 
Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-
1763 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), and John Ferling, The Ascent of George Washington, 27-45.   
 11 
British officers viewed colonial gentlemen as their social and cultural inferiors.  Officers in the 
colonial armies could only observe and mimic the British officers’ culture of honor from a 
distance.  British professionalism and elitist rituals had awed colonists during the French and 
Indian War.  From the beginning of the Revolution, the Continental Army adopted most of the 
traditions of the British military’s culture, especially its honor code that encouraged a heightened 
vigilance to discern any insult or slight.
29
  Problems arose later in the war when officers began to 
think of themselves as a distinct group of professionals who deserved to be treated with respect 
by civilian officials.   
 The need for public recognition of a gentleman’s self-worth drove many revolutionaries 
to become acutely sensitive to any criticism of their performance.
30
  The leaders of the war for 
independence already believed that they stood on shaky ground in challenging the authority of 
the British government and, because of those feelings of uncertainty, they avidly policed one 
another, alert to any attempt to corrupt the fragile new republic.
31
  As Richard Peters declared 
after listening to Morgan’s tirade, “I don’t see how any Man of Feeling or Sentiment can 
continue in a public Department where every measure is looked upon with a jaundiced Eye and 
of course all Mistakes are magnified into Sins political and moral.”
32
  The key point of Peters’s 
complaint highlights how the culture of honor turned all personal decisions into honorable or 
dishonorable behavior.  Every decision reflected on a person’s character with no distinction 
made between the private individual and his public actions.  A revolutionary whose actions or 
                                                 
29
 Michael Stephenson, Patriot Battles: How the War of Independence Was Fought (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2007), 63. 
30
 Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington’s Army (Chapel Hill: Omohundro 
Institute of Early American History and Culture by University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 38. 
31
 Michael A. McDonnell, “Popular Mobilization and Political Culture in Revolutionary Virginia: The Failure of the 
Minutemen and the Revolution from Below,” The Journal of American History 85 (1998), 950. 
32
 Higginbotham, The War of American Independence, 220. 
 12 
decisions were questioned usually interpreted the objection as a challenge to his honor and, 
which made the political very personal.   
Though many twenty-first century individuals may view the culture of honor as a 
concrete framework within which all controversies were settled by dueling.  Most revolutionaries 
actually preferred to use third-party mediation to resolve their grievances.  The colonial elite’s 
extensive friendship networks allowed individuals to use intermediaries to learn if their 
reputation had been slandered.  The intermediaries then determined if the gossip was a serious 
threat or simply an innocuous misunderstanding.  Mediation could be used to forestall the issuing 
of a challenge to a duel or serve as the first step in an affair of honor.
33
   
Often, when officers were unhappy about perceived congressional affronts to their honor, 
they resigned.
34
  Resignations usually occurred after officers were denied promotions to the rank 
they felt they deserved or when congressional finances made it difficult to pay them on time.  
Many historians have judged harshly the officers who resigned during the war, but most 
revolutionaries believed that resignation was an honorable way to preserve their dignity.  
Politicians also resigned or “retired” from situations that they felt might prove injurious to their 
dignity.  The culture of honor dictated the language used in the officers’ resignation letters.  
Citing their personal resentment over congressional mismanagement of military affairs, officers 
excused their impending absence by insisting they had to leave to preserve their honor and 
reputation.  Washington tried throughout the war to persuade officers not to take offense at 
congressional actions, arguing repeatedly that Congress was not intentionally insulting the 
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officer corps with its resolutions and proclamations.  But many officers rejected Washington’s 
assurances and began to demand respect in the form of guarantees of pensions from the civil 
authority.  
The revolutionaries’ ultimate dramatic recourse to preserve their honor was a physical 
confrontation, usually in the form of a duel.
35
  A duel was a highly ritualized encounter between 
two social equals who were prepared to face death to prove that their actions were honorable.  
Also, a physical confrontation demonstrated the seriousness of the issue.  Morgan feared that 
Peters might be a part of a conspiracy to dishonor Washington, and so, when Morgan confronted 
Peters, he demonstrated his readiness to protect Washington and his personal honor.  In this 
instance, a face-to-face discussion resolved the conflict between Peters and Morgan.  But other 
revolutionaries believed that only dueling could salvage their reputations and honor.  Duels 
occurred with greater frequency among officers in the Continental Army but, as chapter four of 
this thesis makes clear, several affairs of honor involved military officials and congressional 
representatives.  Such confrontations occurred because disputes over the policy of congressional 
privilege between the two revolutionary institutions were not initially resolvable by mediation.      
The four chapters of this thesis follow the chronological timeline of the American 
Revolution and examine key issues that developed between the Continental Congress and the 
Continental Army.  Chapter one examines the initial congressional debates concerning the 
establishment of the Continental Army.  Delegates influenced by radical or conservative political 
ideologies clashed over the new army’s structure and how much power should be granted to the 
new officer class.  The sensitivity to social rank and hierarchy made it difficult to appoint 
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officers because some gentlemen felt slighted by their initial appointments.  Resentments over 
promotions and officers’ commissions caused many problems throughout the war.   
Chapter two discusses the growing pains plaguing both revolutionary institutions at the 
beginning of the rebellion.  The Continental Congress and the army frequently disagreed over the 
guidelines for promoting officers.  Those differences reveal ideological groupings that 
transcended institutional boundaries.  The dispute between General Philip Schuyler and General 
Horatio Gates over command of the northern army is a striking example of the way in which 
third-party mediation worked during the war and illuminates the close friendship networks that 
developed between the military and civilian institutions.  Because of these colonial friendship 
networks, congressional factions developed to support each general’s claim that he deserved sole 
authority over the northern army.  Numerous congressional resolutions resulted from third-party 
negotiations and these allowed the controversy to drag on for over a year because all the 
participants in it had to work within the boundaries of the honor code.   
Chapter three presents the Continental Army’s attempts to push back against 
congressional control.  Toward the end of the war, officers assumed that the new resolutions 
passed by Congress showed disrespect for their status as professional and honorable gentlemen.  
During the winter seasons, officer resignations became an acute problem for Washington and 
Congress.  In 1777/78 officers began to demand half-pay pensions as a reward for their sacrifices 
during the conflict.  The heated dispute over half-pay pensions symbolized to many 
revolutionaries problems within the culture of honor that dictated how gentlemen should react in 
times of conflict and stress.  Instead of realizing that Congress hovered on the brink of 
insolvency, officers fixated on their need for public recognition of their sacrifice.  If that 
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recognition was not forthcoming, the code of honor demanded that they resign, a resolution that 
was anything but desirable during the middle of a war. 
  Chapter four discusses the final resolution tool available to gentlemen to address insults 
to their character.  Revolutionaries turned to affairs of honor as a last resort because a duel 
proved the seriousness of the insult.  The policy of congressional privilege created several 
problems between the Continental Congress and the Continental Army because military officers 
believed that congressmen used privilege deliberately to injure their reputations.  The issue of 
freedom of debate raised the question of whether the honor code allowed any loopholes if they 
aided in the prosecution of the war effort.  Delegates wanted to be able to discuss openly whether 
certain generals should be fired or moved elsewhere to make sure American forces won battles.  
Officers who were discussed disparagingly on the congressional floor believed that they had the 
right to challenge congressmen for their character assassinations.  
Each chapter aims to understand how the culture of honor shaped the revolutionaries’ 
worldview and their decision-making processes.  As political and military setbacks challenged 
colonial leaders, they worried also about their honor and reputation.  When feeling pressured, 
these gentlemen knew that the culture of honor provided three viable methods by which to 
address their personal grievances.  Subscribing to a conception of society that was dominated by 
a code of honor, these men of “Feeling and Sentiment” attempted to navigate the shifting ground 
of a rebellion.  Honor was a means to that end, but it was a controversial frame of reference to 
guide the leaders of the Continental Army and the Continental Congress.  All too often, they 
sought to defend their actions even at the expense of efficiency in prosecuting the war effort.  
And yet, while the code of honor caused many disputes, it did nevertheless, act as “social glue” 
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to hold together revolutionaries from the thirteen colonies and created the hope of a new 
American society and government.
36
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Chapter 1: 
 Revolutionary Fervor in Philadelphia: Creating New Institutions 
 
“Professional soldiers are apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of Citizens.  
They soon become attached to their officers and disposed to yield implicit obedience to their 








 Hoping to forestall days of debate, John Adams rose in the Continental Congress in mid 
June 1775 to propose elevating George Washington as commander-in-chief of the newly 
established Continental Army.  Adams described Washington as “a Gentleman whose Skill and 
Experience as an Officer, whose independent fortune, great Talents and excellent universal 
Character would command the Approbation of all America and unite the cordial Exertions of all 
the Colonies.”
38
  Faced with almost certain fighting against British troops in Boston, Congress 
had agreed to create a military force under its control.  The “cordial exertions of all the Colonies” 
referred to the distinct state militia units already gathered in Cambridge as a makeshift army.  
The appointment of a commander-in-chief signaled Congress’s intent to fight a defensive war 
against the British with a continental army composed of volunteers from all the colonies.  
Delegates wished to appoint a commander-in-chief who possessed military experience and who 
also understood and reflected the attributes of a gentleman.  Emphasizing Washington’s 
independent fortune and “universal” character, Adams stressed his moral as well as social 
reputation.  
 Discussion of military matters dominated the Second Continental Congress from the first 
day of its legislative session.  Revolutionaries found themselves making preparations for war 
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even as they debated proposals for reconciliation with England.  During its first few weeks, 
Congress oversaw the establishment of military and legislative structures that would influence 
how the war for American Independence was fought and understood by contemporaries.  A letter 
from the Massachusetts Provincial Congress declaring that “the sanguinary Zeal of the 
ministerial Army, to ruin and destroy the Inhabitants of this colony [Massachusetts], hath 
rendered the Establishment of an Army indispensably necessary,” demanded that the Continental 
Congress grapple with an issue it had hoped to avoid at the beginning of the new legislative 
session.
39
  Should a continental army be raised to protect colonists from the British Army or 
would this army interfere with redressing colonial grievances with Parliament?  Intending to 
prod Congress into action, the Provincial Council argued that current events in the aftermath of 
Lexington and Concord dictated the creation of “a power full Army, on the side of America…to 
stem the rapid Progress of a Tyrannical Ministry.”
40
 
 Members of the Second Continental Congress knew they faced several momentous 
decisions in the summer of 1775.  Congressmen differed over the question of declaring 
independence and whether they should create a professional army to fight Great Britain.  To deal 
with these and other contentious matters, delegates clung to the culture of politeness that guided 
colonial society.
41
  They constructed their new national legislature to ensure that each gentleman 
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would have an equal voice in debates.  Well aware that they held opposing views on the question 
of independence and how much power national legislature should exercise, delegates created an 
institutional structure that allowed for the development and discussion of different political 
policies.  A major weakness of the Continental Congress and the social conventions by which it 
operated was that there was no neutral forum for the expression of conflicting opinions without 
delegates feeling personally insulted.   
A culture of politeness and deference left room for interpretation, and this leeway 
complicated Congress’s efforts to commission the major and brigadier generals for the 
Continental Army.  Several of the newly commissioned generals felt insulted by the seniority 
system established by Congress and threatened to resign, feeling that they needed to leave the 
Continental Army to preserve their honorable character.  The institutional design of Congress 
and the delegates’ political ideologies influenced how the national legislature handled this first 
challenge to its authority by the Continental Army.  Even at the start of the armed rebellion 
against Great Britain, the culture of honor caused problems between the Continental Congress 
and the Continental Army.   
 Many of the delegates in Philadelphia had served in the First Continental Congress in 
September and October of 1774.  Colonial leaders participating in the First Continental Congress 
understood that they were creating an extralegal assembly.  They believed that the First 
Continental Congress had only the authority to address a petition of protest to Parliament and 
encourage colonial legislatures to adopt trade embargos.
42
  The Continental Congress’s main 
purpose was to allow elite leaders from all of the colonies to meet and exchange strategies on 
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how to resolve the political problems with Parliament.  They did not intend to create a new 
national assembly that superseded the powers of each colony’s legislature.   
With the First Continental Congress’s limited purpose in mind, politicians deliberately 
created a weak legislative body that emphasized decision-making by consensus.  Members of 
Congress made decisions only after lengthy open-floor debate.  The president of Congress had 
almost no authority besides that of casting a vote to break a tie, though appointment to the 
position was based on a gentleman’s social prominence and reputation.
43
  Each colonial 
delegation voted as a single bloc in geographical order from the most northern colony, New 
Hampshire, to South Carolina.
44
  By deliberately creating a weak institutional structure delegates 
could prevent any colony from dominating the proceedings and stop political ideological factions 
from controlling all the decisions.  Delegates debated the institutional structure because they 
wanted to dispel any rumors that they deliberately sought to usurp political power.     
After agreeing to adopt new non-importation and non-exportation agreements in October 
1774, Congress recessed.  The representatives agreed to meet again in May 1775, should they 
need to discuss Parliament’s reaction to their petitions.  After receiving the news of Lexington 
and Concord, delegates gathered in Philadelphia in a state of considerable agitation.  Colonial 
bloodshed was no longer just a theoretical consequence of challenging the Coercive Acts and 
Parliament’s authority.  When the Second Continental Congress began, the delegates 
unanimously agreed to keep the same parliamentary procedures from the First Continental 
Congress, a move that would profoundly shape Congress’s decision-making during the American 
Revolution.   
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Delegates approved of a weak institutional structure for two reasons.  First, delegates had 
no idea at the beginning of the new session, that events in the next few weeks would dramatically 
alter Congress’s responsibilities.  By June, they controlled an army and had the new financial 
responsibility to pay for it.  The siege of the British troops in Boston lent additional importance 
to the delegates’ decisions.  Growing numbers of Americans began to view Congress as the new 
national legislative body in control of military decisions.
45
    
The second reason delegates resolved to follow the rules adopted by the First Congress 
was that they feared the rise of political factions.  They accepted that there were different 
political ideologies but believed that parties were bad for legislatures.  Political parties could 
destabilize the culture of politeness that preserved the political and social order.  By allowing for 
an open discussion of every issue, no single group could dominate proceedings because each 
gentleman would have an opportunity to voice his opinion.  The culture of honor dictated that 
every politician be able to speak, so that no one would feel slighted or insulted.  An undesirable 
consequence of this policy was to make legislative business unwieldy and inefficient.
46
  
Although delegates realized that debate was time-consuming, they hoped that it would 
prevent the creation of factions.  If all had the chance to speak, there would be no need to 
organize special groups to manipulate politics.  While the delegates expressed disapproval of 
political factions, they knew that factions had long existed in colonial politics.  Colonial leaders 
had believed that political groupings arose when a temporary alliance among honorable men was 
needed to institute proper reforms for the benefit of the legislature and society.
47
  With this 
history in mind, delegates to the Second Continental Congress adopted an institutional structure 
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that prevented any faction from dominating congressional business.  That structure did not, 
however, prevent delegates from banding together to gain preferment for their friends or 
manipulate the outcome of a particular vote.
48
 
The Second Continental Congress conducted most of its daily business through the 
committee system and, from 1775 to 1789 it created 3,249 committees.
49
  Delegates served on 
dozens of committees throughout their legislative tenure.  Some committees came into existence 
solely to answer a single letter, while a few standing committees, such as the Board of War, 
oversaw the Continental Army’s military affairs.  Committees typically proposed solutions to the 
issues they were asked to consider. The entire Congress then debated these proposals.
50
  
Committee service took up a considerable amount of a delegate’s time.  A few delegates served 
on a disproportionately large number of committees, either because of their reputation as diligent 
legislators or because they served multiple congressional terms.   
The committee system’s handling of military affairs generally followed a set routine.  
One example from October 1775 had delegates nominating by secret ballot, a three-man 
committee to travel to Washington’s headquarters to determine what the army needed for winter 
encampment.  Then, a separate committee, consisting of another five delegates would draft the 
specific instructions and questions to for the committee that traveled to Washington’s camp.  The 
committee of five would then read their proposed instructions aloud to all of the delegates.  
Congress would then debate each paragraph point by point, until a final set of instructions was 
passed.  Then the committee of three who traveled to meet with Washington left Philadelphia 
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and presented Washington with instructions that had been approved by all delegates after lengthy 
debate.  The entire process took four days.
51
  
Decision-making by the committee system and open-floor debate made for slow progress.  
That officers in the Continental Army never realized how slowly Congress operated would cause 
problems later in the war.  What officers attributed to intentional neglect was actually the result 
of delegates attempting to solve a problem through the committee system and open-floor debate.  
Legislators preferred this system because it was consistent with their understanding of the culture 
of honor.  Every opinion was heard and, ideally, consensus decision-making prevented a delegate 
from feeling slighted or insulted during a debate.  The debate over creating, for the first time, a 
continental army lasted for a full month, as delegates discussed the army’s potential structure and 
the qualifications necessary to become an officer.   
    Debate over the Continental Army exposed ideological differences among delegates.  
Their competing ideologies shaped new interpretations of the eighteenth-century culture of honor 
and influenced the course and conduct of the month-long debate over establishing a new military 
force.  New interpretations developed because many revolutionaries perceived that there was a 
potential power vacuum in America in the event that Britain was thrown out.  They thought that 
they could re-fashion society into a new ideal form.  Historians typically characterize 
congressional delegates as having been either radicals or conservatives.
52
  All congressmen were 
members of the colonial political elite, but they disagreed on the best solutions to the political 
problems with Parliament.  Both ideological groups hoped to use open-floor debate to persuade 
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the opposing group into joining their side.  Eighteenth century political institutions allowed for 
the development of different political ideals, but it was difficult within the political culture to 
express those conflicting viewpoints without unintentionally insulting a gentleman’s reputation.  
Political beliefs supposedly revealed a person’s character. 
Radical congressmen believed that, after years of repressive legislation, pursuit of 
independence was the only reasonable course of action.  While their political goal was 
independence, they hoped that separation from England would permit a new elite social order to 
develop in the colonies.  This social order would reward patriots for their contributions to 
achieving independence and establish a meritocracy in which citizens were judged according to 
“actual specimens of their Conduct, not by Squireship or Cousinship.”
53
  Lacking the strict 
hereditary aristocracy of England, social mobility had always been easier in the colonies, but this 
quote written by Silas Deane to his wife expressed a new vision of society.  Gentlemen gained 
elite status by serving their country, jealously guarding the rights of citizens from the tyranny of 
any oppressive government.  Radicals challenged the traditional social hierarchy and the culture 
of politeness.  They hoped Parliament’s actions would soon push conservative Revolutionaries 
into declaring independence.   
Radical political ideology held that governments inevitably encroached upon the rights of 
citizens and so principled political leaders had to stand watch to prevent any perversion of 
political power.  Influenced by the Whigs, then in the minority, colonists applied Whig political 
ideology to the crisis with Great Britain.  Radical members of Congress concluded that 
independence was the solution to the problem of Anglo-American relations.  They believed that 
keeping a connection with the British Empire would eventually corrupt colonial politics and 
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principles.  But radicals were in the minority in the Second Continental Congress and recognized 
that many conservatives were not ready to contemplate independence.  Only in private letters did 
radicals encourage each other to prepare for severing all ties with the King and Parliament.
54
   
The majority of delegates were conservative and their political approach argued for a 
slow, measured consideration of all the options available to resolve the crisis with Parliament.  
They worried that the crisis would upset the social hierarchy by removing them from power.  
Their traditional interpretation of the culture of honor also acknowledged merit, but they 
believed that genteel birth and a superior education endowed political leaders with the proper 
qualifications to make the best decisions.  As pragmatists, conservatives realized independence 
was an option.  They, however, wanted to submit more petitions to the British political 
authorities before consenting to a revolution that could end in failure. 
In the first few weeks of the new session the Continental Army became a flashpoint for 
both ideological groups.  Radicals believed an army was necessary to gain independence from 
England, but they harbored fears that the military could put an end to their republican dreams.  
History taught the American revolutionaries that standing armies had destroyed many republics 
and the specter of the English Civil War haunted the congressional chambers.  Conservatives 
read the same political literature as radicals and also worried about creating a professional, 
standing army.  Conservatives agreed to consider the establishment of a new military force so 
they could control the volatile situation in Boston between the colonies’ militias and British 
troops.    
The English Civil War loomed large in the delegates’ minds warning against a 
professional army.  Radicals and conservatives repeatedly discussed the lessons learned from 
                                                 
54
 Great examples are: John Adams to James Warren, July 6, 1775, Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1:590 and 
Joseph Hewes to Samuel Johnston, July 8, 1775, Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1:615, where Hewes declares “I 
consider myself now over head & Ears in what the ministry call Rebellion.” 
 26 
Cromwell’s rule in the 1650s.
55
  Puritan Roundheads raised the New Model Army to overthrow 
King Charles I, and after several years, the army grew more loyal to Oliver Cromwell, one of the 
generals, than the political movement.  Eighteenth-century Americans believed Cromwell had 
used the New Model Army to suppress critics of his reign.  The English Revolution began with 
the hope of securing more constitutional rights for citizens but ended with a dictator kept in 
power by a professional army’s support.   
In the decades after the civil war, political pamphleteers analyzed what had gone wrong 
in the war against the monarchy.  Many writers believed that the use of a professional army had 
corrupted the revolutionary movement because soldiers became loyal to whoever paid them.
56
  A 
new political ideology developed that asserted that citizens needed to protect their own rights by 
becoming involved in politics and, if necessary, taking up weapons, to defend those rights.  
These writers and their readers gradually formed the Opposition or Whig party in Britain.  They 
challenged the King and Parliament, demanding a more representative government—but only for 
people who owned property and who therefore had a stake in society’s prosperity.
57
  
Whigs also proposed reforming the local militia units to use in the war effort. Arguing 
that vigilant civilians should not rely on an easily manipulated professional army to defend their 
rights, instead all landowners should pledge to serve to protect their rights and property.  Whig 
pamphlets declared that local militia units should become the government’s standard means by 
which to protect liberty.  While Whigs preached this idealized vision of the militia, in reality, by 
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the mid-eighteenth century, Great Britain maintained a large standing army to expand and defend 
the borders of its empire.   
 In the American colonies, prior to the 1750s, militia units were the only military forces 
to defend territorial boundaries.  High-ranking officers of colonial militias received their 
appointments from royal governors, while the soldiers elected junior officers.  All officers 
typically came from the elite class and the militia rarely participated in military action until the 
French and Indian War.
58
   
Whig ideology and the traditional use of colonial militias to defend territory influenced 
the debate over the Continental Army.  After Lexington and Concord, Congressmen knew they 
needed an organized military force.  They debated whether the army should be structured as a 
professional, European army or a citizen-soldier force similar in form and function to the local 
militia units.  The debate over the army’s potential form illustrates the delegates’ competing 
political and social ideologies.  Conservatives preferred a professional army that relied on a rigid 
social hierarchy to preserve discipline and order in the ranks.  To radical delegates, colonial 
militias represented the ideal of virtuous citizens who volunteered to serve and to protect their 
rights and privileges against a “tyrannical Ministry.” 
During the month-long congressional debate in June 1775 over creating an army, radicals 
repeatedly invoked the memory of the English Civil War to argue against the establishment of a 
professional, standing army.  They argued that the use of paid professionals meant that 
Americans were unwilling to sacrifice enough to defeat the British regulars.
59
  In the radicals’ 
vision of a new republican society, a citizen’s actions determined if he was worthy of joining the 
new elite class.  Radicals convinced themselves that the sheer enthusiasm of the people would 
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overwhelm and defeat the British Regulars in a few short military battles.  This idealism was 
influenced by a Whig political doctrine that argued that a people’s determination to protect their 
rights imbued them with a righteousness (or virtue) that easily defeated corruption.  American 
radicals believed that the Revolution presented an opportunity for the “eyes of mankind” to judge 
“whether the government [Continental Congress], will be productive of more Virtue moral and 
political.  We may look up to Armies for our Defence, but Virtue is our best Security.”
60
  
On a more practical level, voluntary participation in the state militias symbolized 
American patriotism and proved that colonists supported the Continental Congress’s efforts.  In 
traditional Whig rhetoric, professional armies used coercion on multiple levels.  Standing armies 
recruited foot soldiers from the lowest levels of society, men who had no stake in society’s 
welfare or interest in protecting civil liberties.
61
  Whigs believed that professional soldiers were 
mercenaries sold to the highest bidder and they praised militiamen as free citizens who believed 
in preserving the civil authority.  Many radicals argued that if “the Militia is composd of free 
Citizens.  There is therefore no Danger of their making Use of their Power to the Destruction of 
their own Rights, or suffering others to invade them.”
62
  Radical delegates proposed establishing 
a Continental Army that was a loose collection of state militias under the control of Congress, in 
which citizens volunteered when needed to fight the British.  This military structure relied on 
enthusiasm rather than harsh disciplinary measures to fight. 
As radical delegates dreamed of a new republican society, conservative delegates in June 
1775 still urged reconciliation with the king and Parliament.  After Lexington and Concord, 
conservatives agreed with the radicals about fighting a defensive war to prevent further British 
attacks on colonial towns.  But, they believed that only a professional army, instead of a 
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volunteer militia, would impress King George III with the seriousness of their claims.  Therefore, 
in their desire to establish a professional army, conservatives had to undermine the radicals’ 
argument that professional soldiers “are apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the 
rest of Citizens.  They soon become attached to their officers and disposed to yield implicit 
obedience to their Commands.  Such a Power should be watched with a jealous Eye.”
63
  
Conservatives understood the radicals’ fear of a standing army.  They also worried about 
creating a military force that could potentially challenge the power of the civil authority.  All 




Influenced by their interpretation of the culture of honor, conservatives insisted that the 
British could only be honorably defeated by another professional military force, an army trained 
to fight in the European military manner in open-field maneuvers.  Colonists wanted to be 
recognized as civilized, honorable gentlemen fighting oppressive British policies, not as 
“savages leading savages in a howling wilderness.”
65
  Conservatives’ fears about losing their 
social positions lead them to advocate a Continental army organized according to the strict 
hierarchical structure of European armies.  A traditional army would allow the gentry to maintain 
control of the rebellion.
66
  James Duane asserted that “Licenciousness is the natural Effect of a 
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civil discord and it can only be guarded against by placing the Command of the Troops in the 
hands of Men of property and Rank.”
67
  
After weeks of open-floor debate and a second frantic letter from Massachusetts that 
stated, “We tremble at having an army (although consisting of our countrymen) established here 
without a civil power to provide for and control them,” the delegates compromised on the 
Continental Army’s structure.
68
  The army created in the summer of 1775 consisted of volunteers 
who had enlisted for one year of service in a traditionally structured army.  In writing the 
Articles of War for the new army, both ideological groups agreed to less severe disciplinary 
measures than the British army.
69
  Radicals supported one-year enlistments to prevent the growth 
of a class of professional soldiers.  Conservatives gained a hierarchical army composed of elite 
officers with an emphasis on subordination and discipline.  After Congress agreed to finance the 
Continental Army, it turned to the necessity of commissioning the army’s officers.  A matter of 
paramount importance was determining the desirable qualities to be possessed by the office 
corps.  
 When John Adams nominated Washington, he listed the qualities delegates believed 
would best serve the new army and a united colonial effort.  Members of Congress were nervous 
about commissioning the officer corps, worried that the army might one day turn on its civilian 
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masters.  Washington’s reputation among his peers illuminates the characteristics that both 
radical and conservative delegates desired in newly commissioned officers. 
 As commander-in-chief, Washington set the ethical and behavioral tone of the 
Continental Army.
70
  Officers patterned themselves after Washington’s example.  In the 
eighteenth century, military professionals believed that a general led by his personality and that 
his character and reputation inspired men to victory.
 71
  Thus, the most successful and victorious 
generals were born and not made.  The colonies had no formal military training academies and 
many officers in the Continental Army learned from reading military manuals.
72
  Since most 
officers acquired training in the field, Washington and congressional delegates wanted to ensure 
that they nominated men from the right social strata for the officer corps.
73
   
 Legislators also nominated Washington for three other reasons: he was a Southerner, he 
had a legislative background, and he possessed an exemplary public demeanor.  New Englanders 
wanted a commander-in-chief appointed from the South, something which they thought would 
incline other colonies outside New England to view the situation in Boston as a continental war 
and not as a localized problem in Massachusetts.  A Virginian general would tie the most 
populous colony to New England for the duration of the war.  A major issue complicating the 
war effort arose from problems of regionalism and localism that made inter-colonial cooperation 
difficult.  Colonies, and later, states, jealously vied for positions of power during the American 
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  Officer appointments were a key means of controlling the army and winning 
accolades for the bravery of a colony’s citizens.   
Representative Eliphalet Dyer of Connecticut recognized these sectional tensions when 
he confided to his friend Joseph Trumbull, that Washington’s appointment “removes all 
jealousies, more firmly Cements the Southern to the Northern.”  He added, somewhat 
facetiously, that his appointment took away the fear “that an Enterprising eastern New England 
Genll proving Successfull, might with his Victorious Army give law to the Southern & Western 
Gentry.”
75
  New Englanders, recognizing the need for compromise, agreed to give up their hopes 
for a Northern commander-in-chief, by supporting Washington.   
Commenting in a letter to a close personal friend, Washington acknowledged the 
sectional politics that led to his appointment, saying “It is an honour I wished to avoid…but the 
partiality of Congress added to some political motives, left me without a choice.”
76
  Aside from 
Washington’s conventionally modest assertion that he did not seek the appointment as 
commander-in-chief, his statement indicates that he understood the sectional motivations that 
influenced the congressional delegates.  Radicals and conservatives knew that all colonists 
needed to view the armed rebellion against England as a continental affair because, otherwise, 
the British would exploit regional disagreements to end the conflict.   
Washington’s years of service in the Virginia House of Burgesses comforted many of the 
congressional representatives.  As a politician, he understood that the military must be 
subordinate to the civil authority at all times.  This was one way to assuage delegates’ fears of a 
standing army.  In choosing Washington, they deliberately selected a commander-in-chief who 
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had a martial reputation for his service during the French and Indian War.  But they also chose 
Washington because he had far more experience as a colonial legislator, even if he had not been 
one of the more celebrated members in the House of Burgesses.
77
  Washington also possessed a 
political advantage due to his presence at the First and Second Continental Congresses.  
Delegates were comfortable with nominating him because he had witnessed the debates over 
creating the Continental Army and they felt that they could trust him after socializing with him at 
numerous dinners and gatherings in Philadelphia. 
Public demeanor was a critically important component of the eighteenth-century culture 
of honor.  Gentlemen read etiquette books to learn how to comport themselves in public.  Rituals 
and words held significant meaning in the social and political spheres, and Washington proved to 
be a master at crafting an honorable public demeanor in both.  Delegates commented on his 
“easy Soldier like Air, & gesture.”
78
  He impressed Eliphalet Dyer as “Clever, & if any thing too 
modest.” Washington “seems discret & Virtuous, no harum Starum ranting Swearing fellow but 
Sober, steady, & Calm.”
79
  These were valuable attributes in a leader who controlled the 
Continental Army.  In fact, delegates were worried about volatile personalities in the army.  An 
ostentatious general could either bankrupt the cause or persuade soldiers to establish him as a 
tyrant.  Dyer believed that “his [Washington] modesty will Induce him I dare say to take & order 
every step with the best advice possible.”
80
  That last statement reveals the key reason why New 
Englanders agreed to Washington’s appointment: he would obey congressional commands.   
Washington’s modesty was an integral component of his character and a trait that an elite 
gentleman aspired to display in his public demeanor.  A gentleman’s modesty showed that he 
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was not driven by ambition to seek personal gain.  Delegates worried that command of the 
Continental Army might turn an unqualified colonist into a potential Caesar or Cromwell, but 
Washington cultivated the public demeanor of a Cincinnatus.  Even Washington’s acceptance 
speech displayed his modesty: “I declare with the utmost sincerity, I do not think my self equal 
to the Command I am honoured with.”
81
  While reciting these conventionally modest words, 
Washington secretly harbored fears that he was irrevocably tying his reputation to the 
revolutionary cause and he knew that a failed rebellion would permanently damage his 
reputation among his peers.  But the chance for glory as commander-in-chief persuaded him to 
accept command and take control of the disorganized troops surrounding Boston.  In his private 
correspondence, he echoed the modest phrasing of his congressional speech, telling friends that 




Washington refused to take a salary while serving as commander-in-chief, thereby 
cementing his reputation for modesty.
83
  As a gentleman, he would serve for the benefit of his 
country with no expectation of remuneration.  His independent fortune allowed him to maintain 
the public demeanor and life-style of a gentleman.  Delegates appreciated this gesture because, as 
legislators, they too, served the public without pay.  They received only a stipend to help with the 
                                                 
81
 Address to Continental Congress, June 16, 1775, The Papers of George Washington. Revolutionary War Series, 
1:1. 
82
 For his personal letters to friends see George Washington to Martha Washington, June 18, 1775, The Papers of 
George Washington. Revolutionary War Series, 1:3; George Washington to John Augustine Washington, June 20, 
1775, Ibid., 1:19; George Washington to John Parke Custis, June 19, 1775, Ibid., 1:15.  Ferling, in The Ascent of 
George Washington, 88-89, discusses Washington’s concern for his reputation when accepting the appointment.  His 
analysis has shaped my argument.  I also read Schwartz’s George Washington, 4-9, but I disagree with his 
conclusions about Washington’s modesty.  He believes that Washington was truly modest and humble when he 
accepted the post.  I think Washington’s acceptance was a carefully calculated public performance.  Washington 
wanted to be commander-in-chief, but worried about his reputation when accepting because it was a risky to 
undertake the job of leader of an armed rebellion.   
83
 Ferling, The Ascent of George Washington, 86-87, and Schwartz, George Washington, 126.  
 35 
expense of living in Philadelphia.
84
  Washington’s refusal to accept a salary therefore eased 
many delegates’ minds and they told him “that a warm regard to the sacred rights of humanity 
and sincere love to your country, solely induced you in the acceptance of [your] important 
trust.”
85
  Politicians hoped that Washington would serve as a model of decorum and selflessness 
for the officer corps.  
Washington adeptly crafted a public demeanor that appealed to radicals and 
conservatives alike.  Radicals believed that Washington’s refusal of a salary showed his zeal for 
the patriotic cause.  Conservatives were happy with a Southern commander-in-chief and they 
hoped that Washington would serve as a conservative general fighting a defensive war, which 
would check the radicals’ attempts to provoke independence.   
Washington’s personality profoundly shaped the structure of the Continental Army 
during the eight-year war for independence.  By choosing Washington, delegates appointed a 
military commander who desired a conservative, professional army and who believed that 
officers should be recruited from the elite of every colony.  In his first general orders to the camp 
outside of Boston, Washington stressed that disciplinary measures and “due Subordination” were 
necessary to prevent “extreme hazard, Disorder and Confusion.”  Without these measures, the 
army would perish in “shameful disappointment and disgrace.”
86
  He continually urged the 
army’s ordinary soldiers and officers to think about the public’s judgment of their actions.  Men 
of honor cared about their peers’ opinions of them.  A man was a gentleman only if society 
recognized him as one.   
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At the beginning of the war, the Continental Congress commissioned only major and 
brigadier generals; all other officer appointments were the purview of the colonial legislatures.  
Congressmen believed local politicians would nominate suitable “young Gentlemen of a military 
genius.”
87
  Officers obtained their commissions through friendship networks.  That is, gentlemen 
used influence and contacts to receive higher ranks in the officer corps.
88
  Washington received 
hundreds of letters of recommendation from colonial leaders hoping to place family friends at his 
headquarters or in illustrious regiments.  This emphasis on obtaining letters of recommendation 
meant that colonial legislatures and the Continental Congress were flooded with requests.  Even 
so, delegates were happy to write letters of introduction on behalf of family friends or prominent 
young gentlemen from their colonies.    
A typical letter of introduction followed the format used by Eliphalet Dyer writing on 
behalf of Aaron Burr.  First, he provided a brief overview of Burr’s family history and 
connections to prove Burr’s claims to gentility.  Then Dyer assured his correspondent, Joseph 
Trumbull, the commissary general of the Continental Army, that Burr was a young gentleman of 
“fortune & regulation.”
89
  Dyer emphasized fortune and regulation because those terms 
immediately signified an honorable character.  Fortune meant that Burr could afford to look the 
part of a gentleman.  Regulation signified a respectable public demeanor because no rumors of 
ungentlemanly conduct had reached Dyer’s ears.  Dyer concluded his letter of introduction with 
a request that Trumbull help Burr receive an officer’s commission by vouching for his 
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gentlemanly reputation.  John Hancock also wrote a letter of introduction for Aaron Burr.
90
  This 
process was repeated thousands of times throughout all of the colonies.    
During the American Revolution, officers depended on leaders in the civil sphere to 
obtain commissions and promotions.  This system, shaped by the eighteenth-century’s culture of 
honor, ensured the military’s subordination to Congress.  But, it also created many opportunities 
for jealousy to ferment in the officer corps.  Washington had no authority to set the guidelines for 
personal advancement.  Officers, instead, needed to court politicians for their commissions.  The 
process of appointing officers quickly assumed a personal dimension during the war because 
officers had to rely on their reputations and friendships in seeking new commissions or 
promotions.  When for any of a number of reasons, politicians denied the officers’ requests most 
believed that civil authorities were insulting their honor.  
After establishing the Continental Army, Congress decided to appoint only generals.  The 
rationale for the appointment of the majority of officers by local legislatures was the belief by 
congressmen that local politicians would be better able to verify the reputation of officer 
applicants through friendship networks.  But even commissioning new generals for the 
Continental Army proved difficult for the congressmen.  As John Adams stated, “nothing has 
given me more Torment, than the Scuffle We have had in appointing the General Officers.”
91
    
 Washington arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in early July 1775, ready to create a 
Continental Army with the help of his newly commissioned Council of War.  He held the 
appointments for several new major and brigadier generals who would help Washington 
establish a new professional military force capable of meeting the British in open field combat.  
But, before the commander-in-chief could begin training his troops, three of the newly appointed 
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brigadier generals threatened to resign.  It had taken several days of congressional debate to 
agree on the gentlemen to be nominated for these positions and, now those generals rejected 
Congress’s authority.  John Thomas, Joseph Spencer, and David Wooster believed that their new 
Continental Army appointments insulted their honor because they did not correlate with their 
local legislature’s commissions.
92
  Each general had received a rank with higher seniority in his 
local military forces than his new Continental Army commissions and he did not want serve 
under his former military subordinates.  In early July, the delegates felt the army was challenging 
their authority.  
After unanimously selecting George Washington, delegates disagreed over how to 
apportion the commissions for major and brigadier generals between the twelve colonies 
(Georgia’s delegation was not officially in attendance until after Congress had created the 
Continental Army).
93
  In the spring of 1775, the generalships represented an opportunity for a 
colony to receive recognition for its military contributions.  After receiving a generalship, 
colonies then appointed a prominent local gentleman to a high military office.  The appointments 
opened up new avenues of patronage and a chance for a colony to gain a reputation for martial 
excellence.  Thus, George Washington’s battle successes, the few that occurred, enhanced 
Virginia’s reputation for raising quality gentlemen ready to win the war for American 
independence.
94
   
The stakes involved in these appointments were high and delegates used a complex 
political calculus to dole out the generalships to the colonies that had raised troops in the spring 
to fight the British.  Originally, Congress anticipated commissioning two major generals and five 
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brigadier generals.  With, however, only seven positions to fill, delegates worried that some 
colonies would feel slighted.  Congressmen understood that each colonial legislature wanted at 
least one generalship for its colony as recognition of their patriotic effort.  Every colonist who 
followed the battle reports would read about the generals and what colonies they represented.
95
  
John Adams described the political negotiations over generalships in a personal letter to 
Joseph Warren:  “How many Brigadiers general we shall have,” Adams observed, “whether five, 
Seven or Eight, is not determined, nor who they shall be.  One from N. Hampshire, one from R. 
Island, two from Connecticut, one from N. York, and three from Massachusetts, perhaps.”
96
  
Adams’s letter mentioned the colonies that had rushed volunteer armies to Boston after the 
skirmishes at Lexington and Concord.  A week after commissioning George Washington, 
Congress settled on appointing four major generals and eight brigadier generals.  Soon, three 
generals threatened to resign in accordance with the eighteenth-century honor code, thereby 
wreaking havoc with Congress’s carefully considered political calculus.  
When Congress commissioned the new generals on June 22, it also established their 
respective seniority level.  Seniority dictated each officer’s level of authority and place on the 
line of promotion.  A gentleman in the eighteenth century paid a significant amount of attention 
to his position in the chain of command, because he believed his commission rewarded his good 
character and reputation.
97
  Gentlemen insisted that they could not serve with honor under men 
who had been their subordinates in the social hierarchy.  The culture of honor stipulated that 
resignation served as their only peaceable option to deal with this type of insult to their character.  
                                                 
95
 Colonial Americans believed that a person’s social class and the geographical location of his/her birth shaped 
his/her character.  Eric Nellis, An Empire of Regions: A Brief History of Colonial British America (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010).  Colonies vied for honors during the Revolution, hoping to gain recognition and 
renown.   
96
 John Adams to Joseph Warren, June 21, 1775, Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1:530. 
97
 Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor, 29-39, McDonnell, “Popular Mobilization and Political Culture in Revolutionary 
Virginia: The Failure of the Minutemen and the Revolution from Below,” The Journal of American History, 963-
972, and Stephenson, Patriot Battles: How The War of Independence Was Fought, 63-67. 
 40 
Conservatives understood the officers’ reactions, though they probably wished that they had not 
decided to reject congressional authority at the beginning of the rebellion.  Radicals, however, 
hoped to create a new social order that would reward merit and not seniority.  They wanted 
generals who happily accepted their patriotic commissions without worrying about seniority.  
Competing political ideologies shaped how delegates reacted to problems in the military sphere, 
and the culture of honor was open to interpretation by both radicals and conservatives in the 
Continental Congress and the Continental Army.   
As the record of congressional proceedings makes clear, delegates deliberately listed the 
new seniority rankings of the major and brigadier generals.  Delegates ranked the officers based 
upon their reputation and their respective colonies’ military efforts.  Artemas Ward of 
Massachusetts received the highest seniority of the major generals; he was placed second in 
command to Washington.  Ward was ranked so highly because, prior to the establishment of the 
Continental Army, he had commanded the makeshift army surrounding the British troops in 
Boston.  By making Ward second in command, delegates wanted to ease the sting of not 
appointing him commander-in-chief.  Ward understood the political reasons for selecting 
Washington and never resented his congressional appointment.  Congress then appointed Charles 
Lee, a former British officer, Philip Schuyler of New York, and Israel Putnam of Connecticut as 
major generals.   
Using the political arithmetic alluded to by John Adams, Congress appointed eight 
brigadier generals.  In order of seniority, from first to last, Congress commissioned Seth 
Pomeroy of Massachusetts, Richard Montgomery of New York and a former British officer, 
David Wooster of Connecticut, William Heath of Massachusetts, Joseph Spencer of Connecticut, 




  Congress also appointed Horatio Gates, a former British officer, as adjutant 
general to help Washington create a professional army from the amateur military force gathered 
outside of Boston.   
Congress awarded both Massachusetts and Connecticut three generalships each because 
those states had contributed the most men and material to the war effort.  Congress attempted to 
commit New York fully to the war effort by commissioning two prominent New Yorkers.  
Delegates feared that New York City might be the next target of British forces and they hoped 
the commissions would prevent New York from declaring neutrality.  These kinds of political 
calculations influenced the nominations of the Continental Army’s generals and even the 
structure of the army.  Decisions were made after lengthy debate highlighting how the delegates 
compromised their political ideologies to maintain the war effort.  They also compromised on 
many other matters to ensure a deferential atmosphere in Congress where every opinion was 
heard to prevent injured feelings.   
After the shots fired at Lexington and Concord, many colonial legislatures raised their 
own military forces and commissioned their own locally prominent gentlemen for the officer 
corps.  Gentlemen received ranks of seniority in recognition of their reputation and political 
and/or military experience, because many of the newly commissioned officers had served in the 
French and Indian War.  For example, when Congress appointed the new generals, it 
inadvertently ignored the seniority established by Massachusetts’s local legislature.  But in the 
case of Connecticut’s generals, Congress intentionally disregarded the rankings to reward Israel 
Putnam for his military exploits during the spring.
99
  Accordingly, when David Wooster, Joseph 
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Spencer, and John Thomas received their new commissions from Washington, they threatened to 
resign.
100
    
In Washington’s first official letter to Congress on July 10, 1775, he described the 
difficulties with the new commissions.  He also commented on the officers’ behavior when they 
received the news.  In Washington’s words, “the Appointments of the General Officers in the 
Province of Massachusetts Bay—have by no Means corresponded with the Judgment & Wishes 
of either the civil or Military.”
101
  John Thomas resented his new commission; in the 
Massachusetts army he had ranked higher than Seth Pomeroy and William Heath.  Now, he was 
a subordinate to them, ranked six out of eight officers.  Thomas believed that his new 
commission insulted his character and reputation and that the Continental Congress had 
deliberately refused to acknowledge his achievements.  Washington understood his hurt feelings, 
explaining to Congress that the situation “would make his Continuance very difficult, & 
probably operate on his Mind.”
102
  Washington urged Congress to find a solution that would 
preserve Thomas’s dignity and allow him to serve in the Continental Army.   
When Abigail Adams heard about Thomas’s new commission, she told her husband, “I 
fear General Thomas being overlooked and Heath placed over him will create much uneasiness.  
If Thomas resigns all his officers resign; and Mr. Thomas cannot with honour hold under 
Heath.”
103
  Abigail Adams’s comments reflected her keen awareness of the culture of honor used 
both in the military and in civil institutions.  She understood that even if the commission was a 
mistake by Congress, Thomas and his peers considered the commission to be a comment on his 
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character.  To support Thomas, his junior officers would have resigned in protest.  Officers felt 
that their regiment’s honor and their own personal honor depended on recognition of their 
general’s military reputation.  In most gentlemen’s minds the struggle over rank and promotion 
correlated directly with how society and their peers valued their honor and reputations.    
In fact, John Adams stated that a “Want of frequent Communication and particular 
Intelligence led us into the unfortunate Arrangement of General Officers, which is likely to do so 
much Hurt.”  The Massachusetts delegates had ranked their quota of Continental generals 
without realizing that their local legislature had already commissioned prominent local gentry.  
Adams learned in early July that the Continental Congress had unwittingly demoted Thomas.  
Adams reassured politicians in Massachusetts that “I have made it my Business ever since I 
heard of this Error, to wait upon Gentn. of the Congress…and contrive a Way to get out of the 
Difficulty, which I hope we shall effect.”
104
  Massachusetts delegates in Congress wrote 
apologetic letters to Thomas to assure him that they had not meant to insult his honor.  As a 
measure of their seriousness in the matter, they proposed a plan to make Thomas the highest-
ranking brigadier general.   
Members of the Massachusetts state legislature and members of Congress worked 
together to negotiate a solution to Thomas’s commission, they asked Seth Pomeroy to resign his 
new commission, and then they would replace Pomeroy with Thomas.  Plagued by health issues, 
Pomeroy had already left the army encampment in Boston before the trouble with the 
commissions.  His resignation was a simple formality that allowed Thomas to outrank Heath and 
coincided with the original rankings decided by the Massachusetts government.
105
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Joseph Spencer’s and David Wooster’s unhappiness over the new commissions was not 
so easily resolved.  Congress commissioned Israel Putnam as a major general to reward his 
martial zeal.  In the spring, Putnam had engaged British forces in a minor skirmish, earning him 
plaudits in Congress for his bold military manner.  In a letter, one congressman praised Putnam, 
who had served in French and Indian War, as a man “totally unfit for every thing, but only 
fighting.”
106
  Congress rewarded Putnam by deliberately ignoring the ranks established by the 
Connecticut legislature.  An infuriated Spencer and Wooster insisted that the Continental 
Congress must conform to Connecticut’s decision.
107
    
While Washington expressed sympathy for Thomas in his letter to Congress, he 
disapproved of how Spencer handled the news about the commissions.  Spencer had left the 
army after threatening to resign and had then returned to Connecticut.  Washington notified 
Congress that Spencer “was so much disgusted at the Preference given to Gen. Putnam, that he 
left the Army without visiting me, or making known his Intentions in any Respect.”
108
  
Washington’s choice of words indicated his displeasure with Spencer’s actions and painted 
Spencer as a petulant military officer and not a gentleman honorably protesting his unhappiness 
with a congressional decision.  Washington’s characterization of Thomas was in sharp contrast to 
his view of Spencer: “I must join in the general Opinion that he [Thomas] is an able good Officer 
& his Resignation would be a publick Loss.”
109
  Besides notifying Congress that Spencer left 
without his permission, Washington ignored Spencer in the rest of the letter.  His silence about 
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Spencer was an eloquent condemnation of Spencer’s behavior and perhaps reflected 
Washington’s doubts about Spencer’s character.  Washington was also silent about David 
Wooster, who remained in camp but complained loudly about the injustices done to his 
reputation.  Such behavior likely lowered Wooster’s stock in Washington’s eyes.  
Silas Deane and Eliphalet Dyer, congressional delegates from Connecticut, discussed the 
behavior of Spencer and Wooster in their personal and political correspondence.  They seemed 
embarrassed by how petulantly Spencer and Wooster had acted.  Deane wrote “that the late 
Arrangement of Officers, is highly disagreeable to Worster [Wooster], and Spencer and that high 
words have pass’d on the Occasion—that Worster talks high of his Thirty Years Service, and that 
Spencer left his Forces.”
110
  Deane, a radical delegate, believed Wooster’ and Spencer’s behavior 
insulted Putnam and he was happy that Congress had rewarded Putnam for his actions rather 
than for his social reputation.  Radicals championed a new interpretation of the culture of honor, 
which emphasized the recognition of an individual’s actions and not his pedigree.    
Condemning Spencer’s behavior, Deane argued that “he acted a part, inconsistent, with 
the Character, either of a Soldier, a Patriot, or even of a Common Gentleman to desert his post in 
an hour of Danger…and to turn his back sullenly on his General [Putnam].”
111
  Washington 
undoubtedly agreed with Deane’s sentiment, but he could never have expressed that view in a 
public letter to Congress.  Washington had to choose his words carefully because his letters were 
intended for a public audience.  Deane, however, could indulge himself by using heated words in 
a private letter to insult Spencer.   
The culture of honor encouraged fine distinctions in the matter of socially acceptable 
behavior. Thus, although Spencer could resign his commission, he could not honorably leave his 
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troops without notifying the commander-in-chief.  Resignation was an acceptable method of 
protest, but leaving camp without notice was impetuous behavior unbecoming of a gentleman.  
Eliphalet Dyer confided to a friend, “I have Indeavourd to make all the excuse for him [Spencer] 
possible that as this Congress had Superseded him in Rank by Genll Putnam…they must make 
some allowance for the first feelings up on such an Occasion.  I hope he may return soon & 
behave in Character.”
112
  Dyer disapproved of Spencer’s behavior because it reflected poorly on 
Connecticut’s gentry.  He wanted Spencer to model his behavior after Washington’s public 
demeanor.  A gentleman never allowed his emotions to influence his public behavior.  Men 
should appear calm and rational at all times because only the lower social classes expressed their 
feelings without any control.
113
  Spencer behaved poorly by leaving camp in high dudgeon.  His 
actions reflected poorly on his character and made him look petty.   
Dyer’s comments were indicative of Congress’s growing frustration with Spencer’s, 
Thomas’s, and Wooster’s behavior over the commissions.  Many delegates thought that any 
nomination was an honor and that the generals should ignore their disappointment with their new 
rank and accept the commissions.  Delegates could understand “the first feelings” of resentment 
and injured pride but would not tolerate it as a challenge to congressional authority.   
Congress was already worried about its authority to raise an army for a defensive war and 
now it faced challenges from newly commissioned officers who preferred their local legislature’s 
authority.  Wooster returned his commission to Roger Sherman, asking Sherman to “deliver it to 
Mr. Hancock with my best compliments, I desire him not to return it to me.  I have already a 
commission from the assembly of Connecticut.”
114
  Attachment to local authority complicated 
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the Continental Congress’s attempt to gain recognition as the new authority superseding, on 
certain matters, the colonial legislatures.
115
  Delegates had two motives influencing their interest 
in controlling the Continental Army: it would make prosecution of the war effort easier since all 
decisions would be decided by one national legislature as opposed to thirteen legislatures; and it 
presented the opportunity for Congress to gather more authority and cement its power as the 
national legislature.   
Congressional representatives resented Spencer’s and Wooster’s dismissal of their 
authority to appoint, in any order they preferred, the new major and brigadier generals for the 
Continental Army.  John Adams believed that “Gentlemen here, had no private Friendships 
Connections, or Interests, which prompted them to vote for the Arrangement they made, but 
were influenced only by a Regard to the Service; and they are determined that their Commissions 
shall not be despized.”
116
  Adams was defending Congress’s decision-making process against the 
resentful whispers of Spencer and Wooster.  Some congressional delegates had come to resent 
the behavior of all three generals for their complaints about their appointments.  Adams was 
convinced that “It will cost us, Pains to privent their being discarded from the service of the 
Continent with Indignation.”
117
  Fortunately, the delegates relented in their anger when Spencer 
returned to Boston and accepted his brigadier general commission.  Wooster also acknowledged 
his Continental Army commission, though he still considered himself a major general in 
Connecticut’s army. 
Members of Congress allowed their anger towards the generals to dissipate because, in 
the end, they had no alternative.  The generals had, after all, eventually recognized congressional 
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authority.  Besides, another round of political calculus would have been necessary to replace 
Connecticut’s quota of brigadier generals.  Ultimately, though, what prevented Spencer’s and 
Wooster’s dismissal was that the delegates understood their first feelings upon being demoted.  
Congressmen may have disliked the generals’ personal behavior but they accepted that threats of 
resignation were allowed and encouraged by the culture of honor.  At the beginning of the 
Second Continental Congress, delegates were hesitant over how much power they possessed 
over the Continental Army’s affairs.  They therefore worked to reach a compromise with these 
generals. But, as the war dragged on, congressmen grew increasingly intolerant of the generals’ 
behavior.    
The dispute over congressional commissions illuminates several key concerns for the 
revolutionaries in both Congress and the army during the first two months of rebellion.  Congress 
worried about creating a professional army and having to trust military officers with any power.  
The behavior of these three generals appeared to confirm all of the delegates’ suspicions that 
military office transformed patriots into ambitious soldiers who sought greater power and 
influence.  Now congressmen would watch the Continental Army’s officers with an even more 
“jealous eye” to determine if they would despise and flout congressional authority.  Delegates 
did, however, appreciate Washington’s handling of the tense situation because he left everything 
in the hands of Congress (which he was probably very happy to do).  Washington bowed to civil 
authority in handling internal military matters. 
The commissions reveal the complicated political calculations involved in appointing 
officers who possessed military talent and experience while at the same time satisfying local 
legislatures that wanted their prominent local gentry recognized.  Congress wanted gentlemen to 
fill the officer corps because such officers would be a part of the same culture of honor that 
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governed the actions of the congressional delegates.  They would therefore share a set of values 
that shaped their public behavior and decision-making processes.  But, at the same time, the 
culture of honor proved increasingly troublesome because it demanded that gentlemen constantly 
guard against threats to their character.  To officers, commissions defined their social standing 
among their peers.  If they were not promoted or failed to receive a ranking as high as they 
believed they deserved, then their character, which is to say, their honor, had been insulted.  For 
the delegates, the commissions represented Congress’s authority and control over the Continental 
Army.  They worried that officers were challenging their legitimacy as the civil authority.   
The friction between the Continental Congress and the Continental Army only grew 
worse as the army grew larger and added additional temperamental officers to the Continental 
Line.  During the first two years of the war, Congress took steps to increase its control over the 
Continental Army. Congress, rather than Washington, established the guidelines for promotion.  
Congress further asserted its supremacy by discharging a major general during an active 
campaign season because political factions in both congress and the army had used open-floor 
debate to mediate an affair of honor between two generals, Philip Schuyler and Horatio Gates.  
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Chapter 2: 
The Rank Business of Promotion 
 
“I earnestly intreat you to make the most minute Enquiry, after every one of these [officer 
appointments], and let me know his Character, for I am determined, I will know that Army, and 
the Character of all its officers.  I Swear, I will be a faithful Spy upon it for its good.”  
  




 Major General Horatio Gates strode into the congressional chamber in June 1777, with 
prepared speech in hand ready to defend his right to an independent command in New York 
state.  Struggling to control his temper, Gates confronted congressmen about their recent 
decision to make him subordinate to Major General Philip Schuyler.  Gates began by narrating 
“his Birth, Parentage and Education, Life, Character and Behavior.”
119
  He outlined his claims to 
gentility and his qualifications for service in the Continental Army, arguing that “My Rank, my 
Station, my Services entitled me to more Regard than such unceremonious Treatment.”
120
  Gates 
also asserted that New York representatives James Duane and William Duer had deliberately 
insulted his reputation by gossiping about his military performance in an effort to gain 
preferment for their close friend and fellow New Yorker, Philip Schuyler.   
Gates’s accusations electrified Congress.  Shouting down the allegations, James Duane 
demanded that Gates withdraw from the congressional chamber.  Other delegates called for the 
general to continue.  He eventually withdrew without finishing his speech and delegates grimly 
muttered among themselves about the continual problem of Continental Army officers 
challenging congressional authority.   
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 The shouting match between Gates and Duane in June 1777 reflected how over the past 
two years tensions had increased between Congress and the Continental Army.  Congress had 
begun to exert more control over the army in October 1775 through various laws and regulations.  
At times, the officer corps reacted to the congressional initiatives with resentment and anger, but 
most officers followed Washington’s example of patient cooperation with Congress’s numerous 
directives and interference with military protocol.  During the war, the issue of rank and 
promotion became a major point of contention and confrontation between the civil and military 
authorities. 
 From the beginning, Congress decided to control promotions within the Continental 
Army.  Delegates wanted to ensure that the right gentlemen with the proper qualifications fought 
for the correct political and social principles.  Unfortunately, in Congress promoters of these 
principles split along ideological lines between radical and conservative revolutionaries.  As 
discussed in chapter one, these factions held different opinions about the proper qualifications for 
officers.  Radicals hoped to reward patriotic fervor and action.  They wanted to create a social 
meritocracy introducing a new conception of the eighteenth-century culture of honor that valued 
their political principles.  In contrast, conservatives wanted to use the traditional eighteenth-
century culture of honor to preserve social stability.  While they recognized merit as a crucial 




 Ideological differences also existed in the military.  Many army officers had held political 
positions prior to assuming their new military commands and identified themselves as either 
radical or conservative revolutionaries.  Officers often communicated with politicians in 
Congress or in their local legislatures to exchange news and to discuss their political principles.  
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John Adams believed that “a free Correspondence between the Members of Congress and the 
Officers of the Army, will probably be attended with Advantages to the public by improving 
both the Councils and Arms of America.”
122
  What Adams was not so subtly encouraging was 
close personal communication among all revolutionaries.  Such exchanges with their political 
allies and friends would, he hoped, prevent feelings of alienation within the officer corps.  
Furthermore, many congressional delegates wanted to receive the army officers’ suggestions for 
reorganizing the Continental Army into a military force capable of beating the British.  While 
delegates trusted Washington as commander-in-chief, they also wanted to know the opinions of 
other officers so that no general had too much power or influence with Congress.
123
  Men in the 
civil and military spheres exchanged thousands of letters in which they shared gossip and 
political opinions during the rebellion.   
As the war progressed, gentlemen moved fluidly in and out of both revolutionary 
institutions.  The rotation of officers and politicians allowed friendship and patronage networks 
to expand beyond the scope of local connections.  If congressmen failed to be reelected to the 
Continental Congress, they might join the military or become wartime governors of their 
colonies/states.  Army officers followed a similar pattern: Philip Schuyler ran for gubernatorial 
office in New York while fighting British General Burgoyne’s invasion from Canada; other 
officers eventually won election to the Continental Congress or to their local legislatures.  In 
fact, many close relationships existed between politicians and military officers during the war.  
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These friendships are important because they were channels for the flow of political gossip.  In 
the eighteenth century, patronage and close connections helped gentlemen gain political office or 
a colonelcy in the state militia.  Friendships provided an instant character reference because 
gentlemen were only acquainted with people whose reputation and character they respected.  In 
this and in other ways, delegates of the Continental Congress used the guidelines for eighteenth-
century society to bring order to these turbulent times.  Delegates paid close attention to their 
fellow delegates’ friends believing they revealed people’s political allegiances.
124
 
Friendships were a major factor in the dissatisfaction over ranks and promotions within 
the Continental Army.  Officers believed that their comrades gained preferment due to their 
connections with political officials.  Originally, Congress had only appointed generals leaving 
the other officer appointments to local legislatures.  By 1777, after two extensive debates the 
Continental Congress commissioned all officers above the rank of captain.  Continental Army 
officers now looked to Congress and not their superior officers for promotions, a shift that 
resulted in even more letters between the two revolutionary institutions.   
When officers were unhappy with their ranks or lack of promotion, many threatened to 
resign.  As an eighteenth-century military manual warned, “[N]obles become extremely 
disgusted with war when they do not receive promotion.  They believe that an injury has been 
done to their reputation unless, by suitable advancement, they are reassured that one is pleased 
with their services.”
125
  Of course, this suitable advancement was subjective, leaving room for 
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interpretation in both Congress and the officer corps over when promotions were needed.  
Officers of all ranks pushed for promotion writing to acquaintances and close friends to plead 
their cases.  In an officer’s mind a higher rank signified greater recognition of his reputation 
among his peers.
126
  This mindset made promotions personal during the war.  Politicians 
understood these feelings but grew frustrated with the ceaseless petitions from officers 
threatening to resign if they did not receive a higher rank.   
Friendship networks mediated the threat of resignation because friends and political allies 
promised to put forward an aggrieved officer’s name for the next round of promotions.  
Delegates offered to work on behalf of their friend’s interests in hopes of soothing the officer’s 
temper and bruised ego.  Mediation served as a critically important method for negotiating the 
tension caused by the eighteenth-century culture of honor’s requirement that a gentleman 
challenge any perceived insult to his character.  Friends urged each other to calm down and think 
through decisions before writing a letter of resignation or issuing a challenge to a duel.  If a duel 
was the only option in the participants’ minds, then mediators helped explain to the peer group 
why such drastic action was necessary.   
The importance of mediation to negotiating the tensions between the Continental 
Congress and the Continental Army is revealed in the dispute between Major Generals Horatio 
Gates and Philip Schuyler over who would command the northern army in upstate New York.  
The controversy lasted for over a year and resulted in multiple congressional resolutions and 
several threats of resignation.  Schuyler and Gates each used his political allies and friends in 
Congress to fight for him and these allies used mediation to maneuver on behalf of the generals.  
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The Schuyler-Gates controversy exposes how the culture of honor complicated the interactions 
between the military and civil authorities.  The dispute was inherently dangerous and political 
factions in Congress were determined to use mediation to resolve the disputes between the two 
generals before it ended in an affair of honor.   
From 1775 through 1777, Congress introduced new regulations for the military, exerting 
more control over the Continental Army than perhaps delegates realized at the time.  Congress 
controlled promotions and in the fall of 1775 began to create a professional army by introducing 
harsher disciplinary measures and longer terms of enlistment.
127
  As Congress increased its 
authority, it encountered problems rooted in the culture of honor, as officers resented 
congressional control over military promotions.   
 Writing to Congress in late September, Washington worried that he would not have 
enough soldiers during the winter to keep the British contained in Boston.  Army enlistments 
ended in early December and some soldiers were already deserting to return home for the 
harvest.  Washington’s concerns about expiring enlistments offered revolutionaries, in both the 
army and Congress, an opportunity to contemplate a new organizational structure for the 
colonies’ military forces.  The original army created in June was a haphazard affair, and mainly a 
reaction to the urgent situation in Massachusetts after Lexington and Concord.  In the fall of 
1775, delegates began thinking about the best way to conduct a defensive war in the following 
year.   
 Conservatives and radicals differed, often sharply, over the future of the army and even 
what constituted a desirable outcome of the war.  Conservatives initially hoped that a few quick, 
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decisive military victories against the King’s troops would bring Parliament to the bargaining 
table.  Delegates avidly exchanged letters detailing the latest rumors from London about British 
military strategies.  Washington alerted Congress that the Continental Army was slowly melting 
away, while hearing news that Britain was hiring mercenaries to fight in the colonies.
128
 
 Radical and conservative delegates in open-floor debate discussed “how, when, and 
where the said Army may be best raised and levied.”  Some politicians raised the question of “by 
whom the Officers should be chosen and recommended.”
 129 
 Both Washington and members of 
Congress wanted to bring order to the haphazard American military forces.  Unfortunately, 
revolutionaries in both institutions disagreed on the best methods for restructuring the army. 
John Adams’s notes about the debates in October 1775 revealed how radicals and 
conservatives were still debating the army’s structure, a topic they had struggled with during the 
summer months.  The military stalemate in Boston between Washington and Howe, in the fall, 
presented an opportunity for Congress to guide the Continental Army in either a politically 
radical or conservative direction.  Ultimately, the delegates compromised because they could not 
imagine that the war would last beyond December 1776. 
According to Adams’s notes, delegates debated whether the Continental Congress should 
appoint all officers over the rank of captain.  Adams listed each delegate and a short synopsis of 
his argument.
130
  The debate grew heated when delegates proposed enhancing Congress’s control 
over the officer corps.  Radical delegates, such as Roger Sherman, Samuel Ward, and Eliphalet 
Dyer, urged Congress to leave officer appointments to the discretion of each colony’s legislature.  
Conservative delegates, such as James Duane, Samuel Chase, and Edward Rutledge argued for 
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increasing the Continental Congress’s control over its army.  The debates in October 1775 reveal 
the influence that radical and conservative interpretations of honor exerted on delegates’ 
decisions about the army’s structure.     
 Conservatives argued for increased control over the officer appointment process, 
believing that vesting Congress with the power to appoint all officers would cause the military to 
transfer its allegiance from units’ respective provinces to the national legislature.  Delegates 
wanted to prevent accidentally superseding a local legislature’s rankings, thereby avoiding a 
situation similar to the problems that had arisen during the summer of 1775, when three brigadier 
generals had threatened to resign.  Arguing that “We are to form the grand Outlines of an 
American Army-a general Regulation,” James Duane then asked his fellow congressmen: “If We 
were to set out anew, would the same Plan be pursued?”  He suggested that Congress appoint 
officers in consultation with the generals, stating, “Schuyler and Montgomery would govern my 
Judgment.  I would rather take the opinion of Gen. Washington than of any Convention.  We can 
turn out the unworthy and reward Merit.”
131
  In referring to Schuyler and Montgomery, Duane 
had deliberately called attention to two socially conservative generals, his close friends and 
fellow New Yorkers.  The conservatives’ final point stressed Congress’s fiscal control over the 
army, arguing, “We pay.  Cant We appoint with the Advice of our Generals.”
132
  Even in 
Adams’s sparsely detailed notes, the radicals’ explosive reactions to the conservatives’ 
arguments is clear.  John Langdon of New Hampshire warned that conservatives proposed “a 
very extraordinary Motion” rife “with many Mischiefs.”
133
 
 Radicals believed provincial conventions were better equipped to nominate officers for 
the Continental Army because local social networks could uncover and report the character and 
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personal history of each applicant.  Dyer insisted, “we must derive all our Knowledge, from the 
Delegates of that Colony.  The Representatives at large are as good Judges and would give more 
Satisfaction.”
134
  Radicals wanted to select officers for their political principles creating an 
officer corps filled with patriots who understood and recognized the dangers of a standing army.   
Many New England congressmen worried that a conservative Continental Army would 
upset the traditional structure of the local militia units, where foot soldiers elected their own 
officers.  Washington abhorred this traditional practice because he believed officer elections 
encouraged too much familiarity between the ranks.
135
  In fact, radical delegates warned that 
“You cant raise an Army if you put Officers over the Men whom they dont know.  It requires 
Time to bring People off from ancient Usage.”
136
  Radicals wanted an officer corps composed of 
one-year volunteers, either elected by army privates or selected by local legislatures for their 
ideological beliefs.  Such arrangements would prevent the conservatives from enhancing 
Congress’s power at the expense of the provincial legislatures.   
 After a heated discussion, Congress delayed issuing new guidelines until a congressional 
committee had consulted with Washington at the army’s headquarters in Boston.  Washington 
then persuaded delegates to assume responsibility for all officer appointments above the rank of 
captain.  Congress’s final decision was a compromise between radical and conservative 
delegates, who agreed that each colony’s delegation should consult with their local legislature 
before endorsing the appointments.   
Though Congress created a Continental Army, each regiment was comprised of soldiers 
from a specific colony.  Not even Washington ever considered blending the regiments because 
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all revolutionaries agreed that men were more inclined to volunteer if they could serve with their 
neighbors.  By maintaining local distinctions in the regiments, officers then inundated their 
specific colonial representatives with letters laying out their pleas for promotions or threats of 
resignation if they were not granted.   
 The Continental Army suffered major military reverses during the 1776 campaign 
season: an invasion of Canada failed spectacularly and Washington lost New York City and was 
chased into Pennsylvania by Lord General Cornwallis.  The Battle of Trenton, however, offered 
a beacon of hope to war-weary Americans at the end of the year.  After an arduous campaign 
season, officers in their winter encampments began petitioning their congressional 
representatives for promotions to recognize their dedicated service to the American cause.  When 
Congress did not respond quickly enough to suit the officers, they began grumbling and 
threatening to resign en masse.  During the war, officers never recognized how long the political 
process took in the Continental Congress because of the committee system and open-floor 
debate.  Thomas Burke of North Carolina routinely observed that congressional debates were 
“perplexed, inconclusive and irksome.”
137
  
 Facing threats of resignation en masse, Congress contemplated for the first time the 
establishment of specific guidelines for standardizing officer promotions in the Continental 
Army.  Prior to February 1777, promotions were a haphazard affair and officers questioned 
Congress’s motives for commissioning certain individuals.  They grew resentful and exchanged 
accusations about favoritism running rampant and corrupting Congress.  Spurred by 
Washington’s notification that three major and ten brigadier generals needed to be appointed, 
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delegates spent a week discussing specific guidelines for promotions.
138
  Delegates debated three 
different options for promoting officers, eventually settling on a compromise that satisfied no 
one.   
 The first proposal suggested that Congress promote officers according to seniority in the 
ranks.  Some delegates preferred this solution because it adhered to traditional military protocol.  
It left no room for interpretation about the delegates’ motivations; instead promotions were 
linked to seniority within each state’s regiments.  Other delegates shouted down this idea, 
arguing it left Congress without the ability to reward extraordinary battlefield exploits.  By using 
only seniority, the civil authority had no other incentive to offer that would inspire military 
officers to work harder to gain advancement.  Perhaps there was also a fear that this proposal 
might establish a professional officer class similar to that in European armies.   
Radicals proposed promoting heroic and brave officers according to merit.  Merit was 
however, a contested idea and had multiple meanings to revolutionaries in both institutions.  Did 
it consist of possessing excellent martial skills or the correct political principles?  How could 
members of Congress possibly agree on what merit meant in every officer’s promotion?  Burke 
was horrified at the idea of using merit as the sole basis for promotion and he warned that 
Congress “ought to give no room for jealousy.”
139
  Specific guidelines, such as seniority, were 
needed that offered no room for interpretation. 
Burke proposed a third option, revealing his interest in maintaining civilian control over 
the officer corps.  He suggested that “each State should recommend officers in proportion to the 
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men they furnish: three Battalions, one Brigadier, nine, one Major General.”
140
  Burke hoped his 
proposal would allow members of Congress to control the politics within their own state 
regiments while also encouraging states to raise more military forces for greater political cachet.  
Francis Lewis of New York understood Burke’s motivations and urged his provincial legislature 
to send more delegates to Philadelphia, writing, “notwithstanding many declarations to the 
contrary, Colonial prejudices sway the minds of individuals, that each State appear interested in 
the debates, for promotion in the line of their respective States.”
141
  Two years into the war and a 
year after signing the Declaration of Independence, states still competed with each other for 
national recognition.   
In his congressional speeches, Burke insisted that guidelines needed to be established.  
He argued “that the Congress would be an object of very jealous apprehension, unchecked and 
unlimited as it is, if the officers of the army held their honor at the precarious pleasure of a 
majority.”
142
  He understood that “Officers hold their honor the most dear of anything.  Setting 
them aside when they were entitled to promotion would wound that honor very sorely.”
143
  
Burke’s statements captured the essence of why officers threatened to resign, because they 
believed promotions were public recognition of their reputations.  Burke knew that the culture of 
honor shaped the interactions between civil and military authorities because every revolutionary 
understood the honor code.  He warned that officers believed delegates possessed the arbitrary 
power to wound or to recognize the officers’ honor.  Congressmen wanted to exert more control 
over the armed forces, but there had to a clear line to that authority.  Officers needed to know 
that there were unambiguous, unbiased guidelines.  That is why Burke argued against merit-
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based promotions and encouraged promotions calculated either by seniority or state contribution 
quotas.  He wanted to eliminate any room for interpretation to prevent officers from resenting 
politicians and threatening resignation.  The eighteenth-century culture of honor complicated the 
business of promotion.   
After a strenuous week of debate, delegates crafted a compromise.  The final resolution 
declared, “that in voting for general officers, a due regard shall be had to the line of succession, 
the merit of the persons proposed, and the quota of troops raised, and to be raised, by each 
State,” and gave officers three different options for petitioning for promotion.
144
  Ultimately, the 
new guidelines proved disastrous for the Continental Congress and the Continental Army, a topic 
discussed further in chapter three.  Although Congress achieved its goal of exerting more control 
over the military with the new guidelines, just as Burke warned, officers now jealously resented 
Congress’s power over promotions and seethed over the delegates’ arbitrary power.   
The Continental Army was shaped by the circumstances of the war.  Initially created by 
Congress to fight a defensive war against British troops in Boston, by the fall of 1775 the army 
had been split into three different forces fighting throughout the United States.
145
  From the 
beginning, Washington kept in close contact with the civil authority, notifying Congress when 
the army needed new officers appointed, soldiers recruited, or money to procure supplies.  His 
letters prompted debates over different proposals to solve the army’s problems.  Such debates 
took time and the army began to grumble about its civilian masters and government inefficiency.  
Even as Congress argued about solutions for the army, it hoped to prevent the military from 
growing too professional and strong; for the delegates, civil liberties were more important than 
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an efficient military machine.  To deal with the growing problems between the Continental 
Congress and the Continental Army, revolutionaries in both institutions turned to the resolution 
process provided by the culture of honor.  Mediation was the first step to reducing tensions.     
 Delegates built a mediation process into Congress’s institutional structure by using open-
floor debates and the committee system.  In 1777, mediation was needed to resolve escalating 
tensions between the army and Congress and between two major generals, Schuyler and 
Gates.
146
  These generals were arguing over who actually commanded the northern army in 
upstate New York and each attempted to use his friends and political connections in Congress to 
decide the matter in his favor.  Perhaps more clearly than any other situation that came before 
Congress, the Schuyler-Gates controversy exposes how mediation worked in a dispute between 
the two revolutionary institutions involving forceful personalities and basic political principles. 
 Congress actively participated in planning military campaigns for the Continental Army.  
Delegates sent letters to Washington suggesting different locations for attacking British troops 
and urged the construction of forts along the frontier.  Though most conservative delegates had 
initially supported a war for defensive purposes, by August 1775, Congress’s war goals had 
changed dramatically.  Caught up in a military fever and encouraged by delegates from New 
England and New York, Congress planned an invasion of Canada for the fall of 1775.  Several 
delegates argued that Canada longed to be liberated from British control and that an invasion 
would also secure New England’s northern borders against an attack from the British troops 
stationed in Canada.  Major General Philip Schuyler and Brigadier General Richard 
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 As the war expanded to new battlefronts, delegates created new departments and 
committees to handle their increased correspondence.
148
  Congress appointed Schuyler 
commander of the northern army in the newly formed Northern Department.  Major generals 
eagerly sought command of the new departments because the promotions denoted delegates’ 
confidence and approval and boosted the officers’ prestige.   
 Philip Schuyler of New York served simultaneously as a delegate in the Continental 
Congress and as a major general in the Continental Army.
149
  The New York state legislature 
approved of his dual role, reelecting Schuyler every year to his political post.  Schuyler, a 
wealthy landowner in New York, had strong political connections to many conservative 
revolutionaries.  His close family friends included the extended Livingston clan, John Jay, James 
Duane and William Duer.  These men kept him apprised of all the political gossip while he was 
away on army service.  Before receiving his officer’s commission in June 1775, Schuyler had 
also developed friendships with conservative Southern congressmen, such as Samuel Chase and 
Edward Rutledge.  Schuyler would depend on the support of his friends and political allies when 
he competed with Horatio Gates for control of the northern army. 
 A former British army officer, Gates possessed years of military experience and, in the 
summer of 1775, he had eagerly volunteered for service in the Continental Army.
150
  Gates 
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believed in radical Whig ideology, a major reason for his voluntary retirement from the British 
army in the early 1770s.  His political principles and common birth had stymied his advancement 
in Britain’s peacetime army.  After selling his commission, he immigrated to Virginia ready to 
live the genteel existence of a planter.  Congress took advantage of Gates’s military experience 
and appointed him adjutant general, a key administrative position in the army.  In Boston, Gates 
helped Washington drill discipline into the unorganized American forces.  Washington and 
Gates, however, disagreed over the establishment of a conservative military hierarchy in the 
Continental Army.  Gates preferred a military meritocracy, a system rejected by the British 
military.  Gates forged a strong bond with Congress’s radical minority faction after receiving his 
commission.  Samuel Adams, Roger Sherman, and James Lovell became Gates’s close political 
allies and friends and they suggested him for command of the American army in Canada in June 
1776.    
 The invasion of Canada proved an utter disaster for the American troops.  Montgomery 
died storming the city gates of Quebec and thousands of soldiers perished either because of the 
freezing temperatures or a smallpox outbreak.  Congress heard throughout the spring of 1776 
about the retreat of the American forces, and worried congressmen even sent a committee to 
investigate the Canadian debacle to find out which general to blame for the army’s failure.
151
   
Samuel Chase, a close friend of Schuyler, served on the committee and absolved 
Schuyler of any guilt.  Chase found Schuyler innocent for two reasons: he was a close friend and, 
moreover, he had never traveled with the troops into Canada.  Schuyler had remained in New 
York to facilitate the transportation of supplies for the invasion and to negotiate neutrality 
treaties with several Indian tribes.  Fixing blame elsewhere, Chase declared in an open report that 
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David Wooster and his Connecticut troops had hindered the American war effort.
152
  Chase 
wrote: “General Wooster is in our opinion unfit, totally unfit, to Command your Army & 
conduct the war; we have hitherto prevailed on him to remain in Montreal, his stay in this 
Colony is unnecessary & even prejudicial to our Affairs, we would therefore humbly advise his 
recall.”
153
  Chase’s strongly worded appraisal was guaranteed to destroy a man’s public 
reputation and Wooster was livid.  He demanded a congressional inquiry to clear his name from 
Schuyler’s whispering campaign and Chase’s public accusations.  A congressional inquiry 
cleared Wooster, but he missed his opportunity to command the American forces in Canada.  
Instead, that honor would go to newly promoted Major General Horatio Gates.
154
   
On June 17, 1776, Congress granted Gates an independent command in Canada, hoping 
he could halt the army’s retreat.  Gates’s congressional friends trusted him to prevent British 
General Sir Guy Carleton from physically cutting off New England from the rest of the 
American colonies.  Delegates resolved “That General Washington be directed to send Major 
General Gates into Canada, to take the command of the forces in that province.”
155
  John Adams 
wrote Gates a giddy, congratulatory letter emphasizing his hopes that Gates would turn the 
situation around quickly.  “We have ordered you to the Post of Honour, and made you Dictator 
in Canada for Six Months,” Adams remarked teasingly “or at least untill the first of October.  — 
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We dont choose to trust you Generals, with too much Power, for too long Time.”
156
  Even as 
Adams celebrated Gates’s new opportunity, he issued a lighthearted but clear reminder that 
military officials were subordinate to Congress.  Much correspondence of congressmen with 
officers demonstrated a balance between friendship and a clear warning to remember the 
supremacy of the civil government.   
Gates quickly set out for his new command but, before he arrived, the American forces 
had abandoned Canada.  Suddenly, Gates had an independent command but no army.  At their 
first meeting in Albany, New York, Schuyler’s and Gates’s tempers flared as they debated the 
meaning of Gates’s new commission.  Gates believed Congress would want a new army 
recruited and trained to invade British territory.  Schuyler disagreed with Gates’s interpretation 
of the congressional resolution and was concerned that Gates thought that he now possessed total 
control over the northern army.  Both major generals agreed to write Washington and Congress 
about their conflicting interpretations concerning Gates’s commission.
157
  Gates believed his new 
independent command was an opportunity to earn a national reputation for military glory.  
Schuyler, for his part, felt threatened by Gates and worried that Congress doubted his abilities 
and that representatives were plotting to replace him as commander of the northern army and 
Northern Department. 
Composing a letter to notify Washington of the situation, Schuyler swore that he and 
Gates “mean to be candid and wish to have the Matter settled without any of the Chicane, which 
would disgrace us as Officers & Men.”
158
  They agreed to write separate letters explaining their 
views of the situation and then “shew each other what we have written to you upon the 
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  Each general wanted to present a calm public demeanor while Congress arbitrated 
the dispute.  A gentleman needed to appear composed and rational at all times, but both men felt 
that their honor was at stake.   
This was a difficult situation for Washington and Congress to negotiate.  Schuyler made 
it clear that he considered Gates’s interpretation of the congressional resolution to be a direct 
insult to his character and reputation.  He warned that “If Congress intended that General Gates 
should command the Northern Army wherever it might be, as he assures me they did, it ought to 
have been signified to me, and I should then have immediately resigned the Command to 
him.”
160
  But Schuyler insisted, “until such Intention is properly conveyed to me I never can.”  
He told Washington “to lay this letter before Congress, that they may clearly & explicitly signify 
their Intentions to avert the Dangers & Evils that may arise from a disputed Command for after 
what General Gates has said the Line must be clearly drawn.”
161
  Though Schuyler and Gates 
each tried to avoid appearing petty in his petition, each man was upset and wanted Congress to 
declare that his interpretation of the dispute was correct.  They only wrote to Washington to 
follow traditional military protocol; all three officers knew that only Congress possessed the 
authority to fix the misunderstanding.   
On July 8, only days after declaring independence from Great Britain, Congress 
addressed the conflict over command of the northern army.  A new resolution stipulated “That 
Major General Gates be informed, that it was the intention of Congress to give him the command 
of the troops whilst in Canada, but had no design to vest him with a superior command to 
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General Schuyler, whilst the troops should be on this side Canada.”  John Hancock, in his role as 
president, was then ordered to write both generals “recommending to them to carry on the 
military operations with harmony, and in such manner as shall best promote the public 
service.”
162
  Members of Congress hoped that this resolution solved the conflict between the two 
major generals, but Schuyler’s ruffled feathers did not settle so easily.   
Every few months, over the next year, Schuyler or Gates wrote to Congress threatening to 
resign unless his demands were granted.  Each general and his friends in Congress began to see 
control over the northern army as a contest between ideological groups and a referendum on 
character.   The competition over command thus became an affair of honor to both men, and so 
they continually sought reassurance from Congress that it preferred one of them to the other.  
Furthermore, Schuyler’s stubborn personality made it difficult for him to forgive any slight or 
forget any insult.  He continually pushed and prodded Congress into confirming its preference 
for him over Gates.
163
  However, Gates had political allies in Congress who worked on his behalf 
to maintain his reputation.  When a misunderstanding over a congressional resolution escalated 
into an affair of honor between two major generals, the congressional floor became the only 
location to mediate a feud that involved public reputations.   
Mediation served as one of the few tools available to prevent an affair of honor from 
reaching the dueling ground.  In the Schuyler-Gates controversy, friendship networks in both the 
Continental Army and the Continental Congress resolved the dispute to prevent the resignation 
of either major general.  Congressmen talked their friends in the army out of threatening to 
resign while simultaneously promising to guard against evil designs that involved the officers.  
Mediators soothed tempers, but they could also complicate the resolution process.  Some 
                                                 
162
 July 8, 1776, Journals of the Continental Congress, 5:526. 
163
 Gerlach, Proud Patriot: Philip Schuyler, 196-201.  
 70 
gentlemen were quick to see elements of conspiracy in certain congressional resolutions as they 
tried to protect their friend’s character.
164
  Though personality clashes could complicate the 
mediation process, mediation helped dissipate some of the tensions that developed between the 
Continental Congress and the Continental Army.  It served as a valuable tool for both military 
and civil personnel to resolve their differences.    
Both generals wanted the civil authority to arbitrate their dispute because they needed to 
have their reputations publicly validated.  A gentleman’s character required public 
acknowledgment from his peers; Schuyler and Gates understood this unwritten rule of 
eighteenth-century society and used their friendships in Congress to secure an advantage over the 
other general.
165
  Mediation and the generals’ friends smoothed over the dispute and, after the 
July 8 resolution, Gates took command of Fort Ticonderoga to start preparing soldiers for a new 
invasion of Canada. 
Schuyler continued to worry that Congress no longer appreciated his abilities, and so he 
wrote to his friends asking for confirmation that Congress respected him. Otherwise, he warned, 
he would resign.
166
  In October, Edward Rutledge drafted a resolution refusing to accept 
Schuyler’s resignation.  Rutledge assured Schuyler “that the aspertions, which his enemies have 
thrown out against his character, have had no influence upon the minds of the members of this 
house, who are fully satisfied of his attachment to the cause of freedom.”
167
  Rutledge’s 
intentionally provocative language in the resolution revealed his firm allegiance to Schuyler.  His 
mention of aspersions and enemies fed into Schuyler’s worries instead of calming them.  Radical 
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delegates used the same warnings about conspiracy in their letters to Gates and Gates’s closest 
friends in the army.  Lovell warned Trumbull in dramatic terms to 
Put on thy Sword; prepare thy Cuirass; the Beast [Schuyler] is in fierce Rage and Fury 
against thee.  The Breath of his Mouth is doubtless as the Flame of a Furnace.  His Bile 
overfloweth even to the End of his armed Paws, so that a Flood of it is before our Eyes 
for Contemplation.  How have thy Stars forsaken thee, my Friend! so that the baleful 




These allusions to conspiracies reflected and reinforced congressmen’s worries about 
conspiracies and factions as the war dragged on.  The harsh strain of fighting the British 
increasingly wore away at the colonial unanimity that had marked the spirit of ’75.  Debates in 
Congress over the Schuyler-Gates controversy illustrate the delegates’ insecurity about winning 
the rebellion.   
During the winter of 1776, both Gates and Schuyler campaigned for complete control of 
the northern army. Many of Schuyler’s conservative allies tried to overturn Gates’s independent 
command within the Northern department.  Gates visited Congress in Baltimore, to lobby in 
person for a repeal of the July 8 resolution.
169
  Schuyler’s confidants kept him informed of 
Gates’s lobbying and he worried that Gates would prove successful.  In the early spring, 
Schuyler demanded that Congress grant him complete control of the Northern Department and 
northern army, including the ability to fire Joseph Trumbull, a key supporter of Gates.  
Congressmen became frustrated with Schuyler’s increasingly truculent tone and his continual 
demands for preference.  Some members began to view Schuyler’s personality in a negative 
light, worrying he was too petty and too focused on his reputation to prepare for the upcoming 
military campaign.  In fact, in March 1777, Congress issued a resolution chastising Schuyler, 
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revealing the delegates’ growing impatience with the Schuyler-Gates controversy.  They warned 
Schuyler that his tone in several recent letters was “highly derogatory to the honour of 
Congress;” and “it is expected his letters, for the future, be written in a stile more suitable to the 
dignity of the representative body of these free and independent states, and to his own character 
as their officer.”
170
  A frustrated and offended Congress invoked the key terms of honor and 
dignity to reprimand Schuyler.  The resolution warned Schuyler that his language had become 
increasingly petty and dictatorial and that, as an officer, he needed to remember that he was 
subordinate to congressional authority.
171
   
Schuyler became livid upon receiving the congressional remonstrance.  He left camp and 
traveled to Philadelphia intent on tendering his resignation and forcing a congressional inquiry 
into his management of the northern army.
172
  He wanted his character rehabilitated before the 
public.  Because Schuyler was technically a delegate to the Continental Congress, he was 
officially able to participate in legislative business.  His friends managed to soothe his temper, 
convincing him to continue his service in the Continental Army.  They even wrangled a public 
vote of confidence for Schuyler in May 1777, through a new resolution that confirmed his 
command of the northern army.  John Hancock, the president of the Continental Congress, wrote 
a letter to General Gates “informing him, that Major General Schuyler is order'd to take upon 
him the Command in the Northern Department.”  Gates’s options were “either to continue in the 
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Command in the Northern Department, under Major General Schuyler; or to take upon him the 
Office of Adjutant General in the Grand Army immediately under the Commander in Chief.”
173
  
Satisfied, Schuyler left to rejoin his forces in Albany. 
Schuyler’s friends happily informed the New York legislature about their victory over 
Gates and his radical friends.  William Duer confided to Robert R.  Livingston, “I have now the 
Pleasure to inform you that in Spite of all the Arts and Influence made use of by the Eastern 
Delegates in conjunction with the Members from New Jersey-we have got Genl. Schuyler's 
Conduct fully justified, and himself reinstated in his Command in the Northern Department.”  
Duer’s letter revealed the politics involved in Congress’s decision, declaring that “his 
[Schuyler’s] own merit… and the all powerful Influence of Truth assisted with Management at 
length effected all our wishes and we carried the Question.”
174
  Duer’s honest comment about the 
“Truth assisted with Management” referred to the politicking that influenced the delegates’ 
votes.  Schuyler’s friends fought for him for both personal and political reasons, and they wanted 
a New Yorker in charge of the northern army defending upstate New York.  Duer’s reference to 
the management alluded to the intimation by the New York delegates that their support of the 
war effort hinged upon Schuyler’s continued service in the army.
175
   
Bad news traveled swiftly and Gates was furious with Congress’s decision.  His son 
stoked his anger, asking him: “What fault have you committed that you should be thus disgraced 
before all America?”  He went on to urge Gates to hit back: “I conjure you…to resent this 
ignominious treatment by leaving the service of the Congress, a body that neither rewards 
officers according to their merit or has firmness to stand by even its own decrees.”  Gates agreed 
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and traveled to Philadelphia to argue for his honor.
176
  Gates’s prepared speech defending his 
reputation electrified the delegates when he accused Schuyler’s friends of deliberately spreading 
lies about him and his reputation.  Gates voiced serious accusations and, because of them, he was 
forced to withdraw from the congressional chamber when congressmen concluded that he was 
challenging civil authority and congressional privilege.
177
  Gates had the unfortunate luck to 
arrive in Philadelphia only four days after Congress had censured Muster Master General 
Gunning Bedford for challenging Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant to a duel for words spoken 
during debate.
178
  Members of Congress were sensitive about belligerent generals who contested 
their authority and they quickly shouted down Gates’s speech.   
Duer and Duane, then, wrote Schuyler detailed letters describing Gates’s appearance 
before Congress.  Duer described “the tenor of his Discourse [as] a Compound of Vanity, Folly 
and Rudeness.”  Both Duane and Duer openly acknowledged to Schuyler that they had 
campaigned on his behalf and felt no remorse if they had injured Gates’s character in front of 
other revolutionaries.
179
  Knowing the consequences of deliberately injuring a person’s 
reputation, Duer blustered, “Perhaps he may take it into his head to call me out….Should this be 
the case I am determin'd not to She[l]ter myself under Priviledge, being convinced of the 
Necessity there is to act with Spirit, to enable me to discharge with Fidelity the Trust reposed in 
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  While Gates never issued a challenge to a congressional delegate over the situation, 
Duer probably proudly patted himself on the back for his bravado and loyal defense of 
Schuyler’s honor.
181
  Duer’s comments offer an insight into how congressmen and soldiers were 
renegotiating the rules of the honor culture as the fighting dragged on.  Did congressional 
privilege shelter politicians from affairs of honor when they questioned the fighting abilities of 
military officers?  For many officers, their martial skill was synonymous with their character, an 
identification that perhaps explains why Gates and Schuyler became offended whenever a new 
congressional resolution was issued that supported one general at the expense of the other.  
While they used Congress to publicly defend their reputation, they also wanted their friends to 
help mediate their dispute and support their efforts.  Most likely, their friends talked them out of 
taking drastic action because neither general resigned during the year long controversy.  After 
Gates indignantly withdrew from Congress in late June, he returned to his Virginia farm 
contemplating if he would return to the army as adjutant general or perhaps petition for an 
independent command on another battlefront.
182
     
Major military setbacks plagued the northern army under Schuyler’s command during the 
summer of 1777, as Burgoyne overwhelmed the Continental Army in upstate New York.  The 
final blow to American morale was the evacuation of Fort Ticonderoga.  Ethan Allen’s Green 
Mountain Boys and Benedict Arnold had captured the fort in May 1775; now it returned to 
British hands.  When news about the fall of Fort Ticonderoga reached Philadelphia, delegates 
from New England demanded that Schuyler be replaced.  In late July, members of Congress 
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Allegiances to Gates and Schuyler shaped the debate, with both sides advocating its 
friend’s military ability and popularity.  Delegates discussed the issue of popularity many times 
because they believed men would only fight for officers who inspired them.  This common 
eighteenth-century assumption shaped Washington’s public behavior and influenced the 
selection of officers.  Many of Gates’s friends argued that Schuyler was too aristocratic and 
unpopular to inspire the militia to defeat Burgoyne.  If Gates were reappointed, then soldiers 
would flock to serve under his command.  William Williams of Connecticut defended his desire 
to promote Gates by confirming Schuyler’s lack of popularity, “in Conn.: mentions the joy of the 




Attacking the radicals’ arguments, Schuyler’s friends insisted that any general would face 
military setbacks when substantially outnumbered by the enemy.  Schuyler simply needed time 
to recruit more militiamen to resist Burgoyne’s invasion.  Other delegates demanded a 
congressional inquiry of Schuyler’s management of the army before publicly replacing him with 
another officer.  An inquiry provided Schuyler the opportunity to explain his actions and to 
defend his character.
185
  Otherwise, Schuyler might have had genuine grounds for accusing 
Congress of insulting his honor.   
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The debates ended in a compromise, by which the delegates resolved to conduct an 
inquiry into Schuyler’s management of the northern army before replacing him with Gates.
186
  
Two days later, however, as more bad news arrived, Congress ordered that another general of 
Washington’s choice replace Schuyler.  While a radical departure from the typical congressional 
policy of controlling all officer promotions, no delegate wanted to be responsible for earning 
Schuyler’s ire by promptly promoting Gates to replace him.  They passed the decision on to 
Washington so that it seemed professional instead of personal.  Washington, however, refused to 
become involved in the last act of the Schuyler-Gates saga, declaring that he was happy to work 
with the general preferred by Congress.
187
   
Schuyler’s friends had warned other New York politicians about the growing momentum 
in late July to replace Schuyler as commander of the northern army.  While they always wanted 
to defend Schuyler’s reputation against his political enemies, they worried about losing political 
leverage if they continued to support him.  In stark terms they told New York’s Council of Safety 
of the “Delicacy of our Situation.  If the Eastern Delegates carry their point the World is left to 
conclude not only that General Schuyler is unworthy of the Command; but that if the late 
changes had not taken place, Ticonderoga, by the abilities of Genl Gates, might still have been 
preserved.”
188
  If, however, they continued to argue on Schuyler’s behalf “and the Eastern States 
be backward in supplying their militia, and the calamities of the Country in that Quarter 
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encrease, Would there under these circumstances, be any End to Clamour and Reproach?”
189
  
They hoped the congressional inquiry would clear Schuyler’s reputation but, by late July 1777, 
they were unwilling to spend any more political capital to prevent Gates’s promotion.  They 
halted their efforts on Schuyler’s behalf for continued command because they believed a 
congressional inquiry would exonerate his character.  Gates’s allies rejoiced at their victory over 
Schuyler.  It had taken a year, but they finally had the major general they preferred ready to 
engage and defeat Burgoyne’s invading army.  The Schuyler-Gates controversy reveals the 
friendships that developed between officers and congressmen during the war, but it also exposes 
how the friendships could create some of the problems that developed between the Continental 
Army and the Continental Congress.  
Friendship networks proved valuable to revolutionaries in both institutions because they 
allowed mediation to help ease tensions.  When the culture of honor created conflicts, such as the 
Schuyler-Gates controversy, most gentlemen turned to mediation before issuing a challenge to a 
duel or submitting their resignation.  Because Schuyler and Gates were high-ranking officers, 
they used Congress to arbitrate their conflicting claims to command of the northern army.  Both 
officers had the support of strong political factions in Congress, which allowed their dispute to 
last for over a year.  Their constant negotiations over the details of their command showcase how 
important rank and promotion were to most military officers.   
The Continental Army and the Continental Congress experienced significant growing 
pains from the fall of 1775 through 1777 because both institutions were changing and adapting to 
the exigencies of a protracted war.  Through numerous new rules and regulations, Congress 
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increased its control over the military.  Delegates used these regulations to prevent the growth of 
a strong, professional military corps.  Congressmen worried that officers might decide to become 
kingmakers, should they become dissatisfied with the national legislature.  Hoping to cement the 
officers’ loyalty to the civil authority, Congress decided to control all officer appointments above 
the rank of captain.  But, as Burke had warned, the military soon began to resent Congress’s 
power over rank and promotions, the more so because the official guidelines established in 
February 1777 offered too much room for interpretation.   
The eighteenth-century culture of honor encouraged gentlemen to be sensitive to any 
perceived insult to their character.  Moreover, officers believed that promotions were linked to 
their peers’ evaluation of their character.  Most officers would have agreed with Schuyler, who 
insisted that “[a] Man’s Character ought not to be sported with and he that suffers Stains to lay 
on it with Impunity really deserves none nor will he long enjoy one.”
190
  Officers continually 
petitioned Congress, hoping to gain public recognition either through a promotion or a pay raise.  
They used friendship networks to plead their cases.  Not surprisingly, many congressional 
representatives became resentful over the numerous petitions for promotions.  Soon, legislators 
refused to put forward petitioners’ names thereby, creating even more resentment in the officer 
corps.  As John Adams dismissively confided to his wife, “I am wearied to Death with the 
Wrangles between military officers, high and low.  They Quarrell like Cats and Dogs.  They 
worry one another like Mastiffs.  Scrambling for Rank and Pay like Apes for Nutts.”
191
  Even 
after the Schuyler-Gates controversy proved how seriously officers took the matter of 
promotions, Adams and a majority of congressmen refused to acknowledge the officers’ 
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sensitivity.  In the winter of 1777/78, the army began pushing back against congressional 
authority, demanding new guidelines for promotions and pensions for life.  The army wanted 
more respect from the civil authority; they were tired of being “spied upon,” presumably for their 
own good; and they wanted their fellow revolutionaries in Congress to trust them by granting 
them more autonomy.   
 81 
Chapter 3: 
These Winters of Our Discontent 
“The spirit of resigning, which is now become almost epidemical is truly painful and alarming—
This spirit, prevailing among many of the best Officers, from various inducements, if persisted 
in, must deeply wound the common cause…” 




Stealing a moment to write a letter, Colonel Henry Beekman Livingston described to his 
brother the events of the last few hectic months.  In a tone of utter exhaustion, Livingston 
detailed the army’s condition at Valley Forge, stating sarcastically, we “are now Building Huts 
for our winter Quarters without Nails or Tools so that I suppose we may possibly render 
ourselves very Comfortable by the Time winter is Over.”
193
  Still feeling the sting of the defeat 
of Washington’s army twice by Sir William Howe in September and October of 1777, 
Livingston resented that “the Enemy are rolling in the Fat of the Land having played the Soldier 
sufficiently to secure them the Best of Quarters,” while “all my men except 18 are unfit for duty 
for want of Shoes Stockings and Shirts.”
194
  Washington established his army’s winter 
headquarters at Valley Forge, after negotiating a compromise with the Continental Congress and 
Pennsylvania’s legislature.  With Howe’s army firmly ensconced in Philadelphia, politicians 
insisted that the Continental Army maintain a strong presence in the Pennsylvania countryside to 
help bolster public morale.  These political considerations contradicted Washington’s original 
plan of dividing his forces into several small winter camps, spread throughout the countryside, to 
make it easier to supply the army.   
The legacy of Valley Forge dominates the narrative of the American Revolution, but the 
reality of that winter offers an opportunity to examine the military’s growing resentment of 
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congressional authority and how officers began to demand respect as fellow gentlemen and 
revolutionaries.  As the military pushed back against congressional authority, tensions between 
the two institutions went beyond the point of compromise.  Instead, revolutionaries turned to 
resignation as a conflict resolution measure to preserve their honor and reputation.     
Winter always aggravated the problems between the Continental Army and the 
Continental Congress because officers had more time to mull over real or imagined slights to 
their dignity in their quarters.  Having no immediate military campaigns to plan, officers 
typically focused on complaining about their lack of pay, lack of promotions, and lack of 
supplies.  At Valley Forge, they added a new item to the list of complaints: pensions.  Pensions 
were a divisive issue within the officer corps and a controversial proposal on the legislative 
agenda.  For officers, pensions came to symbolize respect and honor and therefore made 
pensions an emotionally charged issue for congressional debate.  Many delegates in Congress 
felt pressured by the military to vote in favor of granting pensions.  When tensions escalated over 
establishing them, revolutionaries in both institutions resigned to protest injuries to their 
character that occurred during the debates. 
 In A Revolutionary People at War, Charles Royster emphasized that Valley Forge was a 
turning point in the Continental Army’s institutional history.  After Washington appointed Baron 
von Steuben to mold his army into a force of European quality, soldiers spent months learning 
traditional battlefield tactics and drills to instill new professional discipline.  Royster argues that 
Valley Forge is where the army began to believe they were the embodiment of revolutionary 
virtue.  Soldiers thought of themselves as distinct from the public because they were sacrificing 
their fortunes and oftentimes their lives to fight for independence.
195
  The civil authority grew 
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concerned over the army’s growing resentment and anger, but congressmen were divided 
ideologically over solutions to placate the military.    
The fall of 1777 to the spring of 1781 were years that represented the nadir of America’s 
military and political fortunes, as the revolutionaries struggled to fight a war for independence 
with no money and a frustrated and tired public.  So, why in the midst of these terrible times did 
congressmen and officers resign from service?  Royster argues that most officers resigned when 
the reality of war did not mesh with their romantic notions of military glory.  Upon that 
realization, they returned their commissions to escape the hardships of active military duty, a 
decision that was probably for the best because they were too interested in cutting a dashing 
figure than successfully fighting the enemy in battle.
196
  There was, however, more to the 
resignations than disillusionment with the war.  
 After fleeing Philadelphia just hours ahead of Howe’s invading army, Congress settled in 
York, Pennsylvania, for the winter months.  The drama of retreating from the temporary capital 
of the United States for the second year in a row frustrated many of the delegates, and they grew 
impatient with Washington’s leadership.  While Horatio Gates had conquered Burgoyne’s large 
army in upstate New York, Washington had lost a series of battles, forcing the national 
legislature to abandon its capital.
197
  In the fall of 1777, delegates struggled with their own 
growing irritation with the army and with the management of the war for independence. 
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The war had already lasted far longer than any revolutionary had anticipated in the 
summer of 1775 and delegate absenteeism began to interfere with congressional productivity.  
As delegates fled Philadelphia, some continued on the road until they reached home instead of 
stopping in York, Pennsylvania.  The average workload of a congressional delegate consisted of 
ten-to-twelve-hour days filled with committee meetings and long open-floor debates.  If a 
delegate did not surreptitiously leave Congress, then he might write to his state legislature asking 
to resign his position due to pressing family matters or because he resented the political 
compromises necessitated by congressional factions.  Congressmen believed that politics and 
votes were personal and, by 1777, some of them were tired of public service.  Delegate turnover 
became a larger issue in the winter months when Congress had difficulty reaching a quorum to 
conduct business.
198
  Elbridge Gerry humorously notified Samuel Adams that he needed to 
return to Congress and help with congressional business since “few can stand it as well as our 
Friend Mr. Lovell; he writes Morning Noon and Night, Sickens once a Fortnight, and devotes a 
Day to Sleep, after which, like the Sun from behind a Cloud, he makes his Appearance with his 
usual Splendor.”
199
  Still, the work never stopped.  During the winter, delegates debated the 
Articles of Confederation, fiscal policy, officers tendering their resignations, new guidelines for 
officer promotions, army pensions, and how to supply an army that was in an “Almost Naked & 
very often in a Starveing Condition.”
200
  The problems plaguing the war effort made the civil and 
military authorities sensitive to any gossip about their performance.  The winter months of 
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1777/78 were filled with accusations and innuendos about the merits of Continental Army 
officers and congressional delegates. 
By the fall of 1777, the pressures and problems of the war stretched the revolutionaries’ 
patience, leaving many gentlemen feeling that resignation was the only way for them to preserve 
their dignity.
201
  Resignation served as a form of protest when there was no direct opponent to 
challenge to a duel or when officers could not find a specific delegate in Congress to blame for 
their woes.  The winter months allowed officers and politicians plenty of time to become 
disgruntled at their treatment by the public.   
Officers’ pay continued to be a thorny issue between the army and Congress.  Wanting to 
be frugal, congressmen from the beginning, in June 1775, had stipulated a low salary for officers, 
believing men should volunteer for patriotic rather than pecuniary reasons.
202
  In the fall of 1775, 
Washington had petitioned Congress for an increase in the officers’ pay, arguing that the current 
allowance was “inadequate to their Rank, & Service; & is one great Source of that Familiarity 
between the Officers & Men, which is so incompatible with Subordination & Discipline.”  The 
low pay, he added, did not allow subalterns “to support the Character & Appearance of 
Officers.”
203
  While Congress provided the uniforms for enlisted men (that is, when supplies 
existed,) officers paid for their own uniforms.  In the eighteenth century, clothing signaled rank 
and character.
204
  Officers were expected to maintain a neat and genteel appearance to inspire 
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their soldiers’ obedience and awe.  Even eighteenth-century military manuals encouraged this 
practice, stating that “these pleasant externals [uniforms] are not combat weapons, to be sure, but 
they are a perpetual reminder to the officer of his status and distinction, and by impressing his 
superiority on his soldiers they incline the men to consideration, respect, and obedience.”
205
  
Money helped codify social distinction and Washington knew that his junior officers were going 
into debt trying to maintain the lifestyle expected of an officer.
206
  To retain officers, Washington 
successfully persuaded Congress in November 1775 to increase officers’ salaries, even as radical 
congressmen grumbled about the lack of patriotic virtue in the officer corps.     
By November 1777, officers were again focused on their salaries as they settled into 
winter quarters.  Pay, promotions, pensions, and food became the major topics for discussion in 
Washington’s dissatisfied army.  Officers blamed their problems on an apathetic public and a 
callous national legislature.  As a camp doctor recorded in his journal, “the officers look upon 
Congress with an evil eye, as men who are jealous of the army, who mean them no good, but 
mean to divide and distress them.”
207
  
Currency inflation and squabbles over promotions exacerbated the officers’ feelings of 
resentment.  The issue of pay grew more significant as officers received letters from their 
families describing the escalating prices of everyday items. Officers knew their salaries could not 
cope with the inflation.  Many families actively encouraged their loved ones to return home to 
help out with the family finances because a soldier’s pay was inadequate.  Even when families 
did not complain about money, some officers were tired of continually reaching into their own 
pockets to provide themselves and sometimes their men with food and clothing when army 
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supplies failed to materialize.  Officers in debt or inadequately supplied blamed Congress and the 
Commissary Department for their woes, and many at Valley Forge probably would have secretly 




Pay helped officers provide for their families, but it also symbolized the civil authority’s 
respect.  Officers believed that Congress must pay them at a level commensurate with their 
personal sacrifice for the war effort and that, by refusing to grant this idealized amount, Congress 
purposefully injured the dignity of the officer corps.
209
  With prices continuing their climb, most 
officers realized that an increase in their salary would not necessarily end their financial troubles.  
They then discussed the possibility of receiving postbellum pensions, which would help them 
pay off any debt incurred during the war.  Pensions would signal civilian respect, while also 
offering an opportunity for families to be financially secure if employment opportunities were 
scarce after the war. 
As usual, Congress used the winter months to analyze what had gone wrong during the 
previous military campaigns and contemplate strategies for the upcoming season.  After losing 
the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, Washington wanted to institute new reforms in the 
Continental Army.  Congress also wanted an army that would be able to defeat British troops, 
and they commissioned a committee to meet with Washington at Valley Forge to discuss 
institutional change.  Before the committee arrived, Washington asked his senior officers to 
submit in writing their proposals and opinions for plans to solve the problems plaguing the 
army.
210
  A majority of the officers urged Washington to advocate half-pay pensions, reforms in 
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the Quartermaster Department, and new rules for promotions because the February 1777 
guidelines had left too much room for interpretation.  Each senior officer warned Washington of 
the dissatisfaction in the officer corps, where gentlemen of all ranks were threatening to resign if 
conditions did not improve.  Officers were frustrated with civilian authority at the local and 
national levels; they wanted immediate action but had no idea that Congress was struggling on 
some days just to reach a quorum so that it could conduct legislative business.
211
  
Officers tended to resign in larger numbers during the winter months: the result of 
dwelling on the miserable conditions of army life.  Although the ordeal of Valley Forge marked 
the increasing professionalization of the Continental Army, creating a unique martial pride 
among soldiers and officers, there were nevertheless, a larger number of officer resignations that 
winter than in any previous winter.
 212
  Officers cited various reasons for leaving the army, 
including injuries sustained during the previous campaign, supply shortages, inflation, and the 
length of the war.  Some officers were tired of fighting for independence; others did not want to 
train to become professional officers.  Officers in both groups left the army. 
Most of the letters of resignation submitted to Washington were shaped by the 
eighteenth-century culture of honor.  Officers deliberately styled their letters to highlight their 
gentlemanly status, using key terms to explain why they needed to leave the army. They usually 
gave one of three reasons for returning their commissions: personal health; no money to provide 
for their family; or to protest injuries to their reputation.  Officers were intent on explaining to 
Washington why they had to resign, and they sought his approval by appealing to him as 
gentlemen.  Though the officers understood that they were fighting for independence, many still 
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believed that they needed to protect their reputations at all cost.  Cultural norms about the 
importance of character and reputation triumphed over patriotic virtue in the army, but it did so, 
as well, in the Continental Congress.  Most of the letters of resignation tended to follow a similar 
format, and Washington’s patience was stretched to its limit during the winter of 1777/78, when 
hundreds of officers submitted their resignations.
213
  
An officer’s letter of resignation did more than return a commission.  Such a letter also 
served as a conflict resolution tool for easing tensions.  Many officers intended their letters to be 
received as a formal notification of protest and a validation of their gentlemanly status in the 
public sphere.  The honor code encouraged gentlemen to resign when situations threatened their 
gentility, and their letters of resignation reveal some of the hidden rules of the code.  Historians 
have tended to judge officers harshly for abandoning the army because of seemingly petty 
grievances, but to the officers it was a matter of character and reputation, crucial elements in 
their social standing.   
Junior officers cared about how their letters of resignation were perceived by their 
superior officers.  They carefully analyzed the language used in their discharge papers and they 
could read between the lines of Washington’s pen, understanding which of his words meant an 
honorable discharge and which ones indicated merely a routine discharge.  Lieutenant Colonel 
Lott Brewster requested an honorable discharge in January 1778 because “he lacked the 
Constitution to stand the fatigue of another Campaign.”
214
  Washington approved his request, but 
Brewster complained to Washington’s aide-de-camp Richard Kidder Meade, who had written the 
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letter accepting Brewster’s resignation, that “the Discharge does not mention that my Reasons 
are thought Sufficient but that on my insisting for it as my Right it was Granted.”
215
  Brewster 
was protesting to Meade about the treatment of his character in the discharge papers because he 
was not granted an honorable discharge.  In Brewster’s formal discharge papers he was merely 
given a routine discharge from the army, and he was upset with Washington’s word choice.  
Washington’s aide-de-camp added insult to injury with his final reply to Brewster’s protest about 
the language of the discharge papers.  Meade notified him that, “the Genl was by no means 
satisfied with your reasons for leaving the Army, but as he knew of no power that he had to keep 
an officer contrary to his will, that a discharge should be granted to you” but “had that discharge 
expressed his approbation,” there would be “an inconsistency in his conduct.”
216
  
Occasionally, Washington overtly expressed his disapproval in his replies to resignation 
letters.  Those replies reflected his frustration with the officer corps and how the culture of honor 
complicated military affairs.  Hoping to shame a colonel into staying with the army, Washington 
wrote:  
Officers wishing to retire have frequently observed, that there would be enough left, and 
therefore that the want of their services could not be material.  Those who reason thus 
pay themselves but an ill compliment, as they evidently confess, that others posses more 
virtue—more attachment to the great and common cause than they themselves do.  If 




Washington’s choice of words deliberately questioned the resigning officer’s character and 
attempted to manipulate him into remaining with his troops.  Washington also reiterated the 
importance of patriotic virtue in coping with the hardships of military service.  However, the 
hardships of service were unequally distributed depending on the state regiment.  Some 
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Continental Army regiments suffered major difficulties due to problems encountered by their 
local legislatures in pulling together supplies and shipping them to Valley Forge.
218
  While 
Washington could become peevish on occasion after receiving multiple resignations in a day, he 
grudgingly accepted that, according to society’s rules his officers had a right to resign their 
commissions.  He wanted gentlemen to serve in the officer corps and had to deal with the 
consequences of the gentlemen’s code of honor.   
 The majority of the officers’ resignation letters in 1777/78 addressed the negative impact 
of the war on their “private Affairs.”
 219
  As an officer explained to Washington, “I am not 
possessed of an independent fortune & what little I have is much impair’d by my Continuance in 
the Army.”
220
  Officers complained that their “pay on the present establishment when compared 
to the advanced prices of every Article of Life…is by no means adequate to support them in a 
Character suitable to their Rank.”
221
  Most soldiers, particularly officers, in the Continental 
Army struggled to maintain financial solvency because they were paid in a new currency that 
depreciated rapidly. 
 Officers also frequently cited their health and constitution when resigning their 
commission.  Washington quickly granted honorable discharges to officers seriously wounded in 
battle but was frustrated with other officers who sought to retire when they were not physically 
harmed.  Many complained about the hardships of camp and simply wished to be home with 
their families.  Senior generals had little patience with officers who were obviously resigning 
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because they were homesick.  As the winter dragged on at Valley Forge, Washington became 
increasingly reluctant to grant furloughs to junior officers because, once at home, many were 
likely not to return to camp.  Unfortunately, the policy of refusing furloughs created a backlash 
when officers started resigning because they were not allowed to leave camp.
222
 
 Washington felt health was the least honorable reason for officers to return their 
commissions.  When officers resigned due to their unhappiness with camp conditions, it set a bad 
precedent among their junior officers and the foot soldiers, who usually suffered even more 
extreme hardships in winter quarters.  But Washington realized it was better to discharge officers 
than force them to remain in service when they were clearly unhappy.
223
  Though he let officers 
resign, by March 1778 he was again frustrated enough with the proffered excuses to write 
disparagingly to Major Isaac Beall: “I am at a loss to account how Gentlemen can reconcile such 
an abandonment of the Public Interest, at this crisis of our Affairs, either with the principles of 
honor or their duty to themselves and their Country.”
224
  Washington pointedly condemned 
Beall’s behavior, notifying the major that Washington did not think he had acted in a 
gentlemanly manner.  During the war, Washington attempted to broaden the meaning of the 
traditional culture of honor to include patriotism in order to shame officers who were resigning.  
Nevertheless, he knew he could not prevent them from using resignation to protest injuries to 
their reputation or to leave the hardships of military service.     
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Officers usually threatened to resign after being passed over for a promotion or because 
of personality problems within the different states’ officer corps.  Selfish though such reasons 
may seem, they were hardly that.  Promotions equaled public recognition of a gentleman’s 
character in the eighteenth-century military.
225
  Colonel Henry Beekman Livingston is the 
perfect example of an officer who knows that he should not resign during the war because of 
dissatisfaction over promotion, but who insists that it would be a grievous mortification to be 
“commanded by those Formerly my Inferiors in Rank.”  Livingston began his letter to 
Washington by stating: 
Could I at any Time have embraced an Opinion prevalent in the Army, That the Indignity 
with which an Officer is treated, when by an Act of the Legislature or Ruling Power he is 
superseded in Rank renders him justifiable in withdrawing himself from the Service of his 





Livingston protested that he did not want to pursue that course of action but, should such a 
situation arise, he would have no choice but to resign in order to protect his reputation.     
Problems with promotions fueled Washington’s frustration with Congress because he 
understood his officers’ sensitivity over rank.  In December and early January, he fell victim to 
speculation (known as the Conway Cabal) that Horatio Gates might replace him as commander 
in chief.  Historians agree that the Conway Cabal never existed in the minds of anyone but 
Washington and his staff officers, though some congressmen were frustrated with Washington’s 
demands for military reform in 1777.
227
  Studying the Conway Cabal reveals the flow of gossip 
in the personal letters that passed between officers and politicians.  News about the Cabal 
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reached Congress when John Laurens, Washington’s aide-de-camp, wrote to his father, Henry 
Laurens, president of the Continental Congress, asking if radical delegates were plotting to 
replace Washington with Gates.  Speculation about a cabal reveals Washington’s own sensitivity 
concerning his reputation as a general.  Lord Stirling started the controversy by passing along a 
comment in a letter to Washington, allegedly written by Brigadier General Thomas Conway to 
Horatio Gates, stating: “Heaven has been determined to save your Country; or a weak General 
and bad Councellors would have ruind it.”
228
  Sensitivity to how others perceived one’s character 
influenced most of the revolutionaries’ decision-making process during the war.   
Officers warned Washington that “we are exceeding sorry to say that in this army no 
regular Line of promotion has ever been observed.  Promotions without any apparent reason 
have taken place, which reflect disgrace & dishonor upon us.”
229
  For these officers, the 1777 
guidelines had left too much room for interpretation and recent promotions had upset several 
brigadier generals.  They felt “unprecedented & surprising promotions are frequently taking 
place in favour of persons who have never distinguished themselves as soldiers, and who have 
nothing more to boast of it in the present contest, than that they have modestly trumpeted their 
own praise to Congress.”
230
  To eliminate their grievances they proposed that Congress create a 
special commission “to fix the rank of the officer upon a proper footing, and to settle a regular 
line of promotion, not to be departed from, but in cases of extraordinary merit, or upon great 
political principles.”
231
  By mentioning political principles they acknowledged that congressmen 
felt pressured to commission foreign officers, such as Thomas Conway and the Marquis de 
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Lafayette, to please potential foreign allies.  Some senior American generals believed that French 
officers received preference in promotions because they were not subject to the state quota 
problems. Resentment plagued every congressional decision to promote officers.  As Elbridge 
Gerry complained, “[B]ut what has been the consequence of every appointment of generals 
officers made by Congress? If it did not suit the whole army, opposition has taken place, and 
reduced Congress to the necessity of asserting the rights of themselves and their constituents.”
232
  
Though some members of Congress may have grown frustrated with the problems relating to 
promotions, others understood the officers’ sensitivity about rank.     
Officers attempted to portray their resentment over promotions as a reasonable response 
to slights injuring their character.  “Resentment,” as Nicole Eustace explains in Passion is the 
Gale, “resulted from a man’s rational appraisal that the words or actions of another menaced his 
honor and social standing.”
233
  A gentleman should always maintain control over his feelings and 
passions, which is why it is rare to read a letter in which Washington loses his temper.    
Brigadier General George Weedon’s letter of resignation used carefully selected language 
to highlight his resolute and gentlemanly resentment of another general’s promotion.  He 
maintained that he had “coolly and impartially considered every Circumstance attending this 
extraordinary change.  I have advised with many friends on the Subject.” Weedon wants 
Washington to know that his feelings are tempered by reason and that he was not jealous, which 
was a petty emotion, but, rather, rightly resentful.
234
  Weedon had also reached out to other 
revolutionaries for the purpose of mediation, hoping to see if there was any chance for him to 
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receive a promotion.  But, after learning that there would be no possibility of promotion, he had 
decided “with the Coroberating Opinion of many of your friends, as well as my own,” that it 
would be inconsistent “with my honor [other] than to refuse Service under those that have been 
so long my Junior Officers.”
235
  Weedon’s letter echoed the language and logic used by Colonel 
Henry Beekman Livingston and numerous other officers.     
In an effort to staunch the flow of resignations, Washington met with a congressional 
committee in mid-January to urge reforms that directly addressed officers’ complaints about 
indebtedness, health, and injustices in the granting of promotions.  Prior to meeting with 
congressional delegates, Washington solicited the opinion of many senior officers about how to 
repair the problems in the Continental Army.  He compiled their suggestions into a long letter to 
be submitted to a small congressional committee visiting Valley Forge, detailing military issues 
that needed to be addressed and offered a few potential remedies.
236
  Washington was focused on 
keeping the officers happy and in the army.  He hoped the new congressional resolutions would 
ease some of the complaints in the officer corps by showing that congressmen valued the 
officers’ service.  In the opening paragraph Washington explicitly states that the officers’ 
grievances need to be resolved first “since without officers no army can exist.”  As a 
conservative gentleman, Washington wanted to use the months at Valley Forge to create a truly 
professional army capable of defeating the British army in set battles, and this meant new 
standards of discipline and drill would be implemented.  Influenced by his conservative social 
principles, Washington believed that officers inspired soldiers to perform better through their 
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  He wanted officers to stop fixating on their petty complaints about 
rank and pay and make inculcating discipline in the troops their priority.  Understanding that the 
code of honor made it difficult to ignore the perceived slights, Washington repeatedly 
highlighted in his letter the importance of creating new measures to placate the officers.  In 
hopes of preventing congressional delegates from lightly dismissing his opinions, he carefully 
explained his reasoning behind all the suggested reforms.   
The first proposed reform advocated establishing a half-pay and “pensionary” plan for 
officers and their families.  The prominence given to half-pay suggests that Washington believed 
that this was the crucial reform in preventing more resignations.  He understood that some 
delegates in Congress opposed half-pay plans.  In mid-January, Elbridge Gerry notified 
Washington that “there are many weighty Arguments against” half-pay, “such as the Infant State 
of the Country, it’s Aversion to placemen & pensioners.”
238
  Gerry’s stated opposition to half-
pay shaped Washington’s argument to the Committee at Camp.  He knew he had to convince 
Congress that the officers were not being petty but behaving according to the rules of eighteenth-
century society.  He described the reality of human nature with startling insight:  
Few men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or 
advantage, to the common good.  It is in vain to exclaim against the depravity of human 
nature on this account—the fact is so, the experience of every age and nation has proved 
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Washington’s candid analysis of the human psyche would have upset many of the radical 
delegates, who believed that public virtue by itself was sufficient to ensure the stability of a 
republican society.   
Washington continually emphasized that officers wanted and needed public recognition 
of their wartime sacrifice.  If officers believed the public appreciated them, then they would be 
willing for fight harder and they would be proud of and satisfied with their current rank, and not 
petition so frequently for a promotion.  Washington argued that half-pay provided that 
recognition and respect because it meant that Congress and the general public appreciated the 
officers’ sacrifice and would reward them with pensions for their service in the Continental 
Army.  Washington never suggested a pay raise for the soldiers because the continental currency 
was depreciating so rapidly that inflation would have nullified any increase in pay.  But a 
pension could be used to assure officers’ creditors that they would eventually receive payment 
after the war.
240
  Still striving to be the model revolutionary, Washington proclaimed that he 
urged the adoption of this measure only to retain officers, since he would not “receive the small 
benefit from the establishment, and can have no other inducement for proposing it, than a full 
conviction of its utility and propriety.”
241
  Pensions proved to be a major source of contention 
between the Continental Congress and the Continental Army until the end of the war.  Officers 
insisted on their rights to receive pensions, while Congress worried about creating a professional 
military social class after the war.  By arguing for pensions, officers made half-pay a personal 
issue and grew resentful when Congress debated the half-pay proposal for several months.     
Having addressed the question of pensions, Washington turned to the touchy matters of 
rank and promotion.  He warned the congressional committee “that irregular promotions have 
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also been a pregnant source of uneasiness, discord and perplexity in this army.  They have been 
the cause of numerous bickerings and resignations among the officers, and have occasioned 
infinite trouble.”
242
  But, while Washington knew that new rules were needed, he still faced the 
same problems that had plagued Congress in February 1777.  Officers wanted simple guidelines 
established, with no room for interpretation, a position that left seniority as the best option for 
determining the recipients and timing of promotions.  Washington thought otherwise, believing 
that, should seniority be the only rule for promotion, officers would be left in “listless security, 
certain of enjoying the honors and emoluments of progressive rank, let their conduct be ever so 
undeserving.”
243
  He wanted regulations that emphasized seniority while allowing merit to factor 
into some extraordinary cases.  Moreover, he insisted that state quotas should no longer influence 
congressional decisions in promoting senior generals.  His recommendation was quite specific: 
“[T]hat promotion should be regimental to the rank of Captain inclusively, and from that, in the 
line of the state to the rank of Brigadier inclusively; proceeding, from that, in the line of the army 
at large.”
244
  Ultimately the new congressional guidelines for promotions were shaped by the 
military’s preferences.  But, the amorphous concept of “merit,” still unresolved, would continue 
to provoke discontentment among officers.     
Washington’s letter to the congressional committee presented the problems plaguing the 
army in 1777/78 and emphasized key solutions to reduce the officers’ resentment against the 
national legislature.  Having received the army’s demands, delegates fretted about implementing 
a half-pay pension.  The emphasis on public virtue, candidly discussed by Washington in his 
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letters and analyzed by Royster in A Revolutionary People at War, was fading as the reality of a 
protracted war settled in at both Valley Forge, and York, Pennsylvania, during winter quarters.       
Thomas McKean, a representative from Delaware, arrived in York in late January and 
was disgruntled to find the town an expensive place in which to live.  Attending Congress, he 
found “only nine States represented, and, including myself, but eighteen members, though five 
now at the camp, and some others are expected in a few days.”
245
  When Congress 
ignominiously fled Philadelphia just ahead of advancing British troops in late September, many 
delegates had seized the opportunity to return home, granting themselves a furlough from the 
national legislature.  Henry Laurens, president of the Continental Congress, during the winter 
and spring months of 1777/78, believed fear “had operated upon many minds.”
246
  Delegates 
who served that winter in York were worried about “the excessive expence attending very bad 
fare in this Town and partly of a sudden surprize by the Enemy, and certainly had Sir William 
Howe been a man of enterprize he might have possessed himself of Congress.”
247
  Fear blinded 
some of the delegates from realizing that they shared the same grievances as the officer corps.  
Many of them also cited health and their personal financial affairs as their reasons for leaving 
Congress.   
Congressional resignations share many similarities with officer resignations, but 
historians have rarely discussed how often congressmen resigned during the war.  Jack Rakove 
in The Beginnings of National Politics argues that historians have focused on discussing 
delegates who served multiple terms in Congress because they left a long paper trail of their 
participation and do not challenge the image of patriotic congressmen.
248
  Historians ignore the 
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problems of explaining why the Continental Congress experienced a high rate of delegate 
turnover.  As Richard Henry Lee observed to his brother, “[T]he members of Congress are so 
perpetually changing that it is of little use to give you their Names.”
249
  Rakove asserts that 
serving in the national legislature placed a burden on married gentlemen with families to support 
since their salary did not stretch very far when inflation struck in 1777.  Also, many delegates 
did not want to live in Philadelphia, which was far away from their families and careers.   
Congressional resignations occurred more sporadically than officer resignations, and so 
resigning congressmen did not draw as much attention as officers, who resigned en masse, apart 
from a few disdainful comments in their colleagues’ personal letters.  Officers tended to resign 
during the winter when not on active campaign, but congressmen resigned from legislative duty 
at any time of the year, whether Congress was in or out of session.  Some legislators did not even 
write official notices but simply indicated their resignation by their absence from the 
congressional floor.  Then they would notify their state legislatures that new candidates were 
needed to fill their seat.  The problems of absenteeism and unofficial resignations were so serious 
in May 1778 that Congress attempted to establish “rules for the better conducting business” and 
resolved that “[N]o member shall leave Congress without permission of Congress or of his 
constituents.”
250
  Perhaps frustration with their own absent colleagues influenced delegates to 
harshly condemn officers for wanting to resign their commissions.  Although Congress passed 
new legislation stipulating that at least nine states had to be represented to conduct business, 
delegates could do nothing to physically prevent their fellow revolutionaries from resigning. 
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In resigning, congressmen cited the same concerns about their health and private affairs 
that the officers offered to justify their resignations.
251
  William Ellery of Rhode Island, after 
voting repeatedly against establishing a half-pay pension for officers, wrote to his governor to 
request that his replacement be sent to York as quickly as possible.  Ellery refused to stand for 
re-election, arguing that his health “and the unhappy situation of my family require that I should 
be at home as soon as possible.”
252
  In citing pecuniary reasons for his resignation, Ellery was no 
different from many officers who attempted to leave the army.  Nonetheless, Ellery condemned 
the measure that would have provided an incentive for officers to continue serving.   
Other delegates resigned to preserve their legal or business careers, some simply grew 
frustrated with the congressional workload and the political maneuverings at the national 
level.
253
  As Congress grew smaller, personality clashes among its members became more 
frequent and rancorous.  Moreover, many congressmen disliked the reality of political bargaining 
and the difficulty of getting thirteen state legislatures to agree on important issues.
254
  Because 
Congress relied on committees to conduct legislative business, each of the few delegates present 
in York found himself assigned to more committees thereby fraying already strained tempers.  
John Mathews of South Carolina, vented his frustration with Congress to Thomas Bee, the 
speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, writing, “I have wrote to you for leave 
to come home in December; for God's sake procure it for me, & I'll be dam'd if ever you catch 
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  He continued his complaint, stating that “those who have dispositions for 
Jangling, & are fond of displaying their Rhetorical abilities, let them come.  I never was so sick 
of any thing in my life.”
256
  Although his characterization was perhaps a bit overdramatic, many 
delegates shared Mathews’s frustration with the structure of Congress.  Gouverneur Morris 
apologized to Washington for the delay in passing all of his suggested reforms for the army by 
explaining that “had the several Members which compose our multifarious Body only been wise 
enough Our Business would long since have been compleated.”
257
  He sarcastically observed that 
“our superior Abilities or the Desire of appearing to possess them lead us to such exquisite 
Tediousness of Debate that the most precious Moments pass unheeded away like vulgar 
Things.”
258
  Tempers also flared in Congress when major issues were debated.  In the winter of 
1777/78, representatives of nine states discussed the guidelines for promotions, rules for 
exchanging prisoners, and the half-pay pension for officers.     
 The debate over establishing half-pay pensions lasted for two months, aggravating 
congressmen and frustrating the army.  The debate was drawn out because it touched on an 
ideological nerve in the delegates.  The half-pay pension was a practical proposal by Washington 
to help retain elite gentlemen in the army.  But the proposal forced all delegates to confront the 
possibility that patriotism might not be enough to win the war.     
For many radical delegates, the half-pay petition raised the specter of a permanent 
standing army because officers would receive a government stipend for perhaps the rest of their 
life.  The creation of a separate and distinct group of citizens trained in military drills could 
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threaten the government, should they become displeased with its policies.  The histories of Rome 
and seventeenth-century England haunted the radical delegates from New England, who were the 
most outspoken opponents of the measure.  Henry Laurens of South Carolina, president of 
Congress, joined the radicals in their voluble opposition to half-pay pensions and wrote many 
letters during the two-month debate, sharing his opinion about why the pensions could set a 
dangerous precedent.  Radicals worried that, if they gave in to the military’s pressure this time, 
then what would happen when the next contested issue arose?  Laurens wrote to Washington that 
“Tis an unhappy dilemma to which we seem to be reduced—provide for your Officers in terms 
dictated to you or lose all the valuable Soldiers among them.”
259
  Laurens used “dictated” to 
emphasize his belief that officers were deliberately and unduly influencing the legislative 
process.  He, however, had appointed himself defender of congressional prerogative.  He even 
warned Washington, that “Republicans will at a proper time withdraw a Grant which shall 
appear to have been extorted.”
260
  Such stinging words of criticism provided officers with plenty 
to complain about and more officers resigned when they realized that Congress was resistant to 
granting pensions.     
Because emotions were running high among the few delegates in York and the vote was 
evenly split between conservative and radical delegates, conservatives drafted specific legislative 
rules for their consideration of half-pay pensions.
261
  Conservatives wrote the special rules to 
prevent radicals from killing the measure with every parliamentary tool at their disposal.  
Radicals hoped to send the proposal to the individual state legislatures, where other politicians 
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upset with the military’s threatening behavior would surely defeat it.  Conservatives hoped to 
keep the proposal in Congress, but they agreed to the special rules as a compromise to keep half-
pay on the legislative docket.  Congress conducted multiple votes on the half-pay measure as 
delegates built coalitions to carry and bury the measure.     
Thomas Burke of North Carolina provided a succinct description of the ideological divide 
between delegates over the pension plan.
262
  According to him, conservative delegates agreed 
with Washington’s proposal and argued, “[T]hat it is unjust to sacrifice the time and property of 
the men whose lives are every day exposed for us without any prospect of compensation, while 
so many who are protected by their valor and exertions are amassing princely fortunes.”
263
  
Conservatives worried that the army was rapidly disbanding because officers felt insulted by 
congressional policies.  Also, conservatives wanted to preserve the elite officer corps and they 
believed half-pay pensions would provide officers with an “interest” in their commissions.  That 
is, to retain officers, they were willing to provide them with financial benefits after the war, 
thereby giving them a tangible reason for continuing their military service.  For radical delegates, 
though, to provide any revolutionary with an “interest” perverted the spirit of ’75 because 
“Officers in the Army are and ought to be actuated by the principles of patriotism and public 
spirit, and ought to disdain motives of private interest.”
264
 
Radical delegates worried precedents would be set if they approved the half-pay pension 
plan.  Burke recorded that radicals questioned whether Congress even possessed the power to 
grant pensions without permission of the states.  Many delegates believed that Congress only had 
the authority to prosecute the war and that pensions for life were beyond the bounds of national 
authority.  Conservatives retorted that the “want of power” was no better an argument against 
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half-pay “than against borrowing money which must be paid and its interest in the mean time 
kept up by revenues which must continue long beyond the War.”
265
  They insisted that Congress 
had already seized the authority to borrow money on behalf of the United States so the limits on 
congressional power could be stretched again.  They concluded that pensions were necessary to 
win the war and were willing to pay officers a small stipend for life to achieve independence.     
The issue of half-pay actually brought to light the problem of what to do with the army 
after the end of the war.  Delegates had not discussed the situation before because they had been 
concerned with recruiting more soldiers for the half-filled battalions.  In Washington’s half-pay 
proposal to the congressional committee, he suggested that the officer corps serve as a reserve 
military guard, allowing officers potentially to supplant the militia system.  Radicals became 
immediately suspicious that the Continental Army wanted to remain a standing army in 
peacetime.  Fear of professional soldiers prevented most of the radicals from realizing that few 
officers wished to interfere or participate in politics and that most wanted to return home.  The 
pensions would simply allow them to pay off their wartime debts.   
Radicals argued that enough officers “will always be found to command our Troops who 
will deem the service of their Country and its gratitude a very ample compensation.”
266
  In 
saying so, radicals essentially told the officers that they were not behaving honorably and that 
Congress accepted their resignations.  Laurens offered an even harsher evaluation of the officers’ 
conduct in a letter to Washington: 
How superior are many of the Gentlemen now in my contemplation, to the acceptance of 
an half pay, contributed to by Widows & Orphans of Soldiers who had bled & died by 
their sides, shackled with a condition of being excluded from the Privilege of serving in 
Offices in common with their fellow Citizens, bated in every House of Assembly as the 
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Drones & incumbrances of Society, pointed at by Boys & Girls- there goes a Man who 




Laurens’s vivid description was designed to shame the officers by painting them as leeches on 
republican society.  Laurens had excused Washington from this behavior but Washington must 
have had to maintain tight control over his temper when he read this description of his 
subordinates.  Laurens’s letter was a part of his private correspondence with Washington but it 
was shaped by his conversations with other radical delegates who resented the army’s insistence 
on passing the pension measure.     
Congressional condemnations would have infuriated the officer corps if they had heard 
the debate, but conservative delegates counseled patience to their friends in the military as they 
tried to gather enough votes to establish lifetime half-pay pensions.  Gouverneur Morris 
apologetically wrote to Washington that “I expected before this to have written to you ‘Provision 
is made for the American Officers’ but that Thief of Time Procrastination hath kept it off from 
Time to Time.”
268
  He subtly criticized the fears of the radical delegates, saying that “it is 
astonishing that Congress who certainly are not without sufficient Apprehension should at so 
critical a Moment as the present be so supine but this is human Nature and we must bear it.”
269
  
Sanguine though Morris tried to appear in his letter, conservatives were in fact, scrounging for 
every vote in favor of half-pay at York.  In fact, four days prior to writing his placating letter to 
Washington, Morris had been out of town.  William Duer had pleaded with Morris to return 
because “from a want of Representation in the State of New York, and several other 
Embarrassments we cannot bring as many members absolutely essential to our Safety, without 
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you, especially the Establishment for the Army.”
270
  Emotions were running so high over 
establishing pensions and guidelines for exchanging prisoners of war, that on April 12 members 
drafted a signed statement promising “to meet punctually at the hour of adjournment, to support 
order and preserve decency and politeness.”
271
  They also agreed to speak only twice and not for 
more than ten minutes during a debate, unless Congress was convened as a committee of the 
whole house.  Sixteen members signed the document but Samuel Chase later struck out his name 
because he felt that several signers had violated the contract.
272
  
On March 26, conservatives had introduced the first official resolution for half-pay 
pensions and, a month later, Washington still waited to hear if the resolution had passed.  
Writing to Gouverneur Morris, he pleaded for congressional action: “I wish you could announce 
the provision for Officers concluded.  It seems to me the basis, of all our operations.  Resignation 
after resignation is taking place.”
273
  Using the guidelines established early during the debate, 
congressmen argued about congressional authority and whether the idea of pensions was just and 
constitutional.  Half-pay contradicted the radicals’ reliance on public virtue to win the war, and 
their insistence on that point made the legislative battle bitter and emotional.  With the coming of 
spring, travel became easier and delegates regularly postponed votes on the half-pay resolution, 
hoping to earn support (and votes) from returning delegates.  On May 11, Gouverneur Morris 
confided to Robert Morris that “half Pay cannot be postponed (for now we are the Postponers) 
beyond to Morrow morning,” meaning Robert Morris needed to return to Congress before 11:00 
that morning to help swing the vote in the conservatives’ favor.
274
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The official May 15 resolution that granted half-pay to the officers was a compromise 
between conservatives and radicals.  Henry Laurens described the negotiating process to a close 
friend, stating that “I was Witness to many excellent and some violent strokes in parliamentary 
Manuevre a long Report of a Committee, ridden by amendments and new Resolves.”
275
  The 
amendments and new resolves stipulated that officers would receive half-pay for a period of 
seven years, instead of for life.  Conservatives agreed to this modification to prevent the 
resolution from being sent for ratification to the individual states where it would never pass.  
Radicals compromised on seven years, knowing that Congress possessed the authority to amend 
any law it passed.  Delegates could rescind half-pay pensions in a few years when the threat of 
mass resignations no longer pressured the civil authority.
276
  The seven-year limit also chastised 
the officers.  Delegates wanted to ensure that the military understood that they still possessed the 
power to limit the military’s demands.  The resolution’s language grudgingly bestowed a 
pension.  Also, the infantry were offered a bounty of eighty dollars for serving for the duration of 
the war.
277
  The pension probably did prevent some resignations within the officer corps, but the 
underlying problem of officers’ desire for public recognition was not resolved.  Officers still 
resented congressional suspicion of their patriotism and their efforts to inculcate institutional 
pride in the Continental Army.       
The procedural odyssey of half-pay did not end in May 1778.  The issue was re-
introduced in the summer and fall of 1780 after the continental currency collapsed completely.
278
  
Officers again threatened to resign unless Congress extended the half-pay pensions for life.  
Washington supported their demands because of the financial strain and anger expressed by the 
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officers in their petitions.  Delegates prepared to settle in for another long debate over submitting 
to pressure from the officer corps when word reached them of Benedict Arnold’s treachery.  
Arnold’s betrayal shocked both the Congress and the army, spurring Congress to quickly grant 
officers half-pay for life on October 21, 1780.  The legislators wanted to prevent other officers 
from becoming susceptible to British bribes.  By acceding to half-pay for life, Congress gave 
officers the public recognition and reward that they had been demanding since July 1775.  Of 
course, half-pay was not permanently settled in 1780. Instead it was a major irritant in promoting 
the Newburgh conspiracy in 1783.     
The debate over pensions revealed how officers and congressmen used resignations as a 
tool to resolve conflicts over honor during the war.  Resignations allowed gentlemen to walk 
away honorably from a situation that challenged their reputation.  Revolutionaries in the army 
and Congress used resignation to signal a protest or to escape the hardships of service.  The 
culture of honor shaped a revolutionary’s decision-making process, and historians should 
recognize that resignations were a socially sanctioned practice.  The winter of 1777/78 exposed 
anew the deep ideological divide between radical and conservative revolutionaries’ visions for an 
independent United States and the best methods for winning the war.  Radicals resented patriots 
who resigned for pecuniary reasons, and that was why they disliked the half-pay pension 
measure.  They believed patriotism and a willingness to sacrifice all provided Americans with a 
unique passion that made them capable of defeating the British army.  Conservatives would have 
preferred that patriotism win the day, but they also accepted the fact that military officers wanted 
public recognition and the promise of future financial stability in return for their service in the 
army.  The code of honor provided guidelines for a revolutionary’s conduct during these 
turbulent times, and a gentleman had three tools at his disposal to deal with affronts to his 
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character: mediation; resignation; and affairs of honor.  When mediation and resignation failed to 
resolve an issue, some revolutionaries turned to affairs of honor to preserve their reputations.   
 112 
Chapter 4: 
Are you sir, a gentleman? 
“It is the dignity of America, not the dignity of Congress, we [officers] are fighting to support.  
Treat us justly, reward us for our services, and don’t let our characters suffer from every idle 
report.” 




 In June 1777, frustrated by rumors that certain congressional delegates were slandering 
his name during debate, Muster Master Gunning Bedford sent a note to New Jersey 
Congressman Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant initiating an affair of honor.  Bedford used formulaic 
wording in his text to emphasize the seriousness of his deep resentment of Sergeant’s behavior.  
He stated that Sergeant was guilty of reflecting “illiberally” on his character in a public forum 
“& refusing to give me that satisfaction, which a gentleman is intitled to; without further 
ceremony I beg you will meet me at 6 o'clock on Friday morning at the Center-House, armed 
with a Pair of Pistols.”
280
  Bedford believed that the only way to rehabilitate his reputation and 
prove his honor was to challenge Sergeant to a duel.  Sergeant, however, did not accept 
Bedford’s request for a dawn appointment and instead offered a very different interpretation of 
the culture of honor.  Sergeant believed that congressional privilege protected any words he 
might have spoken concerning Bedford’s character.  The exigencies of a war forced genteel 
Americans to negotiate changing interpretations of the traditional culture of honor.  Were affairs 
of honor a permissible means of gaining satisfaction from an insult to a gentleman’s reputation, 
and what words or actions could be construed as insults on the new national stage?  
 The term affair of honor describes the rituals and negotiations that accompanied a 
challenge to a duel.
281
  Most challenges were resolved before the participants met at dawn, 
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especially during the American Revolution, but every participant knew that death was a potential 
consequence of defending his character.  While most revolutionaries would have agreed that 
“honor was an all-or-nothing proposition,” they disagreed about what constituted an injury to a 
person’s reputation.
282
  The honor culture became subject to new social and political 
considerations.
283
  Peers began negotiating the new codes and, not surprisingly, radical and 
conservative revolutionaries offered conflicting interpretations that revealed the wide gulf 
between officers’ and congressional delegates’ views on the honor code.   
 The negotiation process centered on a new discussion concerning public versus private 
character and raised an important question: did politics have to be personal?  Could 
revolutionaries question the performance of their peers without insulting a gentleman’s 
character?  The traditional interpretation of the culture of honor held that a man’s public 
behavior and private behavior were inseparable and that every action was a demonstration of 
gentility.  Following the complex honor code proved that the elite were the best social and 
political leaders. Thus, adhering to the code conferred legitimacy on them.  As battles were lost 
during the war and patriots resigned, revolutionaries struggled with how to question the decisions 
of individuals without insulting their honor.  Some revolutionaries believed that, instead of 
honorable behavior being the key characteristic by which to measure a gentleman’s status, it 
should be patriotic fervor, competence, or an adherence to the concept of republican virtue.  
Radicals believed that the war offered an opportunity to distance American society from 
aristocratic and corrupt British customs.  Instead, patriots should attempt to live virtuously for 
the new republic.  Honor would be calculated by one’s devotion to a free government, instead of 
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wearing the proper clothing or displaying good manners.  Radical reasoning rankled 
conservatives, who believed that the combination of the culture of honor and elite authority 
would provide stability during a time of tumult and transition.  Conservatives felt that even 
though honor disputes provoked many tensions during the war, the code provided a common 
social language that cut through regional differences and set a communal standard for the future 
leaders of America.  It was expected that the young gentlemen serving in the Continental Army 
would eventually become politicians and civic leaders.   
 Delegates used the guidelines of the honor code as a foundation for the legislative 
structure of the Continental Congress.  The emphasis on committee systems and open-floor 
debate allowed every gentleman’s voice to be heard in order to prevent injured feelings.  
Delegates also hoped to use committees and debate to combat the growth of factions which they 
believed were detrimental to the political system.  In 1774 and 1775, the new national legislature 
brought together different ideological perspectives and congressmen split into radical and 
conservative groupings based on their different views about the importance of the honor code 
and of declaring independence from Great Britain.  Legislators acknowledged the diversity of 
opinions in Philadelphia by instituting and revering congressional privilege.  Legislative 
privilege protected freedom of speech during debates.  Politicians thought that they should be 
allowed to express any opinion during the course of debate and not fear prosecution.
284
  
Congressional privilege was a controversial issue in the eighteenth-century honor culture 
because words could easily damage a gentleman’s reputation.  Politicians wanted the legislative 
floor to be an exception to the code, but many challenges were nevertheless issued because of 
opinions expressed in that public forum.  Supposedly, Congress had sworn its members to 
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secrecy by having delegates promise not to repeat any comments made during open debate.  But 
the pull of colonial gossip and friendship networks proved too strong.  Gentlemen were 
frequently informed when congressmen criticized their actions or decisions, a violation of the 
promise of secrecy and congressional privilege.  This flow of information created many of the 
initial problems in the Schuyler-Gates controversy and was the reason Gunning Bedford issued a 
challenge to Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant for words spoken by the latter in Congress.   
 As congressmen tried to negotiate congressional privilege and the demands of 
reputational politics, the military defended the strict guidelines of genteel honor to prove their 
elite status and bring order to the chaos of military camps.  The difference in interpretation 
between the civil authority and military officials of the stringent requirements of honor created a 
volatile combination.
285
  While some radical revolutionaries were trying to fashion a new 
American culture, most officers clung ever more tightly to the strictures of an honor code 
influenced by their reading of eighteenth-century military manuals.  These manuals implicitly 
encouraged duels as a way for officers to prove their elite status and character.  Officers’ 
conception of the culture of honor inculcated sensitivity over rank and promotion.  
Revolutionaries believed public recognition equated with respectability.  State legislatures 
conferred recognition and respect on civilians by electing them to serve as congressional 
delegates in Philadelphia.  Officers craved national renown, as well.  When officers were denied 
promotions or were notified that their reputations were being disparaged on the congressional 
floor, they grew upset and spoke to their friends about the options available to them to preserve 
their honor.  Communication with friends was a key component of the mediation process, usually 
the first step in resolving an honor dispute.  General Weedon’s letter to George Washington in 
the spring of 1778 highlights how military officers reached out to their friendship networks.  
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Weedon informed Washington that, because he felt he had been dishonored by a congressional 
decision, he had “advised with many friends on the Subject.”
286
  After conferring with them to 
discuss his options, Weedon resigned his commission to protest the injury to his reputation.  
Weedon chose resignation because he had no direct outlet for his anger; there was no specific 
congressional delegate to challenge to a duel.  If, however, an officer did decide that a duel was 
the only appropriate action to preserve his reputation, then an affair of honor began. 
 Duels were a controversial element of the culture of honor and many gentlemen 
disagreed over whether duels were the apotheosis of elite status or a foolhardy ritual that cut 
short too many lives.  Historians have discussed the divergent views of northern and southern 
colonists about the supremacy of the duel in resolving disputes.
287
  But, as Joanne Freeman in 
Affairs of Honor argues, though many gentlemen may have condemned dueling in the abstract, 
when faced with a direct challenge, they participated in the ritual to save their public 
character.
288
  Delegates banned the practice of dueling in the original Articles of War to prevent 
unnecessary casualties.  They knew that the close confines of camp could provoke many petty 
disputes.  A year later, Edward Rutledge of South Carolina proposed altering the Articles of War 
to allow for duels.  He wrote, “I proposed to strike out that Article which prevents the sending of 
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Challenges, and pressed it as a Measure that would tend to make their officers Gentlemen, or at 
least induce them to act as such, whilst in Company with Gentlemen.”
289
  Consistent with 
eighteenth-century mores, Rutledge believed that knowing a duel was the ultimate outcome of 
disparaging a person’s reputation forced men to act more genteelly.   
While dueling was technically illegal in the Continental Army, many junior officers 
engaged in affairs of honor throughout the course of the war.  Small glimpses of officers dueling 
can be gathered from Washington’s General Orders in which he either discussed the courts-
martial convened to punish duelers or reiterated that the Articles of War prohibited dueling.
290
  
Major factors that increased the number of duels were soldiers living in close quarters and 
engaging in heavy drinking.  Lieutenant James McMichael recorded in his diary that “our 
soldiers drank freely of spirituous liquors.  They have chiefly got a disorder, which at camp is 
called the Barrel Fever, which differs in its effects from any other fever—its concomitants are 
black eyes and bloody noses.”
291
  Hard liquor filled soldiers with liquid courage for the 
battlefield as well as for the dueling grounds.  But, many soldiers, after they sobered up, offered 
the proper apologies to end an affair of honor before shots were exchanged.   
The culture of honor stipulated strict guidelines for conducting affairs of honor and 
gentlemen fought duels to prove that they were worthy of their elite status.  Gentlemen believed 
honor was worth their lives.  According to the rules, challenges should never be offered in the 
heat of the moment but instead reflect a calm, rational consideration fueled by resolute 
resentment.  The eighteenth-century code dictated that a gentleman should never want to kill his 
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opponent.  Killing in a duel was not murder but, rather, a rarefied ritual highlighting the social 
superiority of the gentry.
292
  In fact, an army court dropped the charges of dueling against 
Captain Silleron because he had issued his challenge “immediately, as it proceeded from the 
instantaneous Resentment of an incensed Gentleman and was not sent on cool reflection,” which 
the code of honor demanded.  The court-martial was therefore of the “opinion that Captain 
Silleron has not been guilty of a breach of the Article of War which prohibits sending challenges 
and do determine that he does not merit Censure.”
293
  In other words, senior officers believed 
Silleron had not issued a true challenge since he had not followed the proper protocol of an affair 
of honor.  The officers of the court understood the technical details of a formal challenge and 
believed that Silleron had not acted in the proper spirit of a gentleman.  In deciding as they did, 
however, they denied him his genteel status.   
 Though Congress had declared dueling illegal, officers found loopholes by which to 
escape prosecution.  Toleration of the loopholes indicated the army’s willingness to abide by the 
terms of the honor code in spite of legal sanctions.  Washington, as commander-in-chief, tacitly 
encouraged the use of duels by rarely punishing officers for affairs of honor.
294
  Custom dictated 
that duels should be carried out discreetly to avoid the attention of others until the conflict was 
resolved.  Officers were only prosecuted if caught flagrantly violating the Articles of War or if a 
duelist died.  Patrick Henry interceded on behalf of a family friend who had killed his opponent 
in a duel, asking Washington if the junior officer would face prosecution upon returning to the 
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army.  Rather than condemning the duel, Washington replied that, “If Mr White returns to the 
Army I must be under the necessity of taking notice of his unhappy Affair with Mr Greene—I 
cannot say whether the friends of the deceased will appear to prosecute, if they do not, I shall 
have discharged my duty and the thing will pass off.”
295
  Occasionally Washington publicly 
denounced dueling in his general orders, most likely because dueling depleted the officer corps.  
In January 1778, he worried that granting pardons to duelists condoned their behavior and he 
reiterated in official orders that affairs of honor were “directly repugnant to our own Articles of 




Even as Washington proclaimed dueling illegal, several of his aides-de-camp engaged in 
affairs of honor to preserve Washington’s public reputation.  As commander-in-chief, 
Washington presented a façade that adhered to the Articles of War crafted by congressional 
committee, but privately he accepted that challenges were necessary to protect a man’s 
reputation.  Washington’s aides-de-camp and junior officers actually engaged in duels on his 
behalf.  While the aides-de-camp most likely hero-worshipped Washington and were willing to 
sacrifice their lives for him, Washington also represented their opportunity for power and 
prestige.
297
  Their military fortunes were tied to Washington’s success.  If he had been replaced 
as commander-in-chief, they would have lost access to power because Gates already had his 
coterie of officers to whom he gave preference and promotion.  Colonel John Laurens, the son of 
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Henry Laurens, a former president of the Continental Congress, fought a duel with Major 
General Charles Lee over Lee speaking about “General Washington in the grossest and most 
opprobrious terms of personal abuse.”
298
  Brigadier General John Cadwalader also initiated an 
affair of honor with Major General Thomas Conway because of remarks that Conway had made 
about Washington to Gates in a private letter.  Cadwalader shot Conway through the mouth and 
bragged that, although the duel did not end in death, he had “stopped the damned rascal’s lying 
tongue at any rate.”
299
  
The confrontation between Colonel Daniel Morgan and Richard Peters, the secretary of 
the Board of War, discussed earlier, is another example of officers’ loyalty to Washington, their 
commander-in-chief.  To Colonel Morgan, Peters was the symbol of the Conway Cabal and one 
of the sources of the rumors that Congress was attempting to replace Washington with Horatio 
Gates.  After that confrontation with Morgan, Peters, exasperated, fumed that “I don’t see how 
any Man of Feeling or Sentiment can continue in a public Department where every measure is 
looked upon with a jaundiced Eye and of course all Mistakes are magnified into Sins political 
and moral.”
300
  Peters’s complaint reflected a growing problem in Congress because delegates 
who wished to discuss openly why the war was going so poorly, found it difficult to do so 
without stirring up resentment in the military.  Of course, trying to divorce a gentleman’s public 
reputation from his private character was not something every delegate wished to see 
accomplished.   
Proposals to replace the honor code with the principles of republican virtue as the key 
guideline for conduct prompted considerable debate in both Congress and the army.  Should the 
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military be disciplined for challenging congressmen over words spoken in debate?  Did 
congressional privilege create a loophole in the culture of honor under the guise of protecting 
freedom of speech?  Legislators argued that congressional privilege promoted a code of behavior 
that allowed for open discussion.
301
  True gentlemen would not abuse congressional privilege to 
harm their opponents’ reputations, but as always, there was room for interpretation of what 
specifically, constituted an insult to a man’s character.  Gentlemen brought with them to 
Congress and the army their own notions about congressional privilege and the honor code.  The 
premium placed on freedom of debate clashed with the military’s increasing sensitivity over their 
underwhelming wartime performance.  This situation was a recipe for trouble and affairs of 
honor appealed to officers who believed that certain delegates had stretched the boundaries of 
congressional privilege with an aim to harm their reputations.   
When Gunning Bedford wrote his initial challenge to Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant, he 
emphasized that Sergeant had refused to give him the satisfaction “which a gentleman is intitled 
to.”
302
  Sergeant’s response to Bedford’s initial letter seemed calculated to add insult to 
Bedford’s injury because, instead of apologizing, he wrote “I do not recollect mentioning your 
Character or Name on any Occasion unless in Congress in the Course of Business.  For my 
Conduct there, I conceive I am answerable only to that Body & to my Constituents.”
303
  He then 
offered a brief, apologetic statement, saying that “I flatter myself however that no illiberal 
Expressions have escaped me there respecting either You or any other subject.”  By most 
standards, Sergeant’s words would not have been considered a thorough enough apology to end 
the affair of honor.  In fact, it seems that Bedford did not want an apology to end the crisis. 
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Instead, he wanted a duel to prove his honor to all of his opponents in Congress.  Unfortunately, 
the words that actually provoked Bedford’s challenge have not been preserved for the historical 
record.  Bedford, however, had written Washington six months before his problems with 
Sergeant and discussed his unhappiness with his job in the Muster Master Department.  He 
believed that “the Congress, from their little attention to the department, I am convinced, must in 
a great measure be ignorant of the nature & importance of it.”
304
  His complaint about 
congressional inattention was the result of his opinion that “the pay annexed to the office, is by 
no means such as will support the dignity of it, or even the character of a gentleman; & what is 
more mortifying, every Deputy in the Department, receives the same, down to Deputies of 
Deputy; they make no distinction.”
305
  Clearly a conservative gentleman, Bedford wanted a 
promotion to the rank of colonel to enhance his social status and receive a pay raise.  Perhaps a 
debate in Congress over Bedford’s performance in the Muster Master Department or a comment 
questioning his petition for promotion triggered his resentment against Sergeant.
306
 
After receiving Sergeant’s reply, Bedford wrote another letter in even harsher terms to his 
opponent.  Bedford’s letter merits careful examination because it combines the traditional, 
ritualistic language of a challenge to a duel with an expression of the military’s resentment of 
congressional privilege.  He began by reiterating that “[T]he reputation of a gentleman is not to 
be trifled with; you have attempted to injure mine, for which I expect the satisfaction of a man of 
honor.”
307
  He then explained his resentment against Congress and the delegates’ behavior.  He 
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believed that Sergeant’s letter was a “mean & pittiful” evasion and “so far from being an 
extenuation of the insult, the place where the aspertion was made rather heightens it.  I have been 
much abused & illtreated by the arbitrary & ungenerous conduct of that house.”
308
  Bedford 
confessed that he had “long wished to lay my hands on some one particular member, whome I 
could prove had traduced my character; I am at length so happy as to have fixed on one; & could 
only wish he was an object more worthy of resentment.”  Although he focused on deliberately 
insulting Sergeant, Bedford was also attacking the civil authority.  He was clearly looking for an 
opportunity to challenge any delegate to avenge his honor, behavior that bent the rules of the 
honor code.  Sergeant eventually became the target of his anger but, really, Bedford was already 
predisposed to dislike Congress because of his dissatisfaction in the Muster Master Department.  
He ended his letter by insisting:  
I am by no means satisfied, Sir, with your answer.  I will accept of no excuse whatever, & 
shall expect no further trouble in the matter.  If you refuse to make me the satisfaction I 
ask, or to meet me at the place appointed, remember I shall treat you as a scoundrel 
wherever I meet you, & publish you to the world as a person destitute of every spark of 
honor, a poltroon & a coward.
309
   
 
The last paragraph of the letter was meant to impress Sergeant with Bedford’s resolute 
resentment, by demanding that Sergeant acknowledge that this was an affair of honor between 
gentlemen.  The threat of publishing Sergeant as a person devoid of honor was the ultimate insult 
in the eighteenth century.  If he published an account of the disagreement, Bedford would have 
been publicly defending his honor and would have destroyed Sergeant’s reputation.
310
  Sergeant 
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had probably always intended to submit Bedford’s first letter to Congress to ask how to deal with 
the situation because it involved a challenge to the sanctity of congressional privilege.  But, after 
the second letter threatened to charge him publicly with cowardice, he eagerly brought Bedford’s 
letters to the attention of other congressmen.   
 Bedford’s challenge sparked a horrified and explosive reaction among Sergeant’s 
congressional colleagues on June 12, 1777.  Members drafted several resolves to express their 
anger at Bedford’s conduct and that reiterate the importance of congressional privilege.  That 
day, passions grew so heated that Thomas Burke had to propose a motion to prevent Congress 
from voting on any of the resolutions until the next day, to prevent overly harsh action against 
Bedford.
311
  One of the resolves proposed that “the said Gunning Bedford Esqr. be taken into 
Custody of the Door keeper of this Congress, and committed to the Prison in this City, for his 
Contempt and Breach of Priviledge aforesaid, untill the further order of Congress.”
312
  Although 
that proposal was voted down, it reflected congressmen’s hostility toward the officer corps’ 
continual complaints.
313
  Delegates commended Sergeant’s actions for refusing to participate in 
an affair of honor, and offered a resolution that “the said Member, in laying the said Letters 
before Congress, did what his Duty to this House and the State he represents required of him.”
314
  
They voted to denounce publicly Bedford’s behavior, agreeing that “the Letter…contains false, 
and scandalous Imputations against this House, unbecoming the Character of a Person who 
would wish to be considered as a Friend to the Liberties of America.”  Clearly, delegates were 
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incensed that military officers were not recognizing and respecting congressional privilege and 
were challenging the civil authority.  Bedford, for his part, argued that freedom of debate did not 
allow congressmen to question an officer’s reputation and that such behavior was not protected 
by legislative privilege.   
 On June 13, Congress officially resolved to summon Bedford the next day to appear 
before Congress and explain his conduct.
315
  When Bedford arrived, Congress was ready and 
eager to defend its honor.  In this tense atmosphere, Bedford tried to explain his reasons for the 
challenge.  Congressmen then vigorously debated the appropriate disciplinary measures to 
impose on him for his challenge to the civil authority.  The official resolution declared that 
“Bedford has been guilty of a high breach of the privileges of this house, in sending a challenge 
to one of the members of this house, for words spoken by him in this house, in the course of 
debate: Ordered, That Mr. G. Bedford…is expected he will ask pardon of the house, and of the 
member challenged.”
316
  Bedford offered his apologies to Congress and Sergeant, probably still 
furious that he would not receive the traditional satisfaction accorded to gentlemen by the honor 
code.   
The lengthy war for independence created circumstances that encouraged the military to 
develop an understanding of honor that differed markedly from that of Congress.  These 
divergent conceptions of the culture of honor exacerbated the tensions between officers and 
delegates.  Congress had just defended its authority to protect “members from insult for any 
thing by them said or done in Congress, in the exercise of their duty, which is a privilege 
essential to the freedom of debate, and to the faithful discharge of the great trust reposed in them 
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by their constituents.”  But, the matter was not settled, and shortly after the end of the Bedford-
Sergeant affair, a new dispute broke out between another military officer and a congressman. 
 In the fall of 1777, Thomas Burke expressed his doubts in Congress about Major General 
John Sullivan’s ability to lead troops, doubts that sprang from Burke’s having witnessed him in 
action at the battle of Brandywine.
317
  Burke’s comments started a three-year affair of honor 
between him and Sullivan.  Sullivan adhered to the traditional culture of honor and believed that 
the code provided guidelines and stability for the officer corps.  His adherence to the traditional 
guidelines got him into trouble several times, first while he served first as a major general in the 
Continental Army and then as a congressman from New Hampshire.  As he once told 
Washington, “I am by no means an Enemy to Duels & most Sincerely wish that Congress had 
Incouraged Instead of prohibiting them.”
318
  His belief in using affairs of honor to resolve 
disputes actually caused him trouble early in his career because he ignored or was ignorant of the 
rules that dictated who was a proper opponent to challenge to a duel.  At the start of his military 
service he had “agreed to meet an officer of Inferiour Rank at a Time & place he was pleased to 
appoint for doing what he upon the Spot Acknowledged was Strictly my Duty for this I was 
Blamed by officers of my own Rank.”
319
  Senior officers chastised Sullivan because they 
worried that his behavior established “a precedent in our Army unknown in others & which 
would Effectually destroy all Distinction of Rank & Superiority in Commission.”
320
  The senior 
officers were not worried that his conduct violated the Articles of War; instead, they were 
concerned that his conduct ignored the rules of the honor code.  Affairs of honor were reserved 
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for gentlemen of equal rank to prove their elite status, and junior officers needed to earn the 
privilege and a promotion to participate.  Sullivan discussed this particular story with 
Washington to explain why he needed Washington’s approval in his dispute with a staff 
surgeon.
321
  Sullivan wanted Washington to validate his actions, as proof that he had acted 
honorably and within the guidelines of the military, because he could not challenge the irksome 
doctor, his social inferior.
322
  Sullivan’s sensitivity to slights against his character was shaped by 
his belief that his decisions and actions as a major general were inextricably linked to his public 
reputation.  His temper, then, exploded when he began to receive reports from his friends in 
Congress that Burke was publicly questioning his military ability.   
 Burke argued that Sullivan’s tactical mistakes during the battle had “snatched from my 
Hopes the Glory of a Compleat Victory which was certainly in our Power if Sullivan had not by 
his Folly and misconduct ruined the Fortune of the Day.”
323
  Burke witnessed Sullivan’s troops 
being outflanked and overrun by the enemy.  He attributed Sullivan’s “[M]iscarriages” to a “total 
want of Military Genius, and to One of that sort of understandings which is unable to take a full 
comprehensive view of an object, but employs it's Activity in Subtle Senseless refinement.”
324
  
After criticizing Sullivan’s military performance, Burke proposed a formal resolution recalling 
Sullivan “from the army, until the enquiry, heretofore ordered into his conduct, shall be duly 
made.”
325
  Burke’s proposal was drastic because it would order the recall of a major general 
during the fight to save Philadelphia.  Although Burke was frustrated with Sullivan’s leadership 
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at Brandywine, delegates decided that the formal military inquiry would investigate his decisions 
at the Battle of Staten Island in August 1776.
326
  Delegates may have believed that Brandywine 
was too recent and confusing to discuss rationally.  They also may have wanted to establish a 
record of Sullivan’s incompetence before dismissing him from military service.
327
  Many 
delegates and military officers believed that Burke was guilty of character assassination because 
he leveled serious charges against Sullivan’s reputation without proof from an inquiry.  Because 
delegates were unsure about the validity of Burke’s accusations, they agreed to Washington’s 
request that Sullivan’s recall be left to his discretion and judgment.
328
  Sullivan pushed for an 
inquiry at the earliest possible date to clear his reputation.  He also threatened to resign, in order 
to announce publicly his frustration and unhappiness with Congress.   
 News spread quickly of Sullivan’s struggle to protect his reputation.  He wrote letters to 
friends, asking for their support in his battle against Congress.  Other frustrated officers willingly 
pledged to support him because they were also dissatisfied with Congress’s treatment of the 
military.  As Major William Willcocks promised, “I had determined, so far as my influence, and 
knowledge of the facts enabled me, to rescue your reputation, from the undeserved calumny 
thrown upon it by the captious and ungenerous multitude.”
329
  To fight Burke’s accusations, 
Sullivan collected letters that testified to his gentlemanly character and military ability.  He 
sought to save his reputation with the dedication of a lawyer (which was his occupation before 
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the war), compiling a legal brief for court.  In a lengthy public letter to John Hancock, president 
of the Continental Congress, Sullivan explained his military decisions at both Brandywine and 
Staten Island.  In the letter, his frustration and resentment are palpable as he struggled to 
acknowledge the civil authority’s right to investigate the military while still protecting his honor 
from what he considered unwarranted slander.  He warned Hancock and other delegates that, “if 
the Reputation of General officers is thus to be sported with upon Every vague & Idle Report 
Those who set Less by their Reputation than myself must Continue in the Service.”
330
  He 
portrayed Burke as a troublemaker, who “Don Quixot Like pranced at a Distance from the fight 
& felt as Little of the Severity of the Engagement as he knows about the Disposition of our 
Troops or that of the Enemy.”
331
  By linking Burke to Don Quixote, Sullivan suggested that 
Congress was currently acting upon the words of a delusional delegate who was unable to 
comprehend the reality of war and the imperatives of honor.   
After finishing the public letter to Congress, Sullivan also wrote to John Adams, begging 
him to make sure that his letter was, indeed, read aloud to all the delegates.  Sullivan relied on 
his friendship network in Congress to keep him informed and to help him in his fight against 
Burke’s accusations.  Sullivan asked Adams to “call upon Congress to do me justice, and restore 
me that reputation which they have in some degree deprived me of.”
332
  Sullivan was so resentful 
that he threatened that, if he failed to redeem his character at the inquiry, he would “quit the 
service, and employ my tongue, my pen, and every other engine that may be found necessary, to 
save my reputation.”
333
  He even warned Adams that other officers were frustrated with recent 
congressional policies and actions because they worried that their reputations, too, could be 
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damaged without proof.  Sullivan and his fellow officers believed that congressmen were 
violating the culture of honor and that there should be consequences for these offenses.  Sullivan 
ended with a personal appeal: “I know that, as a friend, you will make the proper allowances for 
my feelings.  I rely upon your exertions to bring Congress to do justice to your much injured 
friend and humble servant.”
334
  Sullivan’s letter is an example of a gentleman asking a friend to 
engage in mediation on his behalf.  The mediator could help resolve an affair of honor before a 
challenge to a duel became the only outcome of the dispute.  Sullivan most likely knew that 
Gunning Bedford had been severely chastised only a few months before for challenging Jonathan 
Dickinson Sergeant and that therefore a duel was not an option in September 1777.  He could 
only fight Burke with words and the support of his friends in Congress.    
Sullivan’s military inquiry was held on October 10, 1777, several days after the battle of 
Germantown.  After two days of testimony, the court acquitted Sullivan “of any unsoldier like 
Conduct in the expedition to Staten Island”.
335
  After the military court cleared his reputation, 
Sullivan’s friends in Congress also denied Burke’s charges of incompetence.  Elbridge Gerry 
then encouraged Sullivan to retract his threat of resignation.  Gerry, a supporter of congressional 
privilege and a more ideologically radical delegate, disliked the military’s reliance on resignation 
as a form of protest.  He valued republican virtue over honor as a measure of a gentleman’s 
status, and equated resigning with cowardice.  He wrote to Sullivan that he would “prove a 
Coward” if he “sank under unjust reproach” and submitted “to the servile humiliating Terms of 
your Cruel foes, who have Attacked you with the poisonous darts of Calumny in order to effect 
the very purpose of your quitting the Army which in the close of your letter you tamely yield to 
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  Gerry and Sullivan possessed two different understandings of the culture of honor, but 
they both acknowledged the importance of public reputation.  They disagreed, though, on how 
men earned and protected their reputations.   
On October 12, the same day the military court acquitted Sullivan, Burke wrote to him to 
explain why he believed Sullivan was an incompetent officer.  In his letter, Burke tried to 
divorce the personal from the professional.  He argued that his critique of Sullivan was not a 
character assassination but a rational and logical attempt to weed out bad generals to help the war 
effort.  Burke considered “it as one Essential part of my duty to Attend to the Appointments of 
the Army, and where I perceive that any person so unqualified as I deem you to be has got into a 
Command, where Incompetence may be productive of disasters and disgrace, it is my duty to 
Endeavour at removing him.”
337
  In language guaranteed to infuriate an already sensitive military 
officer, Burke reiterated that he had not attacked Sullivan’s personal courage because “I had no 
knowledge of it, and I was Cautious to Say nothing unjust or unnecessary.”
338
  He insisted that 
his primary objection to Sullivan was his “want of Sufficient Tallents, and I consider it as your 
misfortune, not fault.  It is my Duty, as far as I can, to prevent its being the Misfortune of my 
Country.”
339
  Burke concluded by warning Sullivan that he had not appreciated his words about 
Burke’s behavior at Brandywine.  He felt Sullivan’s Don Quixote comparison had attacked his 
private character and made insinuations about his honor.
340
  He further asserted that “the manner 
of those Expressions which I suppose you meant for Wit and Sarcasm are as unbecoming the 
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Soldier as the Gentleman, and Inconsistent with that plain and dignified Simplicity which ought 
to be the Stile of persons in either rank.”
341
  With Sullivan offended and Burke resentful of his 
words, their lengthy affair of honor began.
342
  Even though Burke believed that a man’s personal 
and public characters should be kept separate, he was unable to practice his own advice.   
Sullivan never accepted the notion of the sanctity of congressional privilege because it 
violated his understanding of the culture of honor.  As a military officer and social conservative, 
he believed that there should be no distinction between one’s private and public reputations.  As 
he complained to Alexander McDougall, another major general in the Continental Army,  
I am not Clearly convinced that a member of Congress has a right to 
Take…Liberties…with the Character of an officer and I think I can never be brought to 
believe that he can have a Privilidge of writing to any Gentleman Accusing him of want 
of Capacity & Every thing that would make him contemptible in the Eyes of the World & 
the other be Barred from replying with Spirit because his Accuser was a member of 





Sullivan rejected the delegates’ claims that congressional privilege was necessary to protect their 
freedom of debate, arguing that they were abusing the system deliberately to attack the honor of 
military officers.  After the Bedford affair, Sullivan knew that he could not directly challenge 
Burke to a duel, but he did not hesitate to say that, when the war was over or when he was no 
longer an officer, he would be glad to meet him on the field of honor.
344
  In his response to 
Burke’s letter, Sullivan deliberately insulted him by claiming “as to your opinion of my Military 
abilities, it can give me no uneasiness untill you give me better evidence of your Capacity to 
judge in matters of this nature.”  As Sullivan had warned his friend, he would gladly exchange 
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acrimony for acrimony with Burke.
 345
    
 In April 1778, Sullivan attacked Burke’s personal character again, this time by 
emphasizing that he was not a gentleman of “[C]andor Honor or veracity.”
346
  This was a direct 
insult, calculated to fuel the fires of their mutual resentment.  He ended his letter ominously, 
hoping “that Some Fortunate Event may bring us within Reach of Each other when I Shall Take 
Those measures which appear to me most proper for the person who has so maliciously 
Endeavoured to injure the Reputation of Sir your most obedient servant.”
347
  When Burke finally 
responded to Sullivan’s provocative letter in the early fall of 1780, he detailed how long they had 
been taunting each other with insults and pledged to end the resentment with a dawn 
appointment.  Burke, true to form, could not resist taunting Sullivan with even more pointed 
commentary about their respective levels of gentlemanly conduct: “I hope you will perceive that, 
if I exceed you in nothing else, I do in temper and the manners of a Gentleman.”
348
  He 
concluded by taunting Sullivan that he understood that “the Idea of your own Eminence is very 
pleasing to you; I wish not to deprive you of it.  Enjoy it, Sir with my hearty good will.”
349
  
Then, as coincidence and state legislatures would have it, Burke and Sullivan were 
elected to serve in the Continental Congress at the same time in late 1780 and early 1781, 
respectively.  After meeting in the chamber, they appointed seconds to negotiate the details of 
their affair of honor, taking a further step closer to exchanging fire.  Hugh Shiell acted as 
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Burke’s second and Alexander McDougall served as Sullivan’s second.
350
  Burke and Sullivan 
asked their close friends to serve as seconds to keep the affair of honor a secret because dueling 
was illegal.  According to the code duello, seconds acted as mediators and tried to negotiate an 
apology to end the dispute between the two angered parties.  If affairs of honor reached the 
dueling ground, then mediation had failed, usually because one participant was determined to 
fight to prove his honor or because the insult was so severe that not even an apology would 




Sullivan and Burke left all matters of mediating their affair in the hands of their seconds.  
The only hint of these negotiations is a single letter from Burke to Shiell, in which he discussed 
why he was angry with Sullivan and explained on what terms Sullivan must apologize to prevent 
the duel.  Burke insisted that “[T]o prevent, also, all pretence for refinements in future, I will 
here state the Questions which alone I will agree to submit.  Was my Conduct as a member of 
Congress sufficient provocation for the affront given by General Sullivan in his letter to 
Congress” and “[W]ere any Asperities in my letters sufficient to Justify the reproachful language 
in General Sullivan's answers?”
352
  Fortunately, the mediators successfully negotiated apologies 
that were acceptable to both participants, which precluded a dawn appointment.
353
  
Burke’s and Sullivan’s three-year dispute yielded to mediation, but the protracted length 
of their affair of honor reveals the difficulties that revolutionaries faced in defining public and 
private characters.  Did politicians have the right to declare the privilege of congressional speech 
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when they criticized the efforts of patriotic gentlemen in uniform?  Burke, who clearly prized 
freedom of debate, could not forgive Sullivan for his rude comments in public letters and that 
was why he agreed to meet Sullivan to defend his reputation with pistols.  The importance of 
public reputation drove many of the seemingly irrational decisions of military and civil 
authorities during the war.
354
  The culture of honor constrained the ability of revolutionaries to 
question incompetent officers and politicians because every critique ultimately devolved into a 
matter of character.
355
   
 Still another clash between an officer and a congressman began with a loud altercation in 
a coffee house between Brigadier General William Thompson and Representative Thomas 
McKean.  Their affair of honor highlights again the importance of congressional privilege, but 
also addresses the question of whether there could be a distinction between a public and a private 
quarrel.  One evening in November 1778, Thompson deliberately set out to find McKean, intent 
on confronting him about recent developments concerning prisoner exchange.  Thompson’s and 
McKean’s verbal exchange has been preserved in the historical record because delegates 
investigated, for over a month, the words shouted during the altercation.  Members of Congress 
wanted to know if Thompson had deliberately insulted their honor and challenged congressional 
privilege when he yelled at McKean in the public sphere.  Congress interviewed seventeen 
witnesses to try and reconcile Thompson’s and McKean’s different memories about what each 
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  Witnesses’ memories and testimony were, of course, heavily influenced by 
their friendships with the men involved.   
Brigadier General William Thompson stormed into the coffeehouse intent on picking a 
fight with McKean if for no other reason than that they had a history of conflict.  Thompson 
resented McKean for two reasons: he had once publicly accused Thompson of harboring a 
deserter from the army (the Carlisle Affair) and McKean had prevented Thompson’s exchange as 
a prisoner of war in September 1778.
357
  On November 18, Thompson had just received word 
that the British army had revoked all Continental Army officers’ parole and the officers had to 
return to New York City.  Upon hearing the news, Thompson blamed McKean for his continued 
prisoner of war status and he began a search for him at coffeehouses popular with congressional 
delegates.   
Parole in the eighteenth century was a military convention that explicitly relied on the 
honor code to govern the behavior of prisoners of war.
358
  Parole was only available to officers 
and its terms were premised on the assumption that gentlemen should not be forced to endure the 
same prison conditions as common soldiers.
359
  Officers lodged with local families or in 
boarding houses and received liberty to walk around and visit with one another.
360
  Thompson, 
as a brigadier general, had been allowed to return to his family in Pennsylvania after he swore an 
oath that he would not fight until he had been exchanged and granted his freedom.
361
  To break 
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The issue of prisoner exchange was difficult because Washington and Congress had 
different ideas about how to negotiate with the British.  Washington insistently called for 
establishing exchange guidelines, but Congress was more reluctant to engage until the British 
recognized the independence of the United States.
363
  Washington also wanted to regain 
commanders, such as Thompson, who had been on parole for over two years after surrendering 
in the field during the retreat from Canada in the summer of 1776.
364
  Congress, however, 
appreciated receiving British specie for the upkeep of British prisoners of war and was reluctant 
to lose this source of reliable revenue.
365
  While Congress’s reluctance to move forward on 
prisoner exchange seemed callous to Washington, who wanted to liberate all American prisoners 
of war, the hard reality that many delegates understood was that, when American soldiers were 
exchanged, most went home rather than returning to duty.  Many American soldiers were 
physically incapacitated after living on British prison ships and refused to re-enlist if their 
original terms of enlistment had expired.  In contrast, British soldiers released by the United 
States returned to the field because they served lengthy enlistments.
366
  
In September 1778, Thompson had hoped that he would be exchanged for Benjamin 
Franklin’s estranged son the royal governor of New Jersey, but McKean and several other 
congressmen blocked that proposal and, instead reclaimed John McKinly, president of Delaware, 
from British custody.
367
  Thompson wanted to be exchanged for several reasons: he wished to be 
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able to command troops again; he wanted to receive pay because, as a paroled officer, it was 
difficult for him to receive his salary; and he had been passed over for promotion while a 
prisoner of war and he wanted the higher rank to which he felt entitled.
368
  After receiving the 
news that he would have to return to New York City, Thompson decided to vent his frustration 
on a specific target, perhaps with the aim of provoking a duel. 
 The investigation started on November 19, 1778, after McKean submitted to Congress a 
memorial that described Thompson’s behavior the previous night in the crowded coffeehouse.  
He stated that Thompson’s behavior was “a breach of Privilege, to have a tendency to destroy the 
freedom of voting in Congress, and to be a gross insult upon this Honourable Body from one of 
their officers, and that in so public a place, thinks it his duty as a Member to communicate it to 
Congress.”
369
  In his lengthy memorial, McKean repeatedly stressed that throughout the 
confrontation, Thompson spoke in a loud tone and seemed visibly upset.  In contrast, McKean 
asserted he had conducted himself in a calm and civil manner.  According to McKean, his own 
behavior served as a model of gentility, while Thompson exhibited all the traits of an uncouth 
military officer who derided congressional authority.  McKean also reported that Thompson had 
in a loud and “imperious tone further said, that the Congress were a parcel of damned Rascals, 
and that he Mr. McKean was so in particular, which he repeated twice,” a key statement that 
McKean knew would upset the delegates.
370
  That sort of language was a harsh insult in the 
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eighteenth century because it implied that an individual lacked honor and that his conduct was 
not governed by any moral restraints.
371
   
Thompson then escalated the drama of that night by asking McKean “if he was a 
Gentleman, which Mr. McKean considered to be intended for a challenge, and he then came up 
to him in an angry manner and touching his shoulder repeated the question.”
372
  McKean’s 
response to this unmistakable invitation to a duel displayed his belief that Thompson was 
violating congressional privilege: “Mr. McKean told him, that he did not think him a gentleman, 
that he was his inferior, and behaved like a Bully and a Brute, and that he should make him 
repent of his conduct.”
373
  Professing to be horrified by Thompson’s behavior, McKean 
announced in Congress his intention to make him repent.  Other delegates were also appalled, 
which was the reason a month-long congressional investigation to determine exactly what 
Thompson had said that night.  Had a military officer directly impugned the honor of Congress 
in front of the people out of doors?   
In a memorial that served as a direct rebuttal to McKean’s testimony, Thompson declared 
that he had not meant to insult congressional honor.  He insisted his altercation with McKean 
was a private quarrel and bluntly stated, “as to the Charge of calling the Honorable Mr. McKean 
a Rascal and a villain your memorialist readily acknowledges it.”
374
  Congress did not appreciate 
Thompson’s distinction between a private and public quarrel, especially because the dispute 
involved a general and a congressman.   
The delegates’ investigation into the Thompson-McKean altercation highlights the 
importance of words to the eighteenth-century revolutionaries.  Their primary concern was a 
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determination of whether Thompson had publicly disparaged Congress during the heated 
exchange.  McKean insisted that Thompson had either said there was a damned set of Rascals in 
Congress or that Congress was a damned set of Rascals, two phrases that meant very different 
things to irate congressmen.  The first phrase cast aspersions on the honor of the delegates 
currently serving in Congress by directly stating that there were rascals in Congress. The 
meaning of a phrase could turn on a preposition for gentlemen sensitive to nuance.
375
  If 
Thompson had uttered the first phrase, then he would have been the third general in two years 
who had directly challenged the authority of Congress.  Also, delegates were keenly aware of all 
the grumbling about Congress that was common in the army’s camps and in the personal letters 
of its officers.  The second phrase was acceptable as a common, if crude, complaint about 
government and politicians.  Though delegates may have resented the implication that Congress 
was a damned set of rascals, the sentiment would not have directly challenged their collective 
and individual honor.   
 On November 23, members of Congress questioned thirteen witnesses about the dispute 
between Thompson and McKean.  The witnesses can be split into three groups: friends of 
Thompson; friends of McKean; and casual acquaintances who had witnessed what had almost 
been a brawl.  All witnesses were first asked to testify if they had heard “any expressions 
reflecting upon Congress?”
376
  The majority of witnesses declared that they had never heard 
Thompson mention Congress and that his heated words were only directed at challenging 
McKean’s honor.  Many witnesses concurred with Thompson’s description of the event, which 
emphasized that his insults were designed for a private quarrel with McKean.  But McKean, like 
Burke and Sergeant, believed that words spoken in debate could not be used to initiate an affair 
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of honor.  Military officers were stymied by this creation of a loophole in the code of honor, 
which challenged their understanding of genteel conduct and led to much resentment.   
 The witnesses were divided in their testimony between Thompson’s friends, who 
emphasized the private quarrel aspect, and McKean’s friends, who heard Thompson say that he 
had been “treated in a rascally manner by Congress.”
377
  Almost all witnesses agreed that it was 
hard to recall the specifics of the argument because it had escalated so rapidly.  Colonel Joseph 
Deane, in describing the coffeehouse confrontation, recalled how “the House was in Confusion.  
I thought the gentlemen would come to blows.  Upon which I went up and stept in between them, 
Many words passed, but cannot particularly recollect them, my attention was taken up to prevent 
their getting together.”
378
  Other witnesses tried to avoid repeating the language used by both 
gentlemen since it was heated and did not reflect well on either Thompson’s or McKean’s 
gentility and dignity.  One witness recalled how “I heard him [Thompson] say several times to 
Mr. MK. you are no gentleman and touching him on the shoulder ask him are you a gentleman.  
Mr MK said not in the sense you mean.  I will make your heart ake for this.  Genl. T. said, I will 
make your bones ake for this.”
379
  The witness then described the heated words relating to the 
issuance of a summons about the Carlisle Affair: “Gen T[hompson] told Mr MKean he had used 
him ill, he had sent A summons for him.  Mr MK said it was not a summons.  Gen. T. said it 
was.  Mr MK said it was not.  G T. said it was.  Mr MK said, well produce it.  G T. said I have 
not got it.  M MK said, What have you done with it.  Gen T. said I wiped my arse with it.”
380
  
The witnesses’ testimony shows that McKean was not as calm as he had claimed to have been in 
his memorial to Congress.   
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After all eyewitnesses had presented their testimony on November 23, Thompson gave a 
speech in which he described his service in the Continental Army and his frustration over not 
being exchanged.  He ended his speech by reiterating that his confrontation with McKean was 
personal, not political.  That night, he said, “his patience” had “deserted him and under those 
circumstances he is sensible he expressed himself with some asperity against that gentleman.”
381
  
Thompson then promised that, “whatever his expressions might be or however they might strike 
others, he solemnly declares he never meant to abuse or reflect upon the honourable Congress or 
any of its Members; And is heartily sorry that under any circumstances any expressions could be 
extorted from him which could be construed to give this house offence.”
382
  What Thompson 
failed to understand and acknowledge in his speech was that delegates were worried about any 
challenge that was even vaguely connected to words spoken in the congressional chamber.  
Private quarrels would not be tolerated, whether the disputes pertained to prisoner exchanges or 
to decisions made by Congress.   
On December 7 and December 23, four more witnesses testified, an indication of just 
how zealous the delegates were in trying to determine what words were spoken at the 
coffeehouse.  After a day of debate, Congress accepted Thompson’s apology but found him 
guilty of a breach of privilege.  In this ruling, they sided with Thompson’s version of the story, in 
which he stipulated that he had never cast aspersions on congressional honor, but they publicly 
denounced his interpretation of the culture of honor.  He was not allowed to challenge a 
congressman for his actions in deciding prisoner exchanges.  Thompson accepted his public 
rebuke from Congress, though he could not forget McKean’s role in his public chastisement.  
Thompson still believed that his dispute with McKean was a private quarrel and that belief and 
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the fact that he had received no satisfaction or apology from McKean; prompted him to publish 
an account of his affair of honor in a Pennsylvania newspaper, the Packet.
383
  There he asserted 
that, “Chief Justice McKean has, in an affair which does not relate to his conduct in Congress, 
and which is of a private nature, behaved like a lyar, a rascal, and a coward.”
384
  McKean then 
brought a suit for libel against Thompson and the newspaper editor of the Packet and won 
damages in the spring of 1781.
385
    
 The war for independence complicated the revolutionaries’ understanding of the culture 
of honor and the importance of protecting their reputations.  Affairs of honor were technically 
illegal in the Continental Army, though officers routinely used challenges to highlight their 
social standing and assert their claims to gentility.  The code taught gentlemen to be sensitive to 
any hint of an insult and this hypersensitivity occasionally made it difficult for congressmen to 
ask why things were going wrong or who was at fault.  Promotions and pensions were also 
linked to honor and calling into question a person’s decision could result in a challenge even 
when no insult had been intended.  Nevertheless, revolutionaries used the code duello to provide 
strict guidelines to determine when it was appropriate to initiate an affair of honor.  That 
punctilious regard for propriety was intended to ensure that the form of punishment was 
commensurate to the offense.  While liquor consumption probably fueled a number of 
challenges, mediation was built into the structure of a duel and the seconds could usually get the 
duelists to offer and accept apologies.   
 All politicians appreciated that the purpose of congressional privilege was to provide for 
freedom of debate, but some radicals and conservatives disagreed over how far that freedom’s 
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permissible boundaries stretched.  Most Continental Army officers adhered to a traditional 
interpretation of the culture of honor and senior officers often clashed with delegates over the 
limits of free speech, when character and reputation where at stake.  Whenever, a general 
attempted to initiate an affair of honor with a congressman, he was quickly shown the might of 
civil authority in the form of public censure for his conduct.  For all the fear of a standing army 
espoused in 1775, delegates proved in 1777 and 1778 that they controlled the military, and many 
officers grudgingly accepted the civil authority’s power.  No pistols at dawn were needed to 
prove Congress’s control over the Continental Army.    
 145 
CONCLUSION: 
The Newburgh Conspiracy 
 
“And you will, by the dignity of your Conduct, afford occasion of Posterity to say, when 
speaking of the glorious example you have exhibited to Mankind, ‘had this day been wanting, 
the World had never seen the last stage of perfection to which human nature is capable of 
attaining.” 




Faced with a mutinous officer corps in early March 1783, Washington drafted a strongly 
worded speech, intending to nip the incipient rebellion in the bud.  He warned his officers that 
pamphlets were being circulated in their quarters at Newburgh, New York, “addressed more to 
the feelings and passions, than to the reason and judgment of the Army.”
387
  In the late winter, 
officers had begun to grow concerned that they would not get paid after the army disbanded, and 
so they had begun to discuss different strategies to pressure Congress into paying their 
postbellum pensions.   
Historians have argued that a small minority of congressional delegates actively 
encouraged the officers to begin grumbling about the inefficiency of the Continental Congress.  
These delegates hoped that rumors of a military coup would induce reluctant states, such as 
Rhode Island, into giving Congress more power and money through the granting of an impost 
duty.
388
  The delegates who advocated a strong national government, such as Robert Morris and 
Alexander Hamilton, issued dire warnings to their friends in the officer corps, hinting that 
Congress was planning to renege on the vote that had granted half-pay pensions for life in 
1780.
389
  Hamilton and Morris wanted their military friends to declare loudly their unhappiness 
with Congress and start a public discussion of drastic measures to scare other delegates into 
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agreeing with the nationalists.  This complicated strategy failed in the end, though it did have the 
benefit of gaining officers a commutation of their half-pay pensions into a one-time payment 
equal to the amount of their salary for five years.   
 When Washington strode into the Temple of Virtue, he faced an officer corps, some 
members of which seriously contemplated overthrowing the authority of the national 
legislature.
390
  Washington knew that all of the officers present had read the Newburgh Address, 
an anonymous pamphlet, and he wrote a speech to refute the pamphleteer’s logic.  Major John 
Armstrong Jr., Horatio Gates’s aide-de-camp, wrote the Newburgh Address to urge the army to 
take decisive action against civilian ingratitude.
391
  He proposed two ideas to force Congress into 
paying the pensions: “If War continues, remove into the unsettled country…and leave an 
ungrateful Country to defend itself,” or, “If Peace takes place, never sheath your Swords Says 
he[Armstrong] until you have obtained full and ample justice.”
392
  In his speech, Washington 
mentioned the polite fiction that the Address must have been written by the enemy, “some 
Emissary, perhaps from New York.”
393
  Washington’s speech at Newburgh provided a summary 
of his interpretation of the culture of honor and the meaning of the American Revolution.   
He began by warning the officers “that the Address is drawn with great Art, and is 
designed to answer the most insidious purposes.”  The author’s purpose was “calculated to 
impress the Mind, with an idea of premeditated injustice in the Sovereign power of the United 
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States, and to rouse all those resentments which must unavoidably flow from such a belief.”  In 
his speech, Washington pledged to act as a third-party mediator to resolve the issues between the 
angry officers and Congress.  He shamed the officers into acting like gentlemen, by recalling his 
own sacrifices for the war effort.  He declared, 
If my conduct heretofore, has not evinced to you, that I have been a faithful friend 
to the Army, my declaration of it at this moment would be equally unavailing and 
improper.  But, as I was among the first, who embarked in the cause of our common 
Country; as I have never left your side one moment, but when called from you on public 
duty; as I have been the constant companion and witness of your Distresses, and not 
among the last to feel, and acknowledge your Merits; as I have ever considered my own 
Military reputation as inseperably connected with that of the Army; as my Heart has ever 
expanded with joy, when I have heard its praises, and my indignation has arisen, when 
the mouth of detraction has been opened against it; it can scarcely be supposed, at this 





He counseled patience, arguing that Congress was subject, “like all other large Bodies, where 
there is a variety of different Interests to reconcile,” to slow and lengthy deliberations.
395
  
Washington, as a former delegate to the Continental Congress, knew how the committee system 
could hold up legislation.  He warned that to listen to the Newburgh Address’s suggestions 
would “tarnish the reputation of an Army which is celebrated thro’ all Europe, for its fortitude 
and patriotism.”
396
  Washington deliberately emphasized the loss of public reputation to prevent 
the officers from following through on their resentment.  If the officers mutinied in March 1783, 
Washington worried that their actions would also destroy not only the army’s reputation but his 
own, as well.   
He ended his speech by using the language of the honor code to shame the officers into 
rejecting the Newburgh Address and the idea of a coup d’état.  He reiterated his pledge to act as 
a mediator between the army and Congress and encouraged the officers to place their “full 
                                                 
394
 Ibid., 10:171. 
395
 Ibid., 10:173. 
396
 Ibid., 10:173.  
 148 
confidence in the purity of the intentions of Congress; that previous to your dissolution as an 
Army they will cause all your Accounts to be fairly liquidated.”
397
  He then asked the officers as 
gentlemen,  
in the name of our common Country, as you value your own sacred honor, as you respect 
the rights of humanity, and as you regard the Military and National character of America, 
to express your utmost horror and detestation of the Man who wishes…to overturn the 
liberties of our Country, and who wickedly attempts to open the flood Gates of Civil 




 This strongly worded statement exposed Washington’s barely concealed anger at the proposed 
mutiny.  His words also revealed his belief that, by invoking the honor code, he could persuade 
the officers to value their reputation over financial gain.  He promised that if the officers voted 
against the Newburgh Address, they would provide “one more distinguished proof of your 
unexampled patriotism and patient virtue,” to the world.
399
 
Washington’s appeal to the code of honor and his dramatic gesture of putting on 
eyeglasses to read a letter put an end to the Newburgh Conspiracy.
400
  In the spring of 1783, his 
officers accepted his argument and publicly agreed with his interpretation of eighteenth-century 
society and politics, that is, that society and its workings were essentially conservative in 
character.  This meant that honor would still influence how political leaders conducted 
themselves in the public sphere and that the new republic would not be free of all deference.  
Conservatives in 1783 believed that the culture of honor provided the necessary outlets to handle 
the continuing ideological disagreements over the strength and power of the national 
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government.  While radicals had wanted to create a society modeled on ancient Sparta and 
republican Rome, conservatives actively incorporated elements of continuity from the old 
colonial social structure into the new independent society to ensure their retention of political 
power.  The American Revolution exposed many competing theories and philosophies about 
government and society but, in 1783, Washington’s speech showed that conservatives were in 
charge of the national government and the army and that their beliefs would continue to shape 
American society until the constitutional convention.   
The eighteenth-century culture of honor acted as “social glue” that helped revolutionaries 
win the war for independence and facilitated the operations of a continental congress binding 
together thirteen distinct and different colonies.
401
  The ideal of honor created a code of genteel 
behavior that allowed political elites to arrive in Philadelphia and reference a common set of 
behaviors and social norms, which they used to guide debates over establishing an army and 
declaring independence.  Character and reputation mattered to these gentlemen because they 
needed to prove that they possessed the legitimacy to become the leaders of a newly independent 
nation.  Many congressmen wanted a genteel officer corps to help win the war because 
gentlemen officers also adhered to the honor code and were willing to accept the civil authority’s 
supremacy over the Continental Army. 
Through the battles over promotions, pensions, and congressional privilege, 
revolutionaries demonstrated the importance of honor in their everyday lives and decision-
making.  While historians have endlessly debated the influence of the Enlightenment on the 
patriots’ political philosophy and system of government, they have not always paid attention to 
how the participants described their own actions and motivations.  Not every revolutionary 
believed in the importance of the honor culture, but they had to acknowledge that the code 
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influenced their peers’ behavior.  Before the advent of organized political parties, gentlemen 
used the culture of honor to channel their ideological disagreements through three different 
means of conflict resolution: mediation; resignation; or affairs of honor.  Third-party mediation 
operated through the extensive friendship networks that existed between the Continental Army 
and the Continental Congress.  These friendship networks suggest that there was never any true 
danger that the army would overthrow the national legislature; many officers and politicians had 
been friends before the war and remained friends after it.  Resignations and affairs of honor 
reveal the inherent problems of a political system in which reputations conferred legitimacy on 
public leaders.  There was accordingly, a heightened sensitivity to any insult, which could have 
led to a breakdown of the system.  Fortunately, however, mediation was built into every part of 
the resignation and dueling process.    
In a period of flux, revolutionaries turned to the honor code to prove their legitimacy to 
the American public.  Politics were based on character and reputation, both of which had to be 
carefully maintained.  These common social assumptions even informed the oath that delegates 
signed at the end of the Declaration of Independence where they mutually pledged “to each other 
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